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FOREWORD

B Y T H E 3 S J B O A R D

The Student Strategy and Security Journal (3SJ) provides a platform to publish on International Relations and any other related disciplines linked to strategy and security. The interdisciplinary dimension adds to the belief that by challenging each other's ideas through thought-provoking, well-researched writing, we are forced to reexamine our biases leading to new perspectives and understandings. Hence, the breadth of the topics within this Journal evidences our desire for ideological inclusivity while still maintaining rigorous standards for scholarship.

To achieve that, we have worked with authors through an extensive and interactive editing process, critically examining the way we look at the world both practically and theoretically. This is especially relevant today during the COVID-19 pandemic, whose next stages are filled with uncertainties. Therefore, we challenge all those reading this Journal and any future contributors to likewise interrogate their own assumptions in the effort to seek improvement in the international realm.

The journal is subdivided into six thematic sections. Firstly, Salla Lampinen and Ellen Stirling discuss different critical theories and their role in the field of International Relations. Next, Max George, Blair Graham, and Robert Hart highlight significant foreign policy events that are contributing to the current global climate. Then, Alexander Olteanu and Rory McDowell discuss

the contributions of grand strategists and their historical and contemporary significance. Afterwards, Julien Fehlman and Clémence Emeriau explore and challenge approaches in security theories. William Davis follows up with a comparison of military and civilian leadership. Finally, Lauren Bergin portrays Strategy's implications on popular culture and video games.

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CRITICAL IR THEORY

F E M I N I S M & E U R O C E N T R I S M

THE IMPORTANCE OF FEMINIST APPROACHES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SALLA LAMPINEN

ABSTRACT

Global politics are filled with gender inequalities, and in the discipline of International Relations (IR), men and masculinities have disproportionate power both in practice and academia. Feminist IR, which has been flourishing separately but not truly impacting the field as a whole, analyses the discipline from the perspective of the marginalised to contest the power of mainstream IR. Inequalities, which are built into the historical legacy of the international system, are taken into the analysis. The aim is to reveal a better understanding of all forms of violence, therefore informing the discipline about causes and consequences of war that are missing from traditional approaches. Feminist IR has four core tasks: to indicate how the mainstream IR excludes and has bias in terms of its state-centric analysis and positivistic methods; to make women visible as social, economic, and political subjects in international politics; to analyse how gender inequalities are embedded in IR; and to empower women as subjects of knowledge by building theoretical understanding of their lived experiences. Feminist IR offers a view for International Relations that traditional IR fails to see, and it should be considered as a valued part of the practice and discipline.

KEYWORDS: Feminism; International Relations; Critical IR Theory.

EUROCENTRISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EUROCENTRIC BIAS AND FRAMING IN FEMINISM, MARXISM AND POSTCOLONIALISM

ELLEN STIRLING

ABSTRACT

This essay begins by presenting a broad overview of Eurocentrism in the context of international relations (IR) theory. It addresses the difficulty in identifying a comprehensive definition of Eurocentrism and gives examples of where it is present in scholar's interpretations of the international system, including assumptions surrounding the Treaty of Westphalia and Modernisation Theory. The rise of anti-Eurocentric work and the identification of different forms of Eurocentrism has been a crucial step in addressing the epistemological Eurocentric bias present in aspects of IR theory. Theories such as Realism and Liberalism have Eurocentric bias woven into their very foundations, attributed to the structure of the international system at the time of their formation. However, Eurocentric bias can also be identified in a number of contemporary IR theories, including Western Feminism and the capitalist system of Marxism, which are discussed in depth. Finally, this essay examines how Postcolonial theory works to reframe security issues, removing the bias of Eurocentrism that is found in other forms of IR theory.

KEYWORDS: Eurocentrism; International Relations Theory; Marxism; Feminism; Postcolonialism.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FEMINIST APPROACHES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SALLA LAMPINEN

INTRODUCTION

Global politics are filled with gender inequalities: men and masculinities have disproportionate power in the discipline and its practice instead of a full social reality for all. Feminist International Relations analyses the discipline from the perspective of the marginalised, often women, and how these inequalities have affected International Relations (IR), and its practice. Mainstream scholars of IR have been engaging selectively with feminist IR, however, as the dominant position of positivist approaches have been challenged since the 1990s, it has given more space for alternative theoretical angles, such as feminism (Steans, 2003). Feminist approaches of IR have been flourishing separately but without truly impacting the field as a whole (Youngs, 2004). Feminism, together with other 'new' approaches such as post-modernism, constructivism, and critical theory, contest the power of mainstream IR (Aydin, 2016). Its scholars have already published on core issues, such as war, peace, and the protection of the nation-state boundaries, with the aim of promoting a more comprehensive security for the international system (Blanchard, 2003).

The most likely victims of war are marginalised groups, such as women and children (Tickner, 1997). Hence feminism, coming from the perspective of the disempowered, should be clearly taken into consideration in a discipline that focuses on war

and conflict trying to predict, explain and reduce their likelihood and impact (Caprioli, 2004). In this light, feminism is important for the study of international politics as it offers a view on it that traditional IR fails to see.

Firstly, the essay will provide accounts for feminist IR approaches in relation to mainstream IR. Secondly, the importance of women as subjects of knowledge is discussed, following with a discussion of objectivity in both mainstream and feminist IR. Finally, the paper will examine how gender inequalities affect the discipline and how feminist approaches take this into consideration.

FEMINIST APPROACHES TO IR

It is important to define what is meant by both mainstream IR and feminist IR to understand how they relate to each other. Namely, mainstream IR is a compound of theories that rely on empiricism - especially realism - and the rational actor model (Aydin, 2016). These frameworks have profound epistemological and ontological contradictions with feminist understandings, raising unsolved critiques on the latter. According to Steans (2003), in fact, despite their differences, neo-realism and neo-liberalism, the dominant theories, both assume that it is possible to understand the world objectively, and that international relations can be investigated through scientific methods. Feminist theories, on the other hand, are grounded in epistemology that takes social

relations as its central category of analysis (Tickner, 1997). Additionally, most of their practitioners would locate themselves in the postpositivist constructivist tradition (Steans, 2003). Feminist IR often regards positivist scholarship as superficial (Youngs, 2004). Indeed, Steans (2003) notes that neo-realism lacks deep insights about the world order, and that it can potentially be put to the service of conservative political ends. The anarchic world order and state-centric system which realism uses to explain world affairs truly proves to be inadequate in understanding aspects of international relations that feminist approaches could possibly offer by focusing on the human.

There is no single feminist IR theory, but rather many approaches, such as Marxist, radical, standpoint, or existentialist feminism, which are often grounded in sociological traditions that lie outside the discipline of mainstream IR (Tickner, 1997). As an example, standpoint feminism suggests that as women's experiences in life are distinct from men's, most knowledge of the masculine discipline does not reflect their realities (Allen, 2009). Therefore, women can produce different knowledge that holds insights into world politics due to their marginalised perspective. Radical feminism, in turn, seeks fundamental social transformational change rather than equality to the existing system (Hudson, 2005). Liberal feminism, however, is an exception in a way that it does not necessarily aim to challenge the epistemological premise of mainstream IR, since it also sees objectivity as possible, but calls for more attention to the position of women when practising IR (Steans, 2003). This essay concentrates on feminist approaches which denounce the epistemological shallowness in mainstream IR, namely, the possibility of objectivity.

Notwithstanding the different approaches, according to Steans (2003), feminist IR has four core tasks: indicating how mainstream IR excludes and has bias in terms of its state-centric analysis and positivism; making women visible as social, economic, and political subjects in international politics; analysing how gender inequalities are embedded in IR; and empowering women as subjects of knowledge by building theoretical understanding of their lived experiences. These points are discussed next.

IMPORTANCE OF WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVES

Women's perspectives have often been excluded from traditional IR (Tickner, 1997). According to Youngs (2004), due to the top-down logic of mainstream IR, how wars affect children and women (military occupation, militarization, (forced) migration, human trafficking, forms of slavery, prostitution) is often ignored. Inequalities, which decrease an individual's security, cannot be understood by using conventional state-centric tools of analysis (Tickner, 1997). However, feminist approaches can produce useful knowledge on this. One of the ways that the legitimacy of women as 'knowers' has been questioned is through the public and private divide. This divide sees men as the 'knowers' of politics, economics and justice in the public sphere, and women as existing solely in the private sphere, not included in politics (Tickner, 1997). The divide has previously legitimised the ignoring of women in IR and has led to mainstream IR being patriarchal in character (Aydin, 2016). Dichotomies such as the mentioned public/private are gendered, and they permit the excluding of women as subjects of

knowledge (Tickner, 1997). Men are associated with the public, therefore part of the discipline, and women with the private, thus excluded from IR analysis (Aydin, 2016). By taking these ideas into the analysis, feminism acknowledges their gendered nature, and participates in the inclusion of what was previously ignored.

According to Aydin (2016), 80 to 90 percent of war casualties since World War II have been civilians, the majority of whom are women and children. Thus, ignoring the perspectives of the most likely victims of conflict means that mainstream IR lacks analytical depth, and provides an incomplete picture of events. Therefore, the knowledge of mainstream IR is problematic because it is constructed only by those in a position of privilege, often white males, producing a distorted view of the world (Sjoberg, 2012). By taking the 'private' into consideration, feminist approaches offer a view of the actual reality, which is more comprehensive.

However, the bottom-up, rather than top-down, approach that considers the human for international politics has been widely questioned by traditional IR scholars (Tickner, 1997; Steans, 2003; Youngs, 2004). Feminists see different realities than traditional scholars when they write about international politics (Tickner, 1997), and therefore do not fit into the narrow boundaries of the discipline, creating questions of legitimacy. As stated by Youngs (2004: 84), the top-down approach of mainstream IR causes an issue of war: "If silence is political, not-knowing is at the core of power and its abuses". As long as the perspectives of women and other marginalised groups are excluded, power relations caused by women's unequal position can be ignored. Therefore, mainstream IR fails in taking issues which

women confront daily into consideration (Youngs, 2004). According to Steans (2003), neo-realism has been criticised for its oversimplified view of the anarchic structure of the world and the state-centric analysis. Feminism can offer a different viewpoint, by placing social relations and real lived experiences at the centre of its analysis (Aydin, 2016). By examining international politics at the microlevel, a better understanding of the relationship between all forms of violence and how unjust social relations contribute to insecurity can be achieved, and therefore, it can inform the discipline about causes and consequences of war that are missing from traditional approaches (Youngs, 2004).

According to Hudson et al. (2009) the treatment of women in society is a fundamental and powerful factor in explaining when wars occur: dysfunctional templates of violence and control often diffuse throughout society and manifest in state security and behaviour. Hudson et al. (2009) maintain that in order to both understand and promote national and international security, scholars cannot overlook the situation and perspective of women. Evidently then, women should not be ignored in the study of international relations.

QUESTIONING OBJECTIVITY

Mainstream IR often criticises feminist approaches because of their rejection of the notion of neutrality of facts, therefore claiming it lacks objectivity (Tickner, 1997; Steans, 2003). However, precisely this perspective offers understanding of the international politics that mainstream IR fails to see. Feminist IR seeks to explain the fuller dynamics of political and economic power, including the real experiences of women and how they are deeply connected

to military systems including, but not limited to, acts of sex tourism, slavery, human trafficking and torture of both women and children (Youngs, 2004).

Due to the ontological and epistemological limitations, traditional IR fails to see the whole picture of war, peace and international politics in general. The assumed universality of world affairs of conventional IR, which is based on the male perspective, excludes people by offering narrow-minded explanations that are perpetuated in the theories (Caprioli, 2004). Tickner (1996: 456), one of the key scholars in feminist IR, states that “a feminist perspective on international theory must begin by questioning claims of universality”. Universality can be defined as “the quality or state of being universal; existing everywhere, or involving everyone” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020). Yet what is claimed to be universal or objective in IR is largely the knowledge of privileged men, which therefore excludes others from the discipline (Tickner, 1996). Feminism takes the structural inequalities that contribute to the insecurity of women, children and other excluded groups into the analysis. Inequalities, which are built into the historical legacies of the modern state and the international system - “only by analysing the evolution of the modern state system and its changing political, economic and social structures can we begin to understand its limitations as a security provider” (Tickner, 1997: 626).

Sovereignty is a form of legitimation which converts power into authority (Steans, 2003), and the structural inequalities that stem from the state-system are central contributors to the insecurity of individuals (Tickner, 1997). By offering an alternative unit of analysis, and questioning the objectivity and inequalities of

the international system, feminism can offer a more adequate platform in understanding the security issues faced by individuals. Youngs (2004) states that if these assumptions of ‘universal knowledge’ are not questioned, the philosophical limitations will continue to be reproduced. While acknowledging the impossibility of universality, feminist approaches can assist in searching for a mutually shared conception of the world (Tickner, 1996). It should be noted that feminist approaches do see regularities, such as gender or patriarchy, but these are socially and culturally constructed rather than universal and natural (Tickner, 1997).

Standpoint feminists claim that the ‘objectivity’ of positivist approaches is false (Steans, 2003), as claims are always subjective on some level. Recognising that there is always a bias can, in fact, offer a better ability to reach higher levels of objectivity. Feminists are suggesting that international theories which claim to offer objective and universal explanations, have been constructed out of the behaviour of men (Tickner, 1994). Claiming universality or objectivity can then be seen as arguing that the male perspective is, in fact, the ‘human perspective’. Therefore, assumptions made from this inaccurate truth can clearly be seen false as well. Harding (1990, cited in Tickner, 1996: 456) argues that, in fact, the perspective of someone from the outgroup is likely to produce more objective knowledge than a member of the dominant group, whose ways of thinking are close to dominant conceptual schemes. Ultimately, Tickner (1997) adds that broadening the knowledge base by adding women’s experiences into the discipline could enhance objectivity.

GENDER IN IR

Feminism not only tries to include women in its analysis, but it also considers how gender affects the discipline, its practice, and its basic assumptions. Feminist theorists are revealing biases and inequalities in traditional IR (Caprioli, 2004), which are both reifying gender hierarchy as well as offering an incomplete picture of events and of global politics (Sjoberg, 2012). Gender relations vary in different cultures, however, they are almost always unequal, making gender a way of signifying power (Tickner, 1997).

According to Sjoberg (2012), 'gender' refers to expectations, attributes and behaviours that are considered appropriate for a person's biological sex category; being a male is associated with masculine characteristics and being a female with feminine. The terms 'sex' and 'gender' are often used interchangeably, however they are fundamentally different. As Caprioli (2004) states, the study of politics and understanding of the world is based on masculinities, which are valued over femininities. However, the political world cannot be completely understood by taking these assumptions of masculinity as neutral. Scott (1987, cited in Sjoberg, 2012: 8) states that gender is a system of symbolic meaning that creates social hierarchies based on degrees of perceived association with masculine and feminine characteristics. According to Sjoberg (2012), in Western cultures, masculine characteristics usually revolve around strength, autonomy, rationality, power, aggression and public life, whereas the feminine is linked to weakness, interdependence, emotion, sensuality, domesticity and private life. It is important to note that feminist perspectives can

be held by men, and vice versa (Steans, 2003).

In IR, gender is often difficult to see, as masculinities appear gender-neutral (Sjoberg, 2012), which masks deeply embedded masculinist assumptions that can naturalize or hide gender differences and gender inequalities (Tickner, 1997). Youngs (2004) states that male power can and should be explained, not just taken as given. By explaining male power and questioning these gendered assumptions of IR, feminism creates space to understand how they have affected the field. It has already achieved to reveal the level of gendering in the discipline that has affected the range of subjects studied, the boundaries of the discipline, its concerns and motifs, as well as the lack of women practitioners in academia and practice (Youngs, 2004).

Traditional IR scholars may believe gender is not about international politics and not part of 'real' politics and therefore, irrelevant to IR as a discipline (Tickner, 1997). However, by failing to take gender into account, mainstream IR offers partial views of power that remain on the surface of an assumed, predominantly male-constructed reality (Youngs, 2004). Feminist approaches understand gender cannot be ignored in IR as it is a constitutive element of how the modern international system was created; taking it into the analysis can reveal the complexities of the power relations present.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, although feminist approaches cannot explain the whole international system, they offer a perspective from the disempowered, who are the most likely victims of war. Placing social relations and lived experiences at the centre of the analysis informs the discipline about causes and consequences

of war that are missing from traditional approaches - state-centric tools of analysis cannot effectively reveal the inequalities and all forms of violence that decrease an individual's security. Mainstream IR relies on masculinist assumptions offering a partial view of reality; taking gender into account can expose the patriarchal power relations present in the international system. Broadening the knowledge base of the discipline through adding women's perspectives into it, could enhance objectivity. Thus, feminist approaches can lead to a more adequate view of the state of events. They are important to global politics and should be considered as a valued part of the practice and discipline of international relations: integrating feminism into IR can lead to higher levels of security in societies.

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EUROCENTRISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EUROCENTRIC BIAS AND FRAMING IN FEMINISM, MARXISM, AND POSTCOLONIALISM

ELLEN STIRLING

Eurocentrism can be found in many aspects of international relations (IR) theory. Whilst it is not always a term used in reference to IR theory, Eurocentrism is broadly defined as a worldview which is centred around and favours Europe over the rest of the world. This paper will build on this rather broad definition and how it relates to IR theory, before discussing its implications. It will focus specifically on three IR theories; Marxism; Feminism; and, Postcolonialism. The former two have received criticism for their Eurocentric aspects which will be discussed, whilst Postcolonial theory works to identify and address issues of Eurocentrism and its historical suppression of non-western voices in IR theory.

To begin, this paper addresses the question of what Eurocentrism is in IR theory. As mentioned in the introduction, Eurocentrism places European and, more broadly, Western culture and values at the centre of discussions, generally at the expense of other cultures. Rather than focusing on the geographical definition of Europe which has changed throughout history, Eurocentrism is about the epistemological and cultural divide between Europe and the rest of the world, assuming that

European civilisation has a unique historical advantage over other cultures (Xypolia, 2016). Eurocentric assumptions can be either conscious or subconscious, and either imperialist or anti-imperialist (Hobson, 2012), with their manifestation having changed over time.

The term Eurocentrism was first coined in the 1980s by Egyptian Marxist Samir Amin and drove the publication of his book *Eurocentrism* in 1989. Amin argues that the introduction of the capitalist system allowed Western cultures to develop more than non-western cultures, thus creating a model of reliance whereby the “others” require support from the West to survive. Therefore, the perpetual use of the capitalist structure continues to drive Eurocentrism as an ideological construct (Fourny, 1994). Generally, Eurocentrism can be used interchangeably with Western centrism, however the latter was not used by scholars until the 1990s. Western centrism places the US at the centre of the international system, however due to the historical ties between the US and Europe, separating the two can be difficult (Kuru, 2016).

The work of Kuru (2016), discusses how IR theory has recently undergone an 'anti-Eurocentric wave', however expresses concern that anti-Eurocentric scholars have a tendency to see Eurocentrism everywhere, without acknowledging the division between the impact of Eurocentrism on our understanding of the international system and having a Eurocentric worldview. Kuru presents three distinct variants of Eurocentrism in IR theory; historical-contextual (referred to as conjunctural); ideological; and residual. Over time, the dominant form of Eurocentrism has changed with the rise of the non-Western world and consequential decline in European dominance. Conjunctural Eurocentrism developed alongside the rise of Europe during the 19th century, as European nations were influential in the creation of world order during that time (Kuru, 2016). Conversely, ideological Eurocentrism is linked to Europe's position on the global stage and is not deterred by the rise of non-Western powers and decolonisation. Ideological Eurocentrism continues to drive the narrative of European states prevailing in a world which is shifting away from European hegemony. Finally, residual Eurocentrism is driven by individuals failing to recognise the problems raised by teaching and researching with a Eurocentric worldview. This can be due to scholarly generations, lack of access to up to date IR literature, or specifically studying a European dominated time period (Kuru, 2016). Residual Eurocentrism is considered by Kuru as the dominant form of Eurocentrism found today, however claims that the prevalence of Eurocentric IR is decreasing over time and the transition from conjunctural to ideological to residual indicates the transition towards the ending of Eurocentrism in IR altogether.

Conversely, Hobson (2012) argues that the presence of Eurocentrism in IR has not declined over time, but instead, has shifted in form. His book *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics* provides the most comprehensive study of Eurocentrism in IR theory, arguing that Eurocentrism has been a consistent factor in influencing the discipline with only slight changes in its format. Hobson breaks down the definition of Orientalism presented by founding Postcolonial theorist Edward Said, stating that Eurocentrism can take either imperialist or anti-imperialist forms. Separating history into three time periods, Hobson presents two forms of Eurocentrism, manifest and subliminal, arguing that pre-1945 Eurocentrism was very overt and interconnected with scientific racism (Hobson, 2012). During this period, the structure of "first the West, then elsewhere" dominated, implying that Europe was the centre of development whereby its methods were diffused globally to become norms (Chakrabarty, 2000: 7). Post-1945, Eurocentrism in IR theory became more subliminal and scientific racism was removed from the discipline. Western-centric thought still remained in the discipline however, even if it was not as overt. For example, phrases such as 'civilised vs. barbaric' were replaced by 'modern vs. traditional', indicating a subtle shift in the terminology, however little change in the underlying meaning (Hobson, 2012). During this post-1945, pre-1989 period, a number of prominent IR theories were founded and thus have frequently received criticism for their Eurocentric biases, including Realism, the English School Theory and Neo-Marxism (Hobson, 2012). Finally, Hobson argues that post-1989, subliminal Eurocentrism was replaced by the revival of manifest Eurocentrism, whereby institutional Euro-

centrism once again dominated mainstream IR theory.

The creation of the Westphalian narrative, whereby the International System we know today was created through the Treaty of Westphalia in 1641, can be considered a Eurocentric approach to global history. Concepts that are today taken for granted, including sovereignty and secularism, are thought to have been founded in this agreement and spread globally through European colonialism. This interpretation of history is argued to be both Eurocentric and inaccurate, with scholars pointing out that sovereignty was unlikely to be conceptualised in Westphalia, as it appeared much later on in history (Osiander, 2001; Kayaoglu, 2010). Working on the assumption that Westphalia was the foundation of the modern international system continues to drive the narrative of the rest of the world waiting to be discovered and developed into fully fledged states by European powers (Kayaoglu, 2010). This is an example whereby residual Eurocentrism continues to permeate the lessons of IR theory, as through teaching students this interpretation of world history reinforces these Eurocentric concepts and drives its influence in IR theory (Kuru, 2016).

Another example of Eurocentrism in IR theory is the use of Modernisation theory when discussing development. Modernisation theory is used to explain the phased process which countries work through in their transition from 'traditional' to 'modern' states. This transition is thought to occur when countries adopt economic and social structures found in the West (Linklater, 1997). The principle of

Modernisation theory is inherently Eurocentric, as it assumes that the success of Europe and the West is superior and can be replicated by other countries, when in reality non-western states start at a disadvantage. This is often due to the presence of colonialism which both contributed to the rise of Western powers, whilst undermining the capabilities of newly independent countries to develop. In this sense, Eurocentrism goes beyond Ethnocentrism, whereby not only does European/Western culture portray that their own values and standards are superior, it does so at the expense of other cultures (Tipps, 1973).

Eurocentrism has been argued, especially by Postcolonial theorists, to underpin traditional IR theories including Realism and Liberalism. Realism holds its roots in the actions of great powers, generally based in Europe and the West, whereby their desire to gain power drives the international system. Due to Realism's emphasis on how power influences IR, it often undermines actions and events occurring outside powerful countries. For example, the Cold War, which never amounted to armed conflict between the US and the Soviet Union, cannot be considered peaceful for many other countries. Alternatively, Liberalism's placement of Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) at the heart of the international system can be interpreted as a form of Eurocentrism, as it can be argued that these organisations only serve to promote the interests of the more powerful states, thus overlooking the interests of developing countries (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006).

To begin the discussion of Marxism, I refer back to the first use of the term Euro-

centrism, presented by Marxist scholar Samir Amin, in reference to the capitalist mode of production. Marxist theory is founded in the works of German Philosopher Karl Marx and focuses on understanding social practices through which present day actors and frameworks are constructed (Rupert, 2013). Marxism looks beyond domestic relations and the constraints of territorial boundaries which preoccupy traditional IR theories such as Realism and Liberalism, focusing instead on how globalisation, the capitalist system, and conflict between societal classes are the primary sources of instability in the global system (Rupert, 2013). Similar to Neorealism, Marxism is a structural theory and is interested in the economic sector, instead of the military-political one. Unlike traditional IR theories, Marxism acknowledges people do not make decisions solely based on their current situation, instead decisions are made “under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx in Tucker, 1978: 595). This has important links with recognising how colonialism influences the capabilities and actions of actors today.

Within Marxist theory, the diffusion of the capitalist system globally and its continued use today drives a Eurocentric narrative. Marx believed the feudal mode of production, whereby society is based on exchanging land for service or labour, was a strictly European phenomenon and a step towards a capitalist society. Therefore the birth of the capitalist mode of production had to occur in Europe (Blaut, 1999). From this, the capitalist system and so-called civilised traits were spread via diffusion from the core (Europe) to the

periphery (non-Europe). In return, the periphery states provide Europe with raw materials and labour, driving the capitalist system. The division between periphery and core is today paralleled with the division between developing and developed countries, driving the Eurocentric capitalist system whereby non-western states struggle to develop and are held hostage by their reliance on the West for investment (Ahiakpor, 1985).

Similar to Marxism, Feminism is an overarching term for a plurality of feminist theories, all of which have different historical interpretations and political objectivity. The overlapping principle which brings them together under Feminism is the focus on drawing attention to the plight of women and gender subordination in international politics and the global economy (Tikner and Sjoberg, 2013). Feminist theories re-evaluate the founding concepts of IR presented under traditional theories, including sovereignty, security and the state, and holds its roots in the ‘Third Great Debate’ in the 1980s. Western Feminism has received significant criticism from scholars for their interpretation of women in developing countries, which I present here as a form as Eurocentrism.

Western feminism specifically has received criticism for its portrayal of women in developing countries as a singular monolithic subject, with no consideration given to variations in class, culture, ethnicity or religion (Spivak, 1988). The term Western feminist is used by scholars to draw attention to the theory’s characterisation of non-western women as ‘other’, thus defining themselves as Western.

The emphasis on the division between the West and the rest drives a Eurocentric narrative in its analysis, whereby Western women dominate and their ideologies are portrayed as that of all women (Hawthorne, 2007).

This form of Feminism has also been criticised for the white saviour narrative it presents, whereby women in developing nations are considered in need of saving from oppression, when in reality this is not the case. The work of Western Feminists to give agency to non-western women frequently fails, as taking a Western perspective of an issue can often undermine the actions of the very women they are trying to save (El Ouardi and Sandy, 2019). This white saviour narrative also drives the idea that Western women have more power and capabilities than their non-Western counterparts, driving a type of ideological Eurocentrism. Finally, the dominance of Western feminism above other strands of feminism can also be argued as a form of Eurocentrism, as it removes agency from other types of feminists and their interpretations of IR. For example, Postcolonial and Black Feminism do not just focus on the suppression of women by men, but shine light on the plight of women who have also been oppressed due to their race and social class (McEwan, 2003). Postcolonialism and Feminism frequently overlap in their interpretation of events, as both are interested in addressing the marginalisation of specific groups.

This leads into the final IR theory in this discussion; Postcolonialism. Drawing upon Marxism and Post-Constructuralism, Postcolonial theory is concerned with

marginalised groups and their representation. It is therefore a direct critique on how Eurocentrism has influenced the development of the international system and present-day divisions between the West and non-West. Whilst the 'post' in Postcolonialism indicates that this is now an era after colonialism, postcolonial theory argues that colonialism continues to undermine the development of former colonies, influencing the way in which societies, governments and people experience the international system.

Postcolonial theory is considered to be founded on the work of Palestinian-American Edward Said in *Orientalism* (1976). His monograph argues that the concept of Orientalism, which refers to the study of the Orient (the East) instead of the analysis of the Occident (the West), is directly linked to European imperialism and thus can be described as a form of Eurocentrism. This definition of Orientalism is different to that presented by Hobson (2012) as discussed previously, as it identifies Orientalism as a concept directly related to imperialism/colonialism. Said argues that, under imperialism, the creation of the Orient was to counterbalance the Occident. The latter was considered to be rational, developed and superior and thus, as its opposite, the Orient was perceived as irrational, underdeveloped and inferior (Xypolia, 2016). The power imbalance and negative connotations of the East allowed for the reinforcement of the West as having commanding rule, driving an asymmetrical relationship between the two (El Ouardi and Sandy, 2019).

Postcolonial theorists argue that the international system is inherently constructed to benefit Western powers, with even the boundaries of post-colonial countries being drawn by colonialists to undermine the development of the newly independent states. This parallels with Marxist theory, where history influences the actions of those in the present. Postcolonial theorists also interpret actions and events through alternative lenses compared to other IR theorists. In the case of nuclear proliferation, developing countries have been presented as unable to be trusted with nuclear weapons due to their instability, violation of human rights norms and unpredictable nature. In the work of Postcolonial theorist Shampa Biswas (2014), the question is rephrased; shifting it from who can be trusted with nuclear weapons, to who determines who can be trusted, and why. Those recognised as nuclear-weapon states - the USA, Russia, UK, France and China, are those that decide who is allowed to possess these powerful weapons. Addressing this issue from the perspective of postcolonial theory flips the question onto those who make the decisions (the West) and how the suppression of nuclear programmes and the presentation of countries such as Iran and North Korea as 'bad actors' works to keep the West securely in power.

To conclude, this paper has given a broad overview of what Eurocentrism is and its relevance in IR theory. It has addressed the complexity of defining Eurocentrism in IR theory and given examples where Eurocentrism is present in scholar's interpretations of the international system, including assumptions surrounding the Treaty of Westphalia and

Modernisation Theory. The rise of anti-Eurocentric work and the identification of different forms of Eurocentrism has been a crucial step in addressing the epistemological Eurocentric bias present in aspects of IR theory. There does however continue to be a significant research bias, with the majority of IR research being published by scholars in elite institutes in America's Northeast and Western Europe. Only 3% of IR research papers are from scholars in rising power states, including China, India and Brazil (Kristensen, 2015: 266). The lack of research being undertaken in developing nations indicates there is a long way to go in combating Eurocentrism in IR research.

Whilst Eurocentrism is found in the very foundations of many classical IR theories, it can also be found in more modern theories, including within Western Feminism and the capitalist system of Marxism. Only Postcolonial theory attempts to address the Eurocentric issues found in IR theory and reframe security issues in a way which removes the bias of Eurocentrism. Whilst we cannot ignore the presence of European powers in the history of IR theory, changes in teaching and research can help move towards an anti-Eurocentric IR.

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FOREIGN POLICY

BELARUS, NATO, THE USA

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

ROBERT HART

ABSTRACT

The 2017 National Security Strategy of the Trump Administration in many ways portrays two distinct conflicting personalities - one of 'Principled Realism' and one of a continued promotion of international cooperation. Through a close comparison of the 2017 National Security Strategy and the published strategies of the previous two administrations (Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush), I argue that the continuities held next to the explicit differences portrayed in the 2017 document are illustrative of a larger conflict between a 'Principled Realist' administration and the traditional view-point of continued internationalism from the foreign policy establishment bureaucracy.

KEYWORDS: Trump; National Security; Security Strategy; Principled Realism.

MINSK'S RUSSIA PROBLEM

MAX GEORGE

ABSTRACT

Despite widespread assumptions of Russia and Belarus as close allies in the post-Soviet period, this relationship - characterised by significant imbalances - is evolving as Minsk attempts to reduce its political and economic dependence on Russia before it loses the freedom to maintain its sovereignty in the face of Russian intentions for closer integration. This paper will argue that a strategy of 'triangulation' results, as Belarus seeks to forge for itself a neutral position: increasing its freedom to operate internationally without Russia, while avoiding dangerously antagonising Moscow. The paper will demonstrate that a predominance of domestic considerations for Minsk leads it to resist Russian integration plans and open up alternative diplomatic options. In addition, it will explain the importance of Belarus's economic dependence on Russia, and how this will limit any westward drift. Finally, the paper will explore risks to this Belarussian strategy of seeking an 'in-between' status: first, that it is unable to rebalance away from Russia, leading to domestic instability; and second, that an uncertain presidential succession in Minsk provokes Russian fears of a more decisive westward shift.

KEYWORDS: Russia; Belarus; Foreign Policy; Economic Dependence; Integration.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PRETEXT: WHY "HUMANITARIAN" INTERVENTION IS IMPERIALISM BY ANOTHER NAME

BLAIR GRAHAM

ABSTRACT

Conventional wisdom informs us that the proliferation of humanitarian interventions constitutes a normative development in international politics as, freed from the constraints of power politics following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western policymakers are now at liberty to pursue a more idealistic foreign policy and concern themselves with halting human suffering wherever it may be found. Using the case studies of the NATO interventions in both Kosovo and Libya, this essay argues that this reading of humanitarian intervention has no foundation in reality. Instead, terming such interventions "humanitarian" serves as a very useful pretext for Western planners seeking to mask the self-serving and imperial nature of their foreign adventures. To fully underscore this point, this essay assesses in detail the motives, means, and outcomes of the two aforementioned cases. This criterion demonstrates that the interventions in both Kosovo and Libya were antithetical to "humanitarianism" and casts a very dark shadow over the concept of humanitarian intervention more broadly.

KEYWORDS: Humanitarian Intervention; Responsibility to Protect; Kosovo; Libya; NATO.

MINSK'S RUSSIA PROBLEM

MAX GEORGE

INTRODUCTION

Russia-Belarus relations are in a state of flux. At a base level they are characterised by a power asymmetry between the two states. For Belarus, domestic considerations of regime survival for President Lukashenko predominate. For Russia the primary interest is in keeping Belarus closely within its sphere of influence. The present period is seeing Belarus gradually shift to a more neutral position aiming to maximise geopolitical freedom of manoeuvre, without decisively committing to any 'bloc', recognising Russia's local hegemony. This briefing will assess the relationship thematically to explain this Belarussian strategy of triangulation.

STRATEGY AND (GEO)POLITICS

The primary cleavage of the political relationship between Belarus and Russia concerns integration plans, whereby aspects of economic and foreign policymaking would be combined under supranational organs. The asymmetry of the two states complicates this process: any integration arrangement which would be acceptable to Minsk would require a degree of equality in decision-making, in order to protect Belarusian sovereignty. This equality would necessarily be unacceptable to Moscow as the clear hegemon in the relationship (Preiherman, 2020). Additionally, Belarus lacks the incentive of a third-party external threat to make integration desirable as a means of protection.

The relationship is characterised by a gradual alienation of Belarus from Russian foreign policy. This has been labelled a 'multi-vector foreign policy' (Shraibman, 2019). Over the last decade Belarus has shown itself willing to both diverge from Russian foreign policy and embrace Western governments, critically when this is aligned to Minsk's interests. Minsk has, for instance, refrained from explicitly supporting Russia's annexation of Crimea, instead recognising the reality of Russian control of the territory while emphasising the principles of territorial integrity (President of the Republic of Belarus, 2014). In addition, the recent visit of the US Secretary of State to Minsk highlighted Lukashenko's willingness to promote relations with the US when Belarus comes under pressure from Russia, in this case the energy dispute between the two countries.

Belarus appears to desire a position of neutrality between Russia and the US/EU. Its recent record as a site for conflict mediation (numerous 'Minsk formats' have been the sites of ceasefire and peace negotiations in Eurasian conflicts) would seem to accord with this. This diplomatic 'offer' may afford Minsk freedom of manoeuvre between Russia and the West, in the absence of relative economic or military strength (Shraibman, 2018). Avoiding a decisive alignment with Russian foreign policy or integration into Russian-led supranational structures will be necessary to sustain this position. Finally, such a position will help to assuage Russian fears of a Western drift.

MILITARY

At the strategic level the military relationship is an extension of the geopolitical situation. First, the Belarus and Russia are formally allied under Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) arrangements, however in practice Belarus has shown a reluctance to commit to CSTO operations (compounded by occasional displays of contempt for the organisation by Lukashenko), or to join in Russian overseas military interventions (Kucera, 2017). Second, widely-held NATO planning assumptions that Belarus would decisively take Russia's side in a putative Baltic conflict scenario does not reflect the high risk of entrapment this would entail for Minsk, in addition to risks it would present to the Lukashenko regime (Flanagan et al., 2019).

The potential for Russia to operate from Belarus is operationally undermined by suboptimal military interoperability which, despite joint exercises and years of cooperation, is more limited than often assumed. Belarus has also frustrated Russia with its refusal to allow the establishment of a Russian air base on its territory.

The 2017 *Zapad exercise* conducted jointly between Russia and Belarus is demonstrative of the unrealised potential for military cooperation and integration between the two. It was an opportunity for significant interoperability development and for a geopolitical statement of unity to the West, and offered the possibility of establishing permanent staging areas and logistical nodes for Russian forces within Belarus. Instead, the exercise highlighted political impediments to deeper

military cooperation. Minsk invited multiple external observers without coordinating with Moscow, and emphasised the defensive nature of the exercise, where Moscow had talked up its expeditionary utility (Ioffe, 2017). So, while the military relationship is an extension of the strategic relationship, the fact that military integration is less developed than it could be will limit military options in the future should the strategic relationship evolve.

ECONOMICS AND ENERGY

Belarus's intention to reduce its dependency on Russia is perhaps most evident in the economic domain. The imbalance in the relationship is most marked with regards to energy. Belarus imports around 85% of its energy (mostly from Russia) and, though it is a 'transit state' for Russian gas being supplied to European countries further west, this high level of dependence gives it little bargaining power. The construction of undersea pipelines through the Baltics and the Black Sea has effectively bypassed Belarussian transit, reducing any bargaining power this may have afforded. Importantly, the provision of cheap gas to Belarus since the end of the Soviet Union was always based on an implicit understanding of a trajectory towards closer integration. As Russian efforts to realise this have become frustrated recently, Belarus has now been compelled to pay market prices (Belsat, 2020).

Presently Russia represents around half of Belarus's imports and exports, and the relatively undeveloped, low-tech nature of its

industry makes it more dependent on trade with its largest neighbour. There is significant imbalance in the economic relationship between Russia and Belarus. While 44% of Belarussian exports go to Russia, the reciprocal figure is just 5.4%.

Economics and energy thus represent one of the key drivers of the Belarussian strategy of keeping diplomatic options open and avoiding decisive integration with Russia. The provision of cheap energy from Russia – a boon to the Belarussian economy – was contingent on Minsk's acquiescence to Russian integration plans. That the resulting sovereignty implications would have been unacceptable to Minsk has seen it obliged to pay market prices for Russian gas. Thus if there is no commercial benefit to relying on Russian energy (and wider trade), Minsk will seek to extend its economic links with other countries and regions. This will necessarily result in wider political and diplomatic engagement away from Russia.

CULTURE AND IDENTITY

Culture and identity represent important features of the relationship due to the essentially Russo-centric identity in Belarus: shared language, religion, collective memory, and even media. However this does not automatically translate into unflinching loyalty and pro-Russian policy decisions. There has been a gradual 'Belarusianization' of the national discourse in Belarus, pushed by Lukashenko (OEC, n.d.). Opinion polling shows both falling support for Russian integration but, most importantly, a strong preference for neutrality between east and west (Belsat, 2020). There is limited evidence of any 'Westernising' trends in Belarussian identity, but there are indications of

a popular distinction between cultural and political Russianism.

Perhaps counter-intuitively, this position of maintaining cultural pro-Russianism while avoiding an explicit political identification with Russia is advantageous for Belarus. It denies any space for a narrative of oppressed Russian minorities to be wielded against it, as has been employed by Russia in Ukraine and the Baltics. It allows Minsk to demonstrate superficial sincerity about Russian kinship while diverging on policy.

CONCLUSION

The growing dependence of Belarus on Russia across political and economic domains has reached a point of unease for Lukashenko. His regime's survival is dependent upon Belarus's sovereignty and the gradual shift towards a freer strategic position – freer to make political and economic choices other than Russia – is the manifestation of this unease. Nonetheless, Minsk's awareness of Moscow's ultimate pre-eminence in the relationship explains the triangulation in this strategy: Belarus seeks to buttress its sovereignty and independent decision-making, and to secure its economic options, while not giving Russia any opportunity to reach a threshold for coercion.

It is a balancing act that carries two main risks. First, a failure to rebalance away from Russia and diversify its economy may cause domestic weakness and instability and force re-supplication to Russia on less favourable terms. Second, and most important, an unstable succession of Lukashenko as president: if the rebalancing creates creeping impetus for a more decisive Western, liberal pivot, Russia may feel obliged to adopt a more assertive, even interventionist position towards Belarus.

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RESPONSIBILITY TO PRETEXT: WHY 'HUMANITARIAN' INTERVENTION IS IMPERIALISM BY ANOTHER NAME

BLAIR GRAHAM

Orthodox academic opinion almost ubiquitously embraces humanitarian intervention as a welcomed normative development in international politics – one that should receive the uncritical endorsement of any right-thinking observer. Gone are the days of imperial conquest as humanitarian intervention has ushered in a new era of Western powers risking life and limb in the name of saving strangers. Contrary to the notion that humanitarian interventions are fought in the name of human rights and liberty, I argue that humanitarian interventions are fundamentally no different to wars not described as such. To state my case, I will explore in detail two case studies: the NATO interventions in Yugoslavia in 1999 and Libya in 2011. These interventions will be analysed using the following criterion: a review of the motives of the interventions, the means used throughout the interventions, and the interventions' outcome.

Before delving into the specifics of the aforementioned cases, a point of clarification is in order. There is nothing inherently objectionable about humanitarian intervention in the abstract. As Teson argues “the deeply ingrained view that war is always immoral regardless of cause is mistaken. Sometimes it is morally permissible to fight; occasionally,

fighting is even mandatory” (Teson, 2001: 6). Teson (2001: 7) further states “proponents of humanitarian intervention simply argue that humanitarian intervention in some instances ... is morally justified”. With respect to what these justifiable circumstances may be, Wheeler (2000: 28) cites Waltzer's just war criteria stating humanitarian intervention is “justified when it is a response...to acts that ‘shock the moral conscience of mankind’”. Therefore, in these “exceptional cases of supreme humanitarian emergency”, states “should accept the risk of casualties to end human rights abuses” (Wheeler, 2000: 50). In short, the concept of using military force in faraway lands to protect oppressed groups from genocide or other crimes against humanity is one this author supports.

The problem is that empirical instances of humanitarian intervention very seldom match this description. As mentioned in the introduction, to best demonstrate the fundamentally non-humanitarian nature of such interventions, assessing the motives, means, and outcomes of any given instance of humanitarian intervention is most instructive. This criterion was selected as it is most often referred to by the strongest proponents of humanitarian warfare. Former Australian Foreign Minister and stalwart supporter of the

'Responsibility to Protect' principle, Evans (2008: 60) describes the "criteria of legitimacy" for intervention as follows: "the motivation or primary purpose of the proposed military action [...] the proportionality of the response; and [...] the balances of consequences".

As was also mentioned above, this essay will rely on the case studies of Kosovo and Libya. It is worth mentioning why these particular interventions were selected. Firstly, the chosen cases are some of the most infamous instances of post-Cold War humanitarian intervention. Secondly, the view that these interventions adhere to at least part of the aforementioned criteria is near-ubiquitous in the literature, rendering them at least partly 'humanitarian', according to the conventional wisdom. By way of example, Roberts (1999: 102) argues that NATO's intervention in Kosovo "marked a high point in the increasing emphasis on human rights and humanitarian issues". In the few cases where the war is challenged at all, scholars merely critique how the war was conducted. Wheeler (2000: 284), for example, argues that "NATO acted preventatively and it was right to do so, but it employed the wrong means". In order for the Atlantic Alliance to better demonstrate its unquestioned 'commitment to defending human rights' it should have deployed an invasion force, rather than solely relying on air power. Taking at face value the professed just motives of 'humanitarian interventions' was a theme repeated in much of the post-Libya commentary. Articles asserting the intervention was "paved with good intentions" (Carpenter, 2018: 19-31) and simply "mismanaged" (Zambakari, 2016: 44-62) constituted regular staples in the academic

post-mortem of the war. Simply put, scholars limit their critiques to procedural objections; the sanctity of Western planners' motives are never questioned.

A solid foundation in which to begin any interrogation of the motives of humanitarian interventionists resides in the fundamentally selective nature of their 'humanitarian' wars. If humanitarianism were a principle sincerely held by foreign policy practitioners, surely it would be applied indiscriminately and not only in a handful of ostensibly arbitrary cases. With respect to Kosovo, the apparent double standards surrounding the NATO intervention helps call into question the alliance's professed motivations. After all, the crisis in the Balkans was far from the world's sole human catastrophe taking place throughout the decade, as the Kurds in the south-east of Turkey, the East Timorese, and the residents of Grozny can all attest to.

In response to this common charge, it is often argued that selectivity, in and of itself, doesn't undermine the humanitarian credentials of a given intervention. It is Wheeler's (2000: 49) view that "just because governments are selective [...] does not necessarily mean we should treat their humanitarian justifications as bogus in every case where they are employed". Similarly, Biggar (2013: 233) succinctly states that "it is better to be inconsistently responsible than consistently irresponsible". This is undoubtedly true, but it ignores why the double standards exist in the first place.

It is not just any country whose crimes go seemingly unnoticed by the international

community. Typically, a state is afforded the right to act as they please if they are on good terms with Washington. This was true of NATO member Turkey during their aforementioned slaughter of 30,000 Kurds (Pilger, 2000). The same rules applied to long-time ally Indonesia whose leader, Suharto, was deemed “our kind of guy” (Sanger, 1995) by the Clinton administration, despite the near-genocidal levels of violence he was directly responsible for. Equally, Washington’s one-time ally Russia received unwavering support during their aerial bombardment of Chechnya, with Clinton comparing Boris Yeltsin’s efforts to those of Abraham Lincoln during his campaign against the secessionist south (Basken, 1996).

Expressions of diplomatic flattery notwithstanding, it is often argued that it is simply unfeasible for a state to intervene in defence of an oppressed people wherever they may be found. In some instances, not only would intervention be impractical, it would be disastrous for global security. Addressing the common charge that the West’s failure to act in Chechnya or in defence of the Kurds undermines the humanitarian motives of NATO’s war in Kosovo, Biggar points out that intervention in either of these cases would have almost certainly triggered wider conflicts with Turkey and nuclear-armed Russia. Therefore, “prudence forbids action that is likely to be disproportionate” (Biggar, 2013: 234). Whilst a desire to avoid potentially catastrophic wars is a perfectly reasonable explanation for Western military reticence in either of these cases, it in no way accounts for their proactive role in facilitating these very crises.

For example, 80% of Turkey’s military arsenal used against the Kurds was American-supplied. The Turkish crimes so unfazed Washington that, at the height of the atrocities in 1994, Ankara was the single largest importer of American military hardware (Chomsky, 2012: 11). So, while it is perfectly reasonable to maintain that intervention can often be impractical and counterproductive, is there any moral imperative for refusing to cut off arms sales?

The aforementioned case of Indonesia and East Timor is also instructive. After declaring their independence in August 1999, the East Timorese had the wrath of Jakarta to contend with. Indonesian troops are estimated to have killed 10,000 people and said to have driven as many as 750,000 out of their homes as part of their effort to deny the people of East Timor their right to self-determination (Chomsky, 2012). In this instance, not only were Western powers once again intransigently arming the aggressor, but extraordinary measures were deployed to obstruct attempts at bringing the Indonesian authorities to justice.

The United Nations wished to send a team of forensic experts to the scene to gather evidence of war crimes. Washington had other ideas and blocked the deployment of these investigators until Indonesia’s rainy season commenced (Chomsky, 2015). Isabel Ferreira, East Timor’s Human Rights co-ordinator, left no doubt as to what this meant “when the rainy season begins, all the bodies will be washed away into the rivers and there will be no evidence left to investigate” (Chomsky, 2012).

In short, what the above examples demonstrate is that the same actors who professed to value the lives of Kosovar Albanians and insisted that ‘something must be done’ to stop Serb atrocities had no qualms about facilitating – and covering up – slaughters of equal or greater proportion. This serves as a clear illustration that NATO’s decision to intervene in Yugoslavia was not based on a sincerely held conviction to avert human suffering. Instead, it seems clear that the intervention was guided by a different set of ulterior motives.

There were a number of motivating factors that drove NATO’s war but one, in particular, is worth underscoring. It had long been an American objective to fully marketise the European continent, a fact admitted internally by Washington policymakers. For example, in 1982, the Reagan administration published U.S. National Security Decision Directive 54: United States Policy Towards Eastern Europe. This text called for a “quiet revolution” to break-up Europe’s communist governments (Parenti, 2000: 25). This was followed by a similar strategy document two years later, USNSDD 133: United States Foreign Policy Towards Yugoslavia, which called for bringing the socialist state into the “orbit of the world market” (Parenti, 2000: 25). It is through this lens that NATO’s war against Yugoslavia must be viewed.

Viewing the intervention as part of an American effort to marketise the Yugoslav economy helps explain subsequent remarks made by the then-Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. Writing in the foreword of a 2005

book on the subject, Talbott candidly stated “it was Yugoslavia’s resistance to the broader trends of political and economic reform – not the plight of Kosovo Albanians – that best explains NATO’s war” (Norris, 2005: xxiii).

Talbott’s earnest writing helps provide crucial context to the, arguably, even more significant admission from the then-Supreme Commander of NATO, General Wesley Clark. According to Clark, the NATO intervention drawn up by the “political leadership” was not “designed as a means of blocking Serb ethnic cleansing. It was not designed as a means of waging war against the Serb [...] forces in Kosovo. Not in any way. There was never any intent to do that” (Chomsky, 1999: 36). If this isn’t enough to call into question the intervention’s ‘humanitarian’ credentials, the words of Elmar Schmähling – the then-head of German military intelligence – should leave little doubt about NATO’s true motives. The NATO strategy, Schmähling insists, was to “put pressure on the civilian population” and “to destroy the Yugoslav economy so deeply it would not recover” (Pilger, 2016: 148).

These admissions from figures intimately involved in the war’s planning serve as a useful explanation for the means used during the 78-day bombing campaign. Keeping in mind that the intervention was not designed as a means of blocking Serb ethnic cleansing and was instead intended to put pressure on the civilian population, it is little wonder NATO’s ‘humanitarian’ bombs destroyed bridges, water supplies, and electricity sources, often in areas of no discernible military importance. The case of Vojvodina is an instructive example. A region

located hundreds of miles from Kosovo - which, according to international observers, was entirely peaceful just days before the bombing commenced on March 24, 1999 - experienced some of the highest levels of NATO violence (Chomsky, 1999:34). Similarly, Podgorica's refusal to participate in Yugoslav military action did not spare Montenegrin cities from the Atlantic Alliance's aerial bombardment (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017: 192).

With respect to destroying the Yugoslav economy so deeply it would not recover, it is worth examining what NATO targeted, specifically. During the campaign, NATO destroyed fuel storage facilities, oil refineries, chemical factories, airports, railways, and warehouses (Parenti, 2000: 167). Perhaps the most transparent demonstration of NATO's true agenda comes from a study by the Confederation of Trade Unions of Serbia. According to their research, of the 164 factories destroyed during the bombing, all were state-owned (Parenti, 2000: 166).

In addition to selecting highly questionable targets, NATO's weapons of choice should cast further doubt on the 'humanitarian' nature of the war. How, for example, the use of illegal depleted uranium was intended to alleviate the suffering of Kosovar Albanians was never explained (Rudic, 2018). Similarly, the military necessity of using prohibited cluster bombs - which accounted for half of all the British bombs dropped - remains unclear (Curtis, 2003: 146).

As would be expected after employing such violent means in predominantly civilian areas, the ultimate outcome of NATO's intervention

was far from 'humanitarian'. An estimated 1,200 to 2,500 Serb civilians perished as a result of the bombing (B92, 2006). Moreover, those fortunate enough to have survived the conflict did not necessarily escape unscathed. NATO's use of illegal chemical weapons condemned Serbia to the highest cancer mortality rate in the whole of Europe (B92, 2015).

In fairness, NATO's intervention was not waged in defence of Serbs; rather, the Western powers acted to protect Kosovar Albanians from imminent harm. Therefore, to consider the war's ultimate outcome 'humanitarian', one ought not to look further than NATO's success in this regard. Unfortunately, here too the Atlantic Alliance failed.

The OSCE's December 1999 report on the conflict found that the majority of Serb violence against the Albanians took place after NATO's bombing commenced - the precise opposite of the alliance's professed intentions (Pilger, 2016: 150). To make matters worse, this is the exact outcome Western powers anticipated before deciding to go to war. By way of example, the American diplomat Norma Brown stated in the bombing's aftermath that "there was no humanitarian catastrophe until NATO began to bomb ... Everyone knew that a humanitarian crisis would arise if NATO started to bomb" (Curtis, 2003: 136). Similarly, the then-Chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton, reportedly warned prior to the bombing that intervention would "provoke Serb soldiers into greater acts of butchery" (Curtis, 2003: 139). Even General Wesley Clark has subsequently conceded that it was "entirely predictable" military action would worsen the humanitarian

situation (Curtis, 2003: 139).

Turning to Libya, it is instructive to begin an analysis of NATO's motivations in this intervention by, once again, highlighting the transparently selective nature of the conflict. Just like Kosovo, the violence in Libya was hardly aberrational. To illustrate this point, it is worth examining the case of Sri Lanka. In 2008 and continuing into 2009, Colombo waged its final assault against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam insurgents in an attempt to bring an end to its decade-long conflict. In so doing, it is estimated that as many as 40,000 civilians were killed (Doucet, 2012). Despite some calls for the invocation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the Western humanitarian warriors, who could not possibly countenance sitting on the sidelines in the face of Libya's (comparatively far less severe) violence, appeared uninterested in coming to Sri Lanka's rescue (Herman and Peterson, 2011: xii). By now, there is little need for detailed elaboration. Washington was on very good terms with the Sri Lankan authorities. As an expression of gratitude for these cordial relations, the U.S. had sent two billion dollars' worth of military aid Colombo's way, which would prove instrumental in ensuring the deadly efficiency of their violence (Herman and Peterson, 2011: xvi).

Perhaps the most revealing example concerns the West's long-standing allies in Saudi Arabia. Western powers were so determined to give their Libyan intervention a veil of legitimacy that they brokered a deal with their counterparts in Riyadh. According to diplomatic sources at the United Nations, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton promised to "green light"

the Kingdom's incursion into neighbouring Bahrain in return for an Arab League endorsement of NATO's proposed action (Curtis, 2018: 373). Simply put, in order to put a stop to one government's suppression of peaceful protesters, Washington consciously authorised another. This, in itself, should completely refute any suggestion of NATO's benign intentions.

To further undermine NATO's professed intentions it is worth considering that, although serious, the humanitarian situation in Libya in the war's prelude was far from catastrophic. As Professor Alan Kuperman observes, "the best evidence Khadafy did not plan a genocide in Benghazi is that he did not perpetrate it in the other cities he recaptured" (Forte, 2012: 242). This was true in the cities of Ajdabiya and Zawiya where the death toll barely reached the hundreds. In Bayda, between 59 and 64 are estimated to have been killed (Forte, 2012: 244). In one of the more extreme cases, Misrata, 257 lost their lives, a figure just north of the 232 killed by the Egyptian authorities in Cairo (Forte, 2012: 244). Readers can draw their own conclusions as to why there were no calls for intervention to stop these relatively comparable atrocities in Egypt.

Perhaps because the violence in Libya was not particularly exceptional, Western planners resorted to grossly exaggerating the on-ground situation to lend their proposed action much-needed credence. The then-U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice charged that Gaddafi had armed his troops with Viagra as part of an effort to encourage mass rape (MacAskill, 2011). Hillary Clinton echoed these baseless allegations, proclaiming the Libyan army was

using both violence against women and rape as “tools of war” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2012). Eventually, after these claims had outlived their usefulness, the truth emerged. Cherif Bassiouni, who led the UN’s Libya human rights investigation, determined that these charges were nothing more than the product of “massive hysteria” (Harding, 2011).

Worse still was the aforementioned charge of imminent slaughter in Benghazi. Central to NATO’s justification for war was the claim Gaddafi had hired black mercenaries from neighbouring African states to commit “genocide” in the coastal Libyan city (Smith, 2011). This allegation was nothing more than a total fabrication, a fact implicitly admitted by even the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016). In their February 2016 report, they concluded that charges of looming genocide were completely unfounded. So, if Western leaders really were convinced by the sanctity of their own case, why did they engage in such atrocity propaganda?

Naturally, this raises questions about the alliance’s actual motivations. It is not far-fetched to suggest wars for oil have long been staples of Western foreign policy (Muttitt, 2012). Based on the internal record, Libya appears perfectly in keeping with this long-established practice. To demonstrate this point, the following leaked 2007 internal memo from the U.S. embassy in Tripoli is worth examining. It lamented that Gaddafi’s oil policy was becoming increasingly “nationalistic” which “could jeopardize effective exploitation of Libya’s extensive oil and gas reserves” (The Telegraph, 2011). Gaddafi further provoked the ire of the West after renegotiating

preexisting oil contracts with foreign firms one year prior to NATO’s intervention. Under Libya’s new terms, private companies would only be entitled to 12% of the oil revenue, as opposed to the previous arrangement of 50%. According to The Wall Street Journal, this so frustrated Western oil giants that they “hoped regime change in Libya ... would bring relief in some of the tough terms they had agreed to in partnership deals” (Faucon, 2012). It may still be speculative to suggest this was the impetus for war, but leaked emails from Hillary Clinton’s close adviser Sydney Blumenthal strengthens this view. According to Blumenthal, France’s intervention was primarily driven “by a desire to gain a greater share of Libya (sic) oil production” (Edwards and Cromwell, 2018).

Despite their insistence that the intervention was strictly for the purposes of civilian protection, the above strongly indicates that NATO planners had other ideas. This is further evidenced in the way the war was prosecuted. Far from protecting civilian life, the Atlantic Alliance went so far as to, on occasion, directly target it, along with much civilian infrastructure (Ahmed, 2015). This was, perhaps, most viciously done in the Gaddafi loyalist stronghold of Sirte. An entirely peaceful city before NATO arrived, the benign humanitarians visited a ferocious aerial bombardment on its residents from the earliest stages of the conflict (Forte, 2012: 86).

Also inconsistent with NATO’s limited mandate is their direct targeting of Gaddafi himself. Contrary to their repeated denials of wanting regime change, NATO forces regularly targeted the Libyan leader throughout the entire campaign. Then-British Defence Secretary Liam Fox, for example, revealed that NATO

intelligence and reconnaissance assets were utilised in an attempt to “hunt down” Gaddafi (Forte, 2012: 121). Similarly, Fox’s American counterpart, Leon Panetta, boasted “it was a U.S. drone combined with the other NATO planes that fired on the [Gaddafi] convoy” (Forte, 2012: 125).

Naturally, NATO’s self-serving agenda did not yield a humanitarian outcome. Once they had succeeded in removing Gaddafi from power, the Atlantic Alliance cared little for the welfare of the country. In the true spirit of humanitarianism, Libya was abandoned and left to its own devices as competing bands of militias - many of whom received clandestine support from Western capitals (Hosenball, 2011) - fought for power in the ‘liberated’ nation. The result was a civil war which continues to plague the country to this day. What was formerly the richest country in Africa is now home to, among other things, slave markets (BBC, 2017).

Despite the official pronouncements stemming from Western policymakers, along with much of the academic community and mainstream journalism, humanitarian intervention is in no way representative of a normative foreign policy development. On the evidence of everything just discussed, it seems clear that ‘humanitarian’ interventions are antithetical to any discernible interpretation of humanitarianism. That the concept has persisted for so long and met limited serious scrutiny speaks to its great utility. Humanitarian intervention is not an expression of Western planners’ desire to put a stop to human suffering wherever it may be found; rather, it is a prolific weapon in the propaganda arsenal of politicians seeking to make their self-serving imperialists pursuits more palatable to war-weary publics.

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

ROBERT HART

INTRODUCTION

The publication of the 2017 National Security Strategy by the Trump Administration came as a surprise to the many who were anxiously awaiting its arrival. The National Security Strategy was published within the first year of the Trump presidency, an unprecedented feat for any administration, but what silenced the endless commentary in its build-up was the complete, almost conflicting nature of the document when held next to the every day campaign rhetoric used by the President. This creates a great veil of uncertainty for foreign allies in the already uncertain stance of a Trump that is highly critical of multilateralism and international institutionalism. However, when examining the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), it is hard not to notice the evident change in its view of both the world and the trajectory of the United States within that world. Rather than the abrasive language so often employed by Donald Trump, it would not be out of line to suggest that the document actually falls in line in many aspects with the strategic practice constitutive of the last two decades, undermining much of what Trump has famously promised at campaign rallies. Therefore, it is evident that the attempted materialization of Trump's 'America First' strategy in a global context has posed a great challenge to the foreign policy establishment of Washington. Through the close

observation of the divergent ontological backdrop of each administration, the main differences in language and policy, as well as the main continuities between the three administrations, the dual personality of the Trump NSS will become evident. The document itself is illustrative of a Trumpian 'America First' meeting the foreign policy bureaucracy in a manner that is representative of the prevailing power of the foreign policy establishment to maintain institutional continuity within the 2017 NSS.

ONTOLOGICAL BACKDROP

When analyzing national security strategy it is important to first understand the world from which it is conceptualized. The election of George W. Bush saw the rise of the highly influential 'neoconservatism' that has dominated the culture of U.S. foreign policy in the modern 21st century. It created an American interest as one that looks forward and attempts to find a world order that is foundationally comprised of virtue in accordance to the interests of the United States. Consequently, the strengthening of the international system and America's stance within it will increase prosperity and security at the domestic level. In a sense, this is based on the idea that the virtues and norms of an American

society are universal – they are something ‘exceptional’. However, it goes beyond this unitary outlook to propose that the world system should not be based solely on the presence of an exceptional United States, but also of a normative system that is comprised of the United States and other virtuous governments: “The culmination of this logic is, of course, the promotion of democracy as part of a ‘muscular patriotism’ is based upon ‘freedom and greatness’. Creating an international order of values is good for both America and the world” (Michael Williams 2005: 319). U.S. national interest is derivative of the maintenance of a ‘benevolent hegemony’ where American national interests are reliant on the maintenance and creation of a ‘virtuous’ system. However, in the wake of transnational terror events, this image becomes intertwined with fear. The events of 9/11 created a new international environment that is based on asymmetrical warfare patterns inflicted by non-state, transnational groups driven by radicalization and backed by technological capabilities matching those of traditional state adversaries. American foreign policy had been largely designed to respond to traditional adversarial confrontations created in the bipolar system of the Cold War, but, “Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technology against us” (The White House 2002: 3). From this backdrop, the 2002 NSS seems to be observant of a world that can be defined as ‘American exceptionalism’ international promotion compounded with a sense of fear.

With the transition into the Obama administration, it was apparent that the ‘Bush Doctrine’ had lost its support at home. In the wake of Afghanistan, Iraq and the Great Recession, it was time to take a new approach. This new approach signals the discontinuity in the means by which the administration came to understand its endgame. Obama focused his strategic rhetoric on the idea of national renewal - under the Bush administration, the identity of America abroad had seemingly diminished, and in order to remain the global hegemonic power, “We must pursue a strategy of national renewal and global leadership—a strategy that rebuilds the foundations of American strength and influence” (The White House 2010). The concept of ‘renewal’ is a humbling acknowledgement that the United States can no longer enjoy a sense of autonomy when it comes to its ability to combat armed conflict on multiple fronts. This stems from the retrospective observation that “The Bush strategy was able to begin by taking prosperity and deployable military power for granted” (Bahram Rajaei and Mark Miller 2011: 18), widening the gap between the capabilities of the United States and their commitments in the wake of a massive financial collapse. Due to this, it is not difficult to understand Obama’s reasoning of why “[The U.S.] must pursue a rules-based international system that can advance our own interests by serving mutual interests” (2010: 20). From this view, it is important to understand that a return of focus on the domestic and its renewal of strength will directly impact that of the United States and its ability to participate in internationalism. Therefore, the Obama world-view can be defined as a project of ‘American renewal’ in order to promote a just and sustainable international order.

The ontological backdrop of the 2017 National Security Strategy is uniquely derivative of the administration's 'principled realist' outlook on world affairs. In stark contrast to the 'Kantian' world of democratic peace observed by both Bush and Obama, Trump's 'principled realism' follows a more 'Hobbesian' outlook of an anarchical international system in which great powers are in competition with one another in an effort to gain advantage by preserving their own individual security. Furthermore, the "Administration understands alliances as temporary alignments of interest, without intrinsic value for the US [...] but if and when interests coincide, the door could be opened for collaboration to others" (Carlota Encina 2018: 7). This world system consists of resurgent great powers that threaten the normative values of the United States, as well as the international system in an effort to exploit international institutions and challenge the United State's economic security. Due to this, the 2017 NSS suggests that the U.S. needs to reexamine its policies of the last two decades: "Policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions [...] would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy actors" (The White House 2017: 3). Instead, the focus needs to be on the domestic front, or rather an 'America first' approach. At first glance, it is highly reminiscent of 'isolationism', though as stated before, it is important to differentiate campaign rhetorics and documentary language when observing the NSS. However, the fact remains that the Trump outlook on the post-World War II world order of internationalism is highly critical, with a novel view that the United States has been a victim of the international system rather than its arbiter, suffering from 'free riders' and multilateral deals

that do not directly benefit the United States. It is this dark turn to a geopolitical ontology that is quintessential Trumpian policy. Consequently, the 2017 NSS portrays a conflicting strategy that consists of traditional U.S. internationalism grafted onto the 'principled realism' that in result creates even more uncertainty in the validity of the 2017 National Security Document.

WHAT IS DIFFERENT?

The substance of the 2017 strategy consists of two entirely antithetical paradigms that create a hybrid strategy, combining traditional U.S. internationalism to the disruptive 'principled realism' idiosyncratic of Trumpian policy. This apparent break presents us with much continuity as well as divergent conceptions that seek to upend past policies implemented by past administrations. As elucidated above, the return to a geopolitical world based on competition creates a platform to take a much more aggressive posture towards 'resurgent' powers such as China and Russia. Looking back at the Bush and Obama administration's NSSs, it is apparent that the two had very optimistic views of Sino-U.S./Russian-U.S. relations that were based on liberal values of integration. The Bush NSS saw Russian involvement through the scope of a post-Cold War world constitutive of globalization and the need to involve Russia in that process: "Russia is in the midst of a hopeful transition [...] We will assist Russia's preparations to join the WTO" (2002: I, 18). Furthermore, Bush saw the events of 9/11 as a unique circumstance to initiate cooperation with its former adversary in the fight against terror. Similarly with China, the 2002 NSS document promotes integration suggesting that China 'is the gateway to Asia-

Pacific relations' (2002: 27). On the same path, the Obama administration followed suit, stating that "We will continue to deepen our cooperation with the 21st century centers of influence – including China, India, and Russia – on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect" (2010: 11). In fact, this line is stated twice in the 2010 NSS, and it explicitly states that China is essential in addressing the major issues of the times. The 2017 NSS, however, takes a much more pessimistic, state-centric view of resurgent powers in the global order: "China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity" (2017: 2). The NSS cites previous attempts to integrate both states into the international system as a complete failure (2017: 3), and in fact has allowed both states, particularly China, to take advantage of the global system in an exploitative manner. Moreover, the document claims that "China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region" (2017: 25). The competitive nature is illustrative of the realist approach to international affairs, and is in stark contrast to both preceding administrations.

Probably the most novel development within the 2017 NSS is the sharp break that the strategy takes in terms of dismissing the validity of a rules-based international system (Ettinger 2018: 479). The document illustrates the international system as a means for states to pursue their own interests in an exploitative manner that takes advantage of multilateral agreements, creating the need to, as Ettinger says, "Supplant free trade with reciprocity" (2018: 479). This is a major regression back towards a primitive economic practice of early

America, in an assertion of trade policy from a point of domination over partners with the means to "retaliate against discriminatory trade barriers"(2018: 479). In a modern international system, the Bush administration acknowledged that, "Free trade and free markets [have] proven their ability", specifically in their uplifting nature of poverty-stricken states (2002: iii). In fact, one of the main strategic objectives of the 2002 NSS is to work with individual nations and the global trading community in order to construct a free market economic system to promote collective prosperity. Similarly, the 2010 NSS completely dismisses the idea of 'reciprocity' by making the pursuit of free trade fundamental to its strategy: "We will pursue multilateral trade agreements that advance our shared prosperity [...] by resisting protectionism and promoting trade that is free and fair" (2010: 4 and 29). Multilateralism within trade has been a foundational aspect of American foreign policy since the post-World War II era; however, it is not surprising to see a sharp break in this policy under a Trump administration. Trumpian 'principled realism' does not see validity in a multilateral system, but rather one that should resort back to protectionism in a stance that the United States has been a victim to 'free-riders' of the system, and that what is good for the collective is no longer in line with what is good for the United States. The phrase 'free and reciprocal trade' appears multiple times in the 2017 NSS along with the movement away from multilateralism and to a position of one-sided bilateralism in favor of the United States.

Modern American foreign policy has been greatly influenced by the actions of the United States during the Cold War Era to the

time right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the idea was 'containment' of democracy around the world against the influence of communist Russia, and with the fall of Soviet influence in the late 80s and early 90s, the United States saw an opportunity to move to a stance of enlargement and engagement through the implementation of globalization (Ettinger 2018; Macdonald 2018). The idea of 'state-building' became highly popular with the rise of neoconservatism under the Bush administration, under the guise of the expansion of 'American exceptionalism'. State-building is foundational to the 2002 NSS, in an explicit acknowledgement that "We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy [...] to every corner of the world" (2002). The Bush Document is extremely consistent in its posture towards the advancement of democracy and human rights to a point where it became one of his biggest criticisms. While Obama saw the growing gap between capabilities and commitments, the 2010 document still followed the same foundations of commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights suggesting that they "Are essential sources of our strength and influence in the world" (2010: 2). Even more fundamentally, the document outlines international development as a major objective for the United States in its advancement in the international system. When it comes to the advancement of democracy and human rights, the 2017 NSS is extremely conflicting in its 'state-building' attitude (the similarities will be discussed in the next section). However, when focusing on the differences, one can see an obvious drawback in international intervention in the non-committal language of the document: "We are not going to

impose our values on others [...] [but offer] encouragement to those struggling for human dignity" (2017: 38). This idea is illustrative of the return of focus on making America 'great again' by focusing on the development of the home front. The promotion of values tends to be the necessity to preserve traditional values at the domestic level, and the mention of human rights is almost non-existent, with only a single mention of it in the entire document.

CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO

As stated before, the 2017 National Security Strategy is a contradictory document that is composed of two very distinct personalities: 'Trumpian realism' and the traditional status quo. The conflicting nature of the strategy is illustrative of the inner struggle between conflicting ideologies within the White House, which has inhibited these influences to collide in a single direction (Ettinger 2018: 476). As we saw in the previous section, there are many novel breaks in traditional strategy that lead to conflicting policies in the strategic documents spanning the past two decades. However, now it is important to point out the consistencies between the three administrations in order to elucidate the traditional undertones that have been added by the traditional foreign policy bureaucracy. Throughout all three administrations, the existential threats remained relatively consistent, specifically the nuclear threat. In past decades, this threat has come from a single source, however each document, in unison, acknowledges the current system to be full of rogue states and adversaries with nuclear capabilities and the intention to use them. The

Obama administration sums it up best by explaining that “The gravest danger to the American people and global security continues to come from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons” (2017: 8). Furthermore, the 2002 document sees North Korea as a growing threat as the world’s “principle purveyor of ballistic missiles” (2002). All seem to stay in line in an act to promote and enforce non-proliferation of nuclear capabilities, and in this sense, the harsher language of the Trump NSS is seen as more of a response to the same threats that have just materialized since their conception in the 2002 and 2010 NSS, rather than a break of any kind (Emma Ashford 2018: 144). Leading on from this identification of the threat, the strategic objective on how to address the threat remains consistent in a show of military power and defense infrastructure upgrade. In similar words to the 2002 NSS, the 2017 NSS states, “America’s military remains the strongest in the world. However, U.S. advantages are shrinking as rival states modernize and build up their conventional and nuclear forces [...] Our task is to ensure that American military superiority endures and in combination with other elements of national power, is ready to protect Americans against sophisticated challenges to national security” (2017). The most common theme throughout the documents is the necessity for the United States to carry out its strategy with the backing of the entire national system, though how they get to that point may vary.

Along with assessing the threats of nuclear capability, the three administrations continue to view the threat of jihadi terrorism as critical, though the Obama administration has been criticized in its lack of the use of ‘jihadi’

with terrorism (Macdonald 2018). However, rather than looking at the broad scope of terrorism, it is important to focus on Trump’s view on military intervention and state-building in relation to combating terror. Outwardly, Trump has been especially critical of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, however the 2017 NSS stands in line with Bush in the policy that the U.S. will combat terrorism to its source, even in eliminating terrorist safe havens: “We will act against sanctuaries and prevent their reemergence before they threaten the U.S. homeland [...] We support with our words and actions, those who live under oppressive regimes”. This suggests that the NSS is willing to get more involved in the region than the President publicly claims. Even further, in order to do this the U.S. needs allies in both the region and around the world. In doing so, multilateralism will assist in the implementation of U.S. interests through America’s leadership globally: “We will compete and lead in multilateral organizations so that American interests and principles are protected” (2017). This is a continuation of Obama’s leadership from within the rules-based system. The 2017 NSS recognizes the importance of NATO and the strategic advantage that it grants the U.S. in both Europe and the Middle East, a continuation of a crucial practice of multilateral cooperation in the Middle East (though sometimes, as seen with Iraq, can be a ‘unilateral/multilateral’ cooperation outside of institutions) (Ettinger 2017). This continuation undermines the 2017 NSS’s highly critical nature of multilateralism. While publicly Trump has been overly critical of foreign partnerships and multilateralism, it is very interesting to see the seemingly liberal institutionalism prevailing at certain times throughout the document.

CONCLUSION

The 2017 National Security Strategy is a foundational document for the Trump administration in the sense that it is the first formulation of Trump's foreign policy in a coherent format outside of campaign rhetorics. Historically, the National Security Strategies of the United States have been extremely broad and highly ambitious, covering more than it is possible to address, resulting in what can be described as more of a formality than an actual guideline for intergovernmental agencies and foreign allies (Macdonald 2018). However, the 2017 NSS stands out in the context of uncertainty about the U.S.'s position in the world with the rise of 'principled realism' within the administration. Moreover, the document signals a prevailing view-point of continued internationalism from the foreign policy establishment; however, with the high turnover rate in the current administration and the firings of key security personnel, it is yet to be seen how this strategy will materialize into practice in the coming years.

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GRAND STRATEGISTS

T H R O U G H O U T T H E A G E S

IDEAS OF POWER AND THE POWER OF IDEAS: ALIGNMENT, APPLICATION, ADAPTATION, ARTICULATION IN JOMINI'S AND CLAUSEWITZ'S STUDIES OF STRATEGY

ALEXANDER OLTEANU

ABSTRACT

The concept of 'strategy' is making a remarkable comeback in the 21st century, as balance-of-power politics is being played again, this time truly at the global level. This essay investigates the genesis of 'Strategy with a capital "S"' in the writings of Jomini and Clausewitz in the first half of the nineteenth century and the dynamics of its theoretical interpretation and practical application from the Napoleonic Era to today. It does so by applying the '4 As' of interpretive hermeneutics – prefigurative Alignment, configurative Application, refigurative Adaptation and transformative Articulation – to this iterative investigation of Jomini's and Clausewitz's work. This methodology results in the emergence, from the interstices of their competing and complementary approaches to War and Strategy, of a three-dimensional concept of 'Strategy' aligning Policy Process, Power Praxis and Political Purpose. It also gives rise to a corresponding analytical framework of the deployment of 'Strategy' in various spatio-temporal environments, that combines various leadership modalities with a full continuum of conflictual systems. This essay concludes by arguing that both these elements of the Strategy-as-practice toolkit remain remarkably current and eminently applicable to the rapidly evolving geopolitical ecosystem of the 21st century.

KEYWORDS: Strategy; Total War; Dialectics; Nuclear Era; Napoleon, Frederick II; Clausewitz; Jomini.

COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE STRATEGIES OF ALEXANDER III OF MACEDON, LOUIS XIV OF FRANCE, FREDERICK II OF PRUSSIA, AND NAPOLEON I OF FRANCE

RORY MCDOWELL

ABSTRACT

The four men that are the focus of this essay are each a giant in their own right, often still regarded as heroes in their own country and further afield. Alexander the Great was undefeated on the field of battle from Greece to India, Louis XIV holds the record for longest reign of a monarch, Frederick the Great won the Seven Years War against all odds, and Napoleon won victory after victory on his way to conquering most of continental Europe. While warfare and expansion feature predominantly in the lives of all four men, the strategies employed both in their aims and executions differ wildly, but there are also many striking similarities. In this essay I will compare and contrast these strategies, by first seeking to understand the aims and motivations of each ruler, then examining through what means they attempted to achieve these goals. This will be followed by an overall comparison and evaluation of the men as strategists.

KEYWORDS: Strategy; Comparative Case Study; History of Strategy; Monarchs.

IDEAS OF POWER AND THE POWER OF IDEAS: ALIGNMENT, APPLICATION, ADAPTATION, ARTICULATION IN JOMINI'S AND CLAUSEWITZ' STUDIES OF STRATEGY

ALEXANDER OLTEANU

THE '4 AS' OF INTERPRETIVE HERMENEUTICS

How best to begin an inquiry into whether Jomini and Clausewitz 'wrote about strategy'? Do we, like Heuser (2010b: 3), apply to them retrospectively our own definition of "Strategy with a capital 'S'" – knowing that our current Transatlantic understanding thereof primarily reflects the latter's conceptualization rather than the former's? Do we stick to their original texts and focus on their definitions of 'strategy', as Strachan (2007: 24) seems to advise? Or does an "adequate treatment" of the two giants of modern strategic thought entail that we attempt, with Herberg-Rothe (2007a: 306-307), to think both "with" and "beyond" them? Four decades ago, Aron (1976) had already explained that each such point of view constitutes a separate interpretative level and Lefort (1977: 1269) had approvingly commented that each such hermeneutic circle adds a necessary and necessarily critical perspective to a coherent and comprehensive assessment of the original question.

We have entered the third decade of the 21st century – a time when the notion of 'strategy' is experiencing an unexpected regain in popularity. Old regional and global frameworks of governance seem to fade away whilst 19th

century Europe's 'Great Game' of 'balance of power competition' (Kissinger, 1994) is being played again, only this time on a 'Grand Chessboard' at the planetary level (Brzezinski, 1997) and "[w]ith GPS" (Gray, 1999a). It is therefore more important than ever that we come to terms with what "Strategy with a capital 'S'" means to us today.

This essay takes on Herberg-Rothe's challenge of identifying "the best way to begin" doing so by sketching out – exactly two centuries after the French and Prussian frenemies' 'ideas on Power' began to change their world (and ours!) through the 'power of their Ideas' (Cozette, 2004) - both a methodological and substantive outline of how we should engage in a process of reflexive analysis of our question. Specifically, it applies throughout its four main sections Aron's and Lefort's iterative approach to Clausewitz's and Jomini's discourses on 'Strategy'. For this purpose, it successively deploys to their treatises on war (and operationalizations of 'Strategy') the '4 As' of interpretive hermeneutics – namely prefigurative Alignment, configurative Application, refigurative Adaptation and transformative Articulation (see Fig. 1 below)". It then concludes by highlighting a creative answer capable of illuminating the strategic challenges we ourselves face amidst the uncertainties of our rapidly unfolding Connexity Era (Mulgan, 1998).

Figure 1: Interpretive hermeneutics' '4 As' concentric circles:
Alignment, Application, Adaptation, Articulation

Strategies@Strategy		Jomini's Strategy	Clausewitz's Strategy	Aron's Strategy
Levels of Analysis				
A1: Alignment (History & Theory) [Prefiguration] Q1H: How does it reflect the spirit of a given time & its problems? (M.L. Handel)	Enlightenment Rationalism Revolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategy as scientific conduct of warfare • War is offence, concentration of forces and decisive victory 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Philosophical roots: first Montesquieu and Kant, later Hegel (after 1827) • Strategic principles of warfare • Reason of State • Translation question (Howard & Paret) 	A3: Adaptation (Praxis & Politics) [Refiguration] 'Most elaborate and comprehensive analysis of Clausewitz's work' (Graz) Q3H: How was the work interpreted in different periods & circumstances?
	Romantic Nationalism Counter-revolution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander Genius • Troops' Elan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategy: alignment of ends, means, purpose (Ziel, Mittel, Zweck) • 'Wonderous Trinity' • Troops' Moral • 'War is continuation of politics by other means' 	Re-alignment: Re-fits Clausewitzian theory into 'new realist theory' matching realities of 20 th century's Nuclear Era.
A2: Application (Theory & Praxis) [Configuration] Q2H: What is the theory it advances to explain or solve specific problems?	Frederick II of Prussia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defence • Generally critical opinion • Linear negative static evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited war • Reversal from critical to positive after 1827 point of inflection • Progressive evaluation 	Re-application: 'Peace is not war by other means'; Clausewitz as precursor of 'conflict resolution' approach to IR.
	Napoleon Bonaparte	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offense • Constant admiring opinion • Linear positive static evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absolute war • Reversal from admiring to critical after 1827 point of inflection • Regressive evaluation 	Re-Articulation: Strategy as Praxeology
A4: Articulation (Theory & Politics) [Transformation] Q4H: In what ways has the theory become obsolete? L.J. Blanken synthesis: 'strategic choice' framework	Hew Strachan	@A4.1 Interpretative Theory of war and warfare: Primarily positive because of 'operational' focus.	Theory of war and warfare: Primarily critical – adopts narrow interpretation of 'war is politics by other means'.	@A4.2 Reflexive Current political & military praxis: Military strategy: "Universal Principles of war" school ('Jominian')
	Andreas Herberg-Rothe	Theory of war and warfare: Primarily critical – rejects military autonomy model.	Theory of war and warfare: Primarily positive - adopts a Clausewitz-Plus approach to War & Strategy in 21 st century.	Current political & military praxis: Political strategy: "Context-dependent" school ('Clausewitzian')
	Beatrice Heuser	Theory of war and warfare: Primarily neutral – balances sound operational principles with lack of political oversight over military.	Theory of war and warfare: Primarily constructive criticism -embraces Clausewitzian analysis of war and Strategy but regrets failure to explicitly address ethics and just war.	Current political & military praxis: Ethical strategy as just war and lasting peace: Howard; "Paradoxical logic" ('neo-Clausewitzians'): Luttwak and Gray

STRATEGY AS ALIGNMENT

The first dialectic circle of interpretative hermeneutics as elaborated by Aron and Lefort consists of prefiguring how Jomini's and Clausewitz's substantive theoretical frameworks align with the historical contexts of their socio-cultural ecosystem. It thereby provides an answer to the first of Handel's (1986: 4) four key questions in light of which any great work of political theory must be analysed – namely, the manner in which it reflects “the spirit of a given time and its problems”.

The three-quarters of a century spanning Frederick II's invasion of Silesia, in 1740, and Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo, in 1815, constitutes a period of almost incessant warfare in European history. This era of upheaval and conflict marks three important interdependent transitions that reshaped the destinies of the Old Continent and of the entire world: from Enlightenment Rationalism to Romantic Nationalism (Gat, 1992: 1-2; Calhoun, 2011; Niebisch, 2011); from limited 'Wars of Princes' to total 'Wars of Nations' (Hagemann, 2015: 136); and from an almost exclusive preoccupation with the scientific study of the specific principles of warfare to a philosophically-anchored investigation of the full complexities of war (Herberg-Rothe, 2001; 2009). Colin Gray best explains this critical distinction when he states that:

“War is a relationship between belligerents; it is the whole context for warfare. Warfare is defined as ‘the act of making war’”. (2006: 82)

The concept of Strategy emerged and developed in the interstices of the tension between the theory and practice of 'war' and

'warfare' and is critically shaped by all three transitions mentioned above. The two catalysts for Strategy's rise as the primary practice connecting the emerging European national states' networks of power – political, military, diplomatic, legal, and civic – were Prussia's Frederick the Great (1712-1786) (von Hohenzollern, 1999; Kunnisch, 2005) and France's Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) (Bonaparte, 1999; Colson, 2015). Although neither ruler used the word 'Strategy' as such whilst in power, they were its greatest practitioners and served as inspiration for the three individuals who together defined and clarified the meaning and importance of Strategy during this era: the French Comte de Guibert (1743-1790) (Chaliand, 1994; Heuser, 2010d), the Swiss Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) (Howard, 1965; Shy, 1998) and the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) (Parkinson, 1970; Paret, 1976).

De Guibert first defined strategy in his 'Essai général de la tactique' as “the entire art of movement or large-scale army manoeuvres”, within an emerging vision of unlimited war of movement of massive 'citizens' armies' (Bonaparte, 1999; Colson, 2015). Jomini followed suit concentrating on the operational level by dividing “the art of war” in five “purely military” branches – Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering, and Tactics – and describing 'strategy' as “the art of properly directing masses upon the theatre of war, either for defense or for invasion” (2007: 7). For Clausewitz, “the distinction between tactics and strategy is now almost universal... [T]actics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of war” (1976: 128). Critically, for him, the object of war can only be politically determined, hence his

famous statement that “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (1976: 87).

Although both Jomini and Clausewitz focus on the operational level of warfare when defining ‘strategy’ (Strachan, 2011) and each develops a set of applicable principles (Strachan, 2007: 83) in the conduct of ‘engagements’, the objectives of their studies are radically different (Aron 1976). Jomini aims to establish the scientific nature of warfare by devising a set of universally applicable principles. These tenets must be, in his view, free of political control and capable of being deployed in practice by the military commander’s ‘genius’ irrespective of time, place or technological change (Niebisch, 2011). Conversely, Clausewitz rejects this approach (Paret, 1976: 153) because he realises that “there is more to war than warfare” (Gray, 2006: 86). Therefore, he focuses first on the nonlinear contingencies (Beyerchen, 1992), interactive uncertainties and risk probabilities (Waldman, 2010) of war and on the need to constantly adapt its practice to specific spatio-temporal contexts (Fleming, 2009; Drohan, 2011). Secondly, he emphasizes that political aims constitute war’s very reason for being deployed to either threaten one’s adversary or to physically submit it to one’s will (Schuurman, 2014; Milburn, 2018).

STRATEGY AS APPLICATION

The second dialectic circle of interpretative hermeneutics resides in configuring how Jomini’s and Clausewitz’s theoretical systems apply to the key practical examples they deploy to substantiate their main

tenets – in our case, to the strategic praxis of Frederick II and of Napoleon, both instrumental in substantiating the strategies and principles of warfare advanced by our two authors (Luvaas, 1986; Shy, 1988). It thus addresses Handel’s second interrogation regarding works of political philosophy, focusing on the substance of the theory designed to “explain or solve specific contemporary problems” (Handel, 1986: 4).

Both Jomini and Clausewitz used the ‘vicarious experience method’ (1986: 18) in their dialogue with their ‘two great captains’ – Frederick and Napoleon (1986: 18-19). Jomini first studied Frederick’s battles to develop his principles of warfare, then adapted them to Napoleon’s strategy in combat (Gat, 1989). He then criticized Frederick for often failing to implement his principles by being overly timid (Gat, 1989: 122) and eventually Napoleon for forgetting “that the mind and strength of man have their limit” (Handel, 2005: 272). In doing so he aimed to establish the scientific universality of his principles of warfare – an aim which remained virtually unchanged throughout his long life (Shy, 1998: 145). Clausewitz deployed in addition a ‘critical analysis’ method’ (Handel, 1986: 19) to the study of Frederick and Napoleon by means of a dialectical “application of theoretical truths to actual events” (Bonaparte, 1999: 141). He went far beyond Jomini’s ‘manual of warfare’ containing static principles of operational strategy by positing that strategy varies with the nature of the war being conducted and with its ultimate political purpose (Heuser, 2002). Clausewitz thus succeeded in devising a conceptual framework of war as a system capable of accommodating both Frederick’s limited war practice and Napoleon’s ‘total war’ approach” (Bonaparte, 1999; Esdaile, 2008). Human knowledge develops in specific socio-

historical contexts, through dialectical exchanges of views between members of interconnected multi-generational intellectual clusters, each of whom attempts to occupy the central nodal role of his cluster in terms of reputation and influence as well as of career and personal benefits (Collins, 1998). Such a cluster developed in Europe with respect to the study of war and strategy from the 1740s to the 1840s. Pioneering authors such as Henry Lloyd (1718-1783) (Howard, 1965: 6-8), Dietrich von Bülow (1757-1807) (Palmer, 1998) and the Archduke Charles of Austria (1741-1847) (Heuser, 2010b) were supplanted by a remarkable trio: Guibert set the terms of a new approach to Strategy in 1772 (Chaliand, 1994; Heuser, 2010b: 18-19); Jomini articulated his Principles of Warfare and published them in 1804 (Gat, 1989); Clausewitz read Jomini's initial work, criticized it (Gat, 1989: 123-124) but also re-interpreted and re-defined, after 1827, his own way of thinking about War and Strategy (1989). Finally, Jomini studied Clausewitz's On War, first printed in 1832, then used it to adapt and modify his own seminal work, The Art of War, published in 1838 (Shy, 1998: 153-155). It is this creative tension and iterative dialectical development (Howard, 1965: 10) that have bequeathed us not only a three-dimensional concept of 'Strategy' aligning Policy Process, Power Praxis and Political Purpose (von Clausewitz, 1976: 372; Strachan, 2013: 58), but also a corresponding analytical framework of its deployment in various specific spatio-temporal environments. Both of these remain remarkably current to this day and are fully mapped out here for the very first time.

'Strategy' thus came to encompass a new "amazing Trinity" (Howard, 2007: vii) connecting the Process, Praxis and Purpose of War. First, it

refers to the iterative Process of aligning the aims, assets, and actions of a polity's sovereign Crown, political Counsel, legal Constitution, military Command and civic Community networks active within a specific dynamic spatio-temporal, cultural, economic and technological Context (*jus ad bellum*). Second, it imposes in actual Praxis, through a dialectical confrontational clash of wills carried out in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous crucible of conflict (Mackay, 2020), that polity's objectives upon its adversary(ies) by means of applying the threat or use of legitimate force (*jus in bello*). Third, it does so for the conclusive Purpose of achieving a fair and just outcome for all participating parties, resulting in the contestants' conciliation and ultimately in a sustainable peace (*jus post bellum*)" (see Fig. 2).

The analytical framework mapped out by this definition encompasses three 'ideal' paradigms of Grand Strategy (Wallach, 1986: 302-303), differentiated by the alignment dynamics between Crown, Counsel, Constitution, Command, Community and Context: the primary Functional Fusion Paradigm (Luvaas, 1986: 167; Gray, 1999b: 77-78) to which Guibert, Jomini and Clausewitz all contributed; the Jominian Divisional Differentiation Paradigm (Shy, 1998; Strachan, 2013); and the Clausewitzian Complex Connexity Paradigm (von Clausewitz, 1976: 130). In 'reality', each polity structures its own type of Grand Strategy during specific historical eras. The substantive content and subjective interpretation memorialising the past, analysing the present and pointing towards the future (Strachan, 2013: 235) of such Grand Strategies are defined by the interaction between the type of leadership structure and nature of conflictual system deployed in each particular circumstance. This double continuum,

already prefigured in Clausewitz's writings (1976: 378-379), succeeds in connecting the 'Fusion', 'Differentiation' and 'Connectivity' leadership modalities on the one hand, with the 'Total', 'Real' and 'Guerrilla' warfare (Strachan, 2013: 62) conflictual systems on the other, within an overall conflict classification matrix (see Fig. 3).

Figure 2: Clausewitzian System of Grand Strategy-as-Practice




Figure 3: Classification of Wars in the Guibert/Jomini/Clausewitz Conflict Ecosystem

<i>Leadership Structure</i> <i>Conflictual System</i>	Functional Fusion Paradigm <i>(Guibert, Jomini, Clausewitz)</i>	Divisional Differentiation Paradigm <i>(Jomini)</i>	Complex Connectivity Paradigm <i>(Clausewitz)</i>
Total War	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Napoleon, 1799-1815 ❖ Stalin, World War II ❖ Hitler, World War II 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ World War I Germany 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ 6th and 7th Coalition Allies, 1813-1815 ❖ World War II Allies
Real War	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Frederick II of Prussia, 1740-1786 ❖ Atatürk, post WWI Turkey ❖ Putin in Georgia, 2008 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Von Moltke in Austria 1866 and France 1870 ❖ USA in Iraq & Afghanistan since 1991 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ NATO in Cold War, 1948-1991 ❖ Israel, 1945-1973
Guerilla War	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Franco, Spain, 1930s ❖ Mao, China, 1930s-1949 ❖ Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam, 1950s-1970s ❖ Castro, Cuba, 1950s 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ UK in Boer War, 1890s ❖ USA in Vietnam, 1962-1973 ❖ Israel in Lebanon and 'Palestine', since 1982 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Mandela, South Africa, 1980s ❖ Fretilin, Timor Leste, 1974-1999

Whereas only the Strategy variations encompassed by the 'Complex Connectivity Paradigm' correspond to our current Transatlantic theoretical understanding of the proper relationship between military power and civilian politics (Herberg-Rothe, 2008; 2014; 2016), this analytical framework maps out for explanatory purposes all other options deployed by various state and non-state actors over the past two centuries, without evaluating them from normative or practical perspectives. By deploying this definition and analytical framework of Strategy, we gain a much clearer perspective of the evolution of the notion and application of Strategy from the mid-18th century onwards. This helps us to master both the philosophical and historical tools enabling us to assess their deployment in specific spatio-temporal contexts. We also come to appreciate why Frederick's and Napoleon's Fusion Paradigm was replaced by Jomini's Divisional Differentiation Paradigm after 1815 (Harsh, 1974; Shy, 1998; Dighton, 2018), why the latter

turn began to be supplanted by 1870 by Clausewitz's Complex Connexity Paradigm (Heuser, 2007; Schuurman, 2014; Binkely, 2016) – and why all three re-emerged at various historical conjunctures across the 20th and 21st centuries in multiple forms and variations (Griffin, 2014; Hensch, 2017; Johnson, 2017; Hughes and Koutsoukis, 2019). It is in this sense that Paret aptly observed that:

"[w]ith an efficiency that never ceases to be impressive, each generation chooses those features of an idea [of Strategy] that seem immediately useful, while disregarding or even falsifying the total intellectual concept from which they stem".
(Howard, 1965: 23)

STRATEGY AS ADAPTATION

The third dialectic circle of interpretative hermeneutics posits that an interpreter of Jomini's and Clausewitz's texts active in a different spatio-temporal setting –in our case,

20th-century French philosopher Raymond Aron who in his seminal book *Penser la guerre, Clausewitz*, published in 1976 (Aron, 1976), “offers the most comprehensive and elaborate analysis of Clausewitz’s work and theoretical conceptions” (Gat, 1989: 170) – attempted to refigure their works in such a way as to adapt their historically-bound praxis to his own distinctive political environment. It thus proposes a reply to Handel’s (1986: 4) third seminal question regarding great works of political philosophy, namely in which ways it was “interpreted in different periods and circumstances”.

In contrast to B.H. Liddell Hart (Beaufre, 1965; Strachan, 2013: 126-127), whom he criticizes for a superficial reading of Clausewitz (Aron, 1976), Aron focuses on the Prussian’s post-1827 reworking of *On War* and on his two Notes (Aron, 1974; Lefort, 1977). Like Hart, Aron develops an ‘indirect’ strategy of armed conflict (Aron & Tenenbaum, 1972: 599-621; Emmanuel, 1986: 248-268), but one based on the Clausewitzian insight that the threat of war deployed for policy purposes in order to avoid an actual clash of arms often constitutes the most effective available strategic option. The French author aims to distil therefrom a new strategy of war capable of avoiding direct military confrontation, that best explains the ‘cold war’ of the bipolar nuclear world in which he lives (Aron, 1976: 139-183; Freund, 1976: 643-651). He analyses Clausewitz’s and Jomini’s approaches to war by defining the central debate opposing them as the existence of a universal “key to the science of war [...] a theory capable of revealing to military leaders the secret of victory” (Aron, 1976: 282). He then deploys the use the two authors make of Frederick II and Napoleon’s campaigns (Aron, 1976: 446-450) to demonstrate that Jomini not only failed to fully grasp the “solidarity between politics and strategy”

which excludes “the autonomy of the military conduct of operations” (Aron, 1976: 282-283), but was also unable to envisage the topic central to Clausewitz’s entire work: the relationship between concepts and history (Aron, 1976: 283). Aron shows that whilst Jomini proclaimed that the fundamental principles of strategy remain the same and unchanged for all times because they are “independent of the nature of the weapons and organisations of hosts” (Aron, 1976), Clausewitz wrote that “each epoch develops its own strategic doctrine” (Aron, 1976; Luvaas, 1986, 168). Aron goes on to elaborate a concept of nuclear deterrence based on Clausewitz’s insight of war as an instrument of politics and derives therefrom a theory of peaceful conflict management as the highest form of strategy (Cozette, 2004; Cooper, 2011), one uniquely suited for an international community defined by a limited sovereignty of states resulting from the real threat of total nuclear annihilation (Arndt, 1977).

STRATEGY AS ARTICULATION

The fourth dialectic circle of interpretative hermeneutics asserts that contemporary critics of both Jomini’s and Clausewitz’s work and of their earlier interpreters’ application of the two theorists of war’s writings to their own era will perform a transformative task of double articulation. First, they will engage in an interpretative articulation effort aimed at elucidating Jomini’s and Clausewitz’s original texts on their own terms and in their specific contexts based on the totality of the information pertaining thereto currently available. Second, the critics in question will undertake a reflexive articulation exercise of “refracting” (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 535-536; Neibisch, 2011: 260) these interpretations through the adaptation lenses of earlier commentators, such as Aron.

This will inform the latest critics' aim of distilling a new and relevant conceptualisation of the original texts, capable of providing meaningful insights for current theoretical understandings and future practical actions. This methodology corresponds to Handel's (1986: 4) fourth key question regarding a work of political philosophy, namely "[i]n what ways has the theory become obsolete" and to its logical corollary, focusing on the work's internal resources to overcome obsolescence and remain relevant when applied to contemporary spatio-temporal ecosystems.

We will briefly touch here on three well-known experts of 'Strategy' in general and of the 'Napoleonic war paradigm' in particular: Hew Strachan, Andreas Herberg-Rothe and Beatrice Heuser. All three authors wrote influential monographs analysing Clausewitz's *On War* (Heuser, 2002; Herberg-Rothe, 2007b; Strachan, 2007), made important contributions to the insightful 2007 book entitled *Clausewitz in the 21st Century* (Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, 2007) and critically addressed various aspects of Raymond Aron's commentaries on Jomini and Clausewitz (Herberg-Rothe, 2007a: 306-307; Strachan, 2007: 24; Heuser, 2010b: 3).

Strachan takes a Jominian 'military strategy' approach (2007) by defining strategy in terms of 'universal principles of war' (2005; 2011; 2019). He believes Clausewitz's late insight on the relationship between war and policy has been overemphasized (2013: 13; 2007: 96-97) and disagrees with Aron's attempt to integrate his writings into the theory of a peaceful liberal international order (Herberg-Rothe, 2007: 306-307). Herberg-Rothe adopts a very different, context-dependent 'political strategy' approach (2001; 2007b; 2014) leading him, like Aron, to

make a direct connection between Clausewitz's late notion of 'limited war' and the emergence of a states' system capable of progressively limiting war and violence for its own self-preservation (2007a; 2008; 2016).

The third school of thought comprises scholars who analyse Clausewitz's thoughts on the ethics of war from complementary angles. Colin Gray believes that grand strategy is a process that serves as a "bridge relating military power to political purpose" (2006: 1) and that "history's strategic winners, are the ones who decide what is just and what is not" (1999b: 55). Edward Luttwak focuses primarily on operational strategy's "paradoxical logic" (2001: 3) aiming to suspend, however briefly, the opponent's capacity to react effectively by successfully deploying the element of surprise (2001: 4). Heuser shares Gray's and Luttwak's commitment to Clausewitz's continuing relevance as a strategist of war (2007; 2010c). However, she goes beyond them by drawing on Michael Howard's work (Howard, 1967) to identify throughout the Prussian's entire oeuvre an immanent concern with an ethical foundation for strategic action (Heuser, 2007), capable of being fruitfully rearticulated for the contingencies of the 21st century (Heuser, 2020). Like Clausewitz, Heuser deploys a dialectical critical analysis of history (2001; 2002) to develop a theoretical perspective of the 'ideal' ethics of war. She then nuances her approach in light of war's realities (Heuser, 2010a; 2010b; 2018), so as to ultimately arrive at a dynamic concept of 'ethical strategy' (Mattox, 2008; Heuser, 2013) inhabiting this continuum connecting a universal 'ideal' and a context-dependent 'reality'. Leo Blanken deploys this insight to deny the incompatibility of the three

schools of thought outlined here and to integrate them into an overarching framework of “strategic choice” providing “a more transparent method for choosing among strategies” (Blanken, 2012).

JOMINI'S AND CLAUSEWITZ' ENDURING DOUBLE DIALECTICS ON WAR AND STRATEGY

Clausewitz's enduring double breakthrough was first to recognise that social and institutional change happens dialectically and second to apply this insight to his study of war in general and of ‘Strategy’ in particular. Anticipating Thomas Mann's central thesis in ‘The Magic Mountain’ (Mann, 1969: 726-727) by a century, he intuited that dialectical change is not deterministically unidirectional and progressive, but radically open-ended and multi-directional - and can therefore be regressive as well. Clausewitz's and Jomini's attempts to come to terms with the meaning of ‘Strategy’ were and continue to be shaped by a double dialectic: first, an ever-evolving internal tension between their two contrasting visions of the theoretical meaning and practical application of the term; and second, a shifting binomial pairing reversing its polarity both positively and negatively with each successive external historical and interpretative iteration. It is out of this double-dialectic dynamic connecting internal conceptual epistemology and external systemic ontology unfolding over the course of the past two centuries that our own understanding of ‘Strategy’ has emerged and continues to evolve in the rapidly-changing ecosystem of the 21st century.

Clausewitz's and Jomini's texts discussing the practice of Strategy in times of conflict thus take pride of place in an uninterrupted line of disquisitions going back to Plato and Cicero (Heuser, 2010b: 44-45; Freedman, 2013: 38-40), all of which have as ultimate aim to answer a timeless and universal question, retaining its actuality to this day. This question was best articulated by Michael Howard half-a-century ago: “Under what circumstances can armed force be used, in the only way in which it can be legitimate to use it, to ensure a lasting and stable peace?” (Howard, 1967: 64-65). As Beatrice Heuser reminds us in her *Evolution of Strategy* (2010b: 45; 2020), the essence of this answer was already outlined exactly two millennia ago by influential first-century A.D. Greek philosopher Onasander, as he summed up his treatise, *Strategikos* (The General). He did so by incisively describing the ideal Strategist (Chaliand, 1994: 154-156) in a manner entirely consistent with Clausewitz's view on the matter, as someone capable of effectively combining the human soul's ‘amazing Trinity’ (Howard, 2007: vii) – ethos, logos, pathos – with an ethical vision of *eudaimonia* – a virtuous life well lived (Stricker, 1987: 183):

“[...] a good man, then, will be not only a brave defender of his country and a competent leader of an army but also for the permanent protection of his own reputation will be a sagacious strategist”.

(Chlup, 2014: 57)

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COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE STRATEGIES OF ALEXANDER III OF MACEDON, LOUIS XIV OF FRANCE, FREDERICK II OF PRUSSIA, AND NAPOLEON I OF FRANCE

RORY MCDOWELL

STRATEGIC AIMS AND MOTIVATION

a) Alexander the Great

For Alexander the Great invading the Persian Empire was not even a decision, indeed the campaign had already been planned and initiated by his father Philip II (Brunt, 1965: 205). The original goal was to 'liberate' the Greek cities in Asia Minor from the Persians, which was hardly a new idea, as can be seen from the actions of Athens and the Delian League, and later Sparta following its collapse (Mossé, 2004: 55). It is possible however, that Alexander did intend to seize the entire Persian Empire right from the offset, as he frequently repeated the mantra "from the Gods I accept Asia, won by the spear" following his hurling of a spear into the ground upon landing at the site of Troy (Hammond, 1996: 68). If he did not intend to conquer all of Asia at the beginning of his campaign, he certainly did once he had assumed control of the Persian Empire. Alexander was under the impression that 'India' was the last province of Asia, and that the conquest of the Ganges basin would lead them to what was essentially the end of the world (ibid.: 207). The rest of the Macedonians however, eventually reached their limit following.

the Battle of the Hydaspes in modern-day Pakistan. Many had been on campaign with Alexander for eight years, and now wanted to return home.

It is clear that Alexander's strategic goal eventually became conquering the world, or at least the parts of the world worth conquering. If we consider his view of the world to be something akin to that of Herodotus' Ecumene, he had already made significant progress. At the time he fell ill, he had established plans for an invasion of Arabia (Hammond, 1996: 245), and we are also told that he had left behind designs for the conquest of the entire coast of the Mediterranean (Brunt, 1965: 212). Not only did he intend to conquer the inhabited world, he would then seek to rule it through large scale population exchanges in order to create an homogenous world which would be easier ruled (Strauss, 2003: 129).

Alexander did not need to come up with the idea of invading the Persian Empire, he practically inherited it. He did however, push the idea to its absolute limits by conquering the entire polity and proclaiming himself Darius III's successor, and then progressing beyond the Empire's borders. It is apparent that Alexander's religious beliefs and personal pursuit for glory

compelled him to set such lofty aims. As Hammond writes (1996: 68):

“Alexander was living fully in the world of his gods and ancestors, as they had been portrayed by his favourite poet, Homer, whose Iliad was his constant companion, and as they still lived in his imagination and belief.”

His belief in his own mission as being divinely inspired only intensified as his successes increased. Citing Alexander’s taking of the rock of Aornus, a highly defensible fortress that no longer held much strategic value as an example, Brunt writes that “More than once we are told that the more impracticable a project appeared, the more he was determined to undertake it” (Brunt, 1965: 209). Therefore it is possible to conclude that Alexander’s strategy was formulated with the purpose of establishing his own legendary status comparable to that of Heracles or Achilles.

b) Louis XIV

Louis XIV lived for a period of 77 years and in that time, France was at war during 51 of them (Lynn II, 2011: 36). It is therefore difficult to address all the strategic aspects of his reign, however there are two overarching aims throughout the period. Upon the death of his chief minister, Mazarin, Louis took sole control of France. Within a year he had launched an invasion of the Spanish Netherlands which Lynn argues was Louis trying to “make his mark, to establish his glory” (ibid.: 37). Lynn further argues that Louis was obsessed with *gloire* which can obviously be translated as ‘glory’ but could be better translated as ‘reputation’ (ibid.:

43). Nevertheless, it is clear that the accrualment of glory was still an important objective for Louis in his quest to become ‘the Greatest King in Christendom’ (Lynn, 1999: 32).

Louis’ drive for personal glory differs in certain aspects to that of Alexander’s. While Louis’ famous “L’état, c’est moi” (“The State? I am the State”) quote may be apocryphal, it has endured because it perfectly represents his political personality (Lynn, 2011: 34). With Alexander we see that his ambitions and aims far outgrew that of the position of king of the Macedons, but for Louis this was not the case. As Lynn states “it is nearly impossible to separate the monarch from the man. From birth he was groomed to rule France” (1999: 27). This idea extended to furthering the interests of the House of Bourbon as a whole, with Rowlands arguing that the expansion of the French army under Louis XIV was ultimately to pursue dynasticism (2002: 336).

By the end of the Franco-Dutch war in which France had acquired significant territory, Louis’ overall strategy shifted towards defence. Lynn states that “After the Dutch War, for all his desire for *gloire*, Louis harboured in his heart more fear of invasion than lust for conquest” (Lynn II, 2011: 52). Louis’ main goal became creating a France that need not rely on any ally, but could be entirely secured through its own large military forces and technologically advanced fortifications (ibid.: 35). Louis never sought the position of ‘universal monarch’, unlike Alexander, nor even an undisputed hegemonic position over Europe; rather, his main strategic aim was securing France’s place as the strongest great power.

c) Frederick the Great

Unlike Alexander and Louis XIV, Frederick the Great did not inherit a great power when he came to the throne of Prussia in 1740. Like Alexander, however, his father left behind an army that was better trained than its contemporaries. An opportunity would soon appear over the issue of Maria Theresa's succession to the Habsburg holdings, and Frederick began the War of the Austrian Succession with his invasion of Silesia. In later years Frederick described his decision to invade as "the consequence of his possession of a well-trained army, a full treasury, and a desire to establish a reputation" (Showalter, 1996: 39). From this it could be argued that Frederick's strategy was directed by his quest for personal glory in a similar manner to Alexander and Louis, however this conclusion would be tenuous. When reflecting on foreign policy nine years before he even ascended to the throne, Frederick had argued that "Prussia must expand its territory according to a systematic, long-term plan" (ibid.: 30). It appears more appropriate to conclude that Frederick's decision to pursue a policy of expansionism was perhaps influenced by a desire for glory, but not solely driven by it.

For Frederick, the overarching goal was to elevate Prussia to the position of a Great Power. He argued that only a large, strong state could secure the welfare of its subjects and enhance the happiness of mankind (ibid.: 32), therefore Prussia must become large and strong to achieve these goals. As Showalter states "From his earliest days on the throne Frederick sought not to overthrow the balance of Europe, but to adjust that balance in Prussia's favour" (ibid: 335). Therefore Frederick's strategic aims were divergent to that of

Alexander and Louis, owing to the position of Prussia in the international system.

d) Napoleon

Of the four men, Napoleon is the only one who did not inherit a throne. Instead he created the First French Empire through the virtue of his outstanding battlefield achievements. However, as Esdaile demonstrates in his article *De-Constructing the French Wars: Napoleon as Anti-Strategist* identifying a Napoleonic strategy that extends beyond a few campaigns is a difficult task (Esdaile, 2008: 516). This is partly down to the fact that Napoleon believed that as he had won the throne of the French Empire through military means, he must maintain it that way. On the 26th of June 1813 he said to the Austrian Chancellor Count Metternich:

"Your sovereigns born to the throne may be beaten twenty times and still go back to their palaces; that cannot I – the child of fortune: my reign will not outlast the day when I have ceased to be strong, and therefore to be feared" (ibid: 543).

In this way he is obviously unlike the other three, in that they, born to their thrones, did not feel the need to continually re-legitimise their rule through battlefield victories.

One could then perhaps expect that after many campaigns an end goal might be established, but a clear objective remains elusive. It is possible to recognise, however, that one of, if not the main aim of Napoleon was to overcome the British. As Esdaile states (ibid: 519-520):

“she [Britain] was at the heart of all the enmity which France had faced, the very motor, indeed, of the anti-French war effort. [...] In short, even when other powers entered the war, the defeat of Britain remained everything”.

But the defeat of Britain appears to have largely been an end without proposed means. Napoleon was more interested in pursuing immediate wars based on his ego and personal quest for glory. The prime example for this would be the Russian campaign, as Napoleon felt slighted by the Tsar’s dissolution of their alliance (despite it occurring as a result of Napoleon’s diplomatic inflexibility). As Esdaile states “Alexander had challenged him and had therefore to be put in his place” (ibid.: 549), showing that Napoleon was making strategic decisions based on his own ego.

STRATEGIC METHODS

a) Alexander the Great

The main strategic instrument Alexander used was his tactical superiority, both in the standard of troops available and his own generalship. Strauss states that “If Persia would fight the Macedonians in a set battle, Alexander had good reason to be confident of victory” (Strauss, 2003: 148). His strategy involved avoiding the main Persian strength, its fleet, and instead used his strength, the army, to deny them ports (ibid.: 136). It was not just that Alexander was an effective commander, he managed to win battles with incredibly few losses. While this can be heavily attributed to the Macedonian Phalanx’ mode of fighting (it is difficult to kill an enemy if he is keeping you at bay with a six metre pike), Hammond argues

that Alexander’s love for his men and the camaraderie between them drove him to win with as few losses as possible (Hammond, 1996: 260). The battle of Granicus is an example of this, where Alexander risked his own life using the Companion Cavalry to screen his infantry’s river crossing. Alexander led from the front, and inspired all men to follow him, not only his own Macedonians (ibid.: 261). He knew he could lead an army as far as he did because he could count on his charisma and leadership.

It was not just those directly under his own command that Alexander had an effective strategy for dealing with, he understood the need for the Greek city states as allies. He did not seek to annex or subjugate the Greek League, his approach was that of an ally, albeit one of overwhelming strength (ibid.: 256). He waged an incredibly successful war against Persia and made relatively few demands of the member states, with Hammond arguing that “It is difficult to find fault with the conduct of Alexander as hegemon of the Greek League” (ibid.: 258).

His conduct over the conquered could overall be regarded as conciliatory, although there are incidents such as the burning of Persepolis which run counter to this. Alexander did not share the opinion of his teacher Aristotle that all non-Greeks were barbarians suitable only for subjugation and exploitation (ibid: 79). In many cases Persian satraps were reinstated in their localities, however Alexander did take the measure of dividing civil, military, and financial powers, usually between a mix of local rulers and Macedonian officers (ibid: 79-80). Through this strategy Alexander not only conquered the territories, but increased the likelihood of his retention of them.

b) Louis XIV

In contrast, Louis XIV was not a General, nor even a soldier. He attended battles, however this was carried out as a political move to present himself as a warrior king (Lynn, 1999: 29). Also unlike Alexander, Louis was not in control of a good army, indeed throughout much of the 17th century the French army was particularly poor (Anderson, 1988: 56-57). In order to meet his strategic goals, Louis relied on quantity, not quality, ballooning the size of the army during his reign. At its peak in 1693 the French army numbered 447,000 men, which represented a four-and-a-half to six times increase of the numbers in 1661 (Lynn II, 2011: 56).

One of Louis' main strategic flaws was his failure of diplomacy. While he was in pursuit of an independent France with entirely secure borders, he also sought to achieve this aim unilaterally. As Lynn puts it "Louis's sense of his own glory and of French power tempted him to go it alone in international affairs and war" (ibid.: 49). Louis had made himself a reputation for being expansionist early in his reign with the War of Devolution and the Franco-Dutch War, but then did nothing to remedy his image, so when his grand strategy switched to a defensive focus, it did not translate. Lynn concludes succinctly that Louis "lost the narrative" (ibid.: 54).

c) Frederick the Great

Much like Alexander, Frederick the Great directly inherited an army that was superior to its contemporaries. Unlike Louis he was not interested in grand fortifications as a means of securing the state, and as Showalter affirms "Frederick staked his state's future on his field

army, on soldiers rather than walls" (Showalter, 1996: 36). His development of the oblique order was used to stunning effect at both the battles of Leuthen and Rossbach, acquiring victories with large disparities in casualty numbers which was particularly unusual in the 18th century. Showalter points out that Frederick's writings show that he relied on the use of tactical and operational methods to solve grand-strategic problems (ibid.: 108).

Frederick was well aware of the importance of allies in the European power system and how they affected wars:

"The first thing, as I have said, is to compare all the enemy forces, along with those of their allies, to your own and to the assistance that your allies will give you. Strategy is based on the forces you have, on the strength of the enemy, on the situation of the country where you want to carry the war, and on the political condition of Europe" (Luvaas, 1999: 307-308).

When Frederick began the War of the Austrian succession, he not only knew that he was likely to start a Europe-wide war, he was essentially counting on it (Browning, 1995: 39). It was unlikely that Prussia could take and hold Silesia on its own against Austria, but knowing that Austria would be bogged down in other theatres was what gave Frederick the confidence to launch the war. There is a reasonable argument to be made that Frederick was poor at judging the international system given that around a decade after the end of the war, all the Great Powers of Europe except for Britain waged war on Prussia during the Seven Years War. While he underestimated Austrian tenacity in trying to reclaim Silesia, the other major strand of his

strategy, that of tactical superiority, meant Prussia survived. Showalter said of the Seven Years War that “Frederick had compensated for his state’s geo-strategic disadvantages by his own tactical skill and the fighting power of his army” (Showalter, 1996: 310).

d) Napoleon

Defining how Napoleon achieved his strategic aims is just as difficult as trying to discern the aims themselves. One way that we can compare Napoleon is that much like Alexander and Frederick, he sought decisive victories through tactical and operational superiority (Gates, 1997: 4). While he was a master of the field, the distinct lack of strategic oversight meant that this superiority was eventually for naught. Indeed, even his approach to operational warfare was rather reactionary, as one of his aides confirms “he never devised any other than a vague plan, preferring to take counsel of opportunity, a system more conformable to the promptitude of his genius” (ibid.: 4).

The one identifiable grand-strategic undertaking of Napoleon was the Continental Blockade. The idea was that as France’s superior armies could not reach British shores, she would be strangled economically with Napoleon declaring “We will not lay down our arms until we have obliged the English, those eternal enemies of our nation, to renounce both the scheme of disturbing the Continent and tyranny of the seas” (Esdaile, 2008: 521). This required the closing off of essentially the entire European continent to British markets. This was an ill-fated venture from the start, as not only could France not make up for the want of colonial produce, it was also set up as an exploitative measure. Esdaile describes it thus (ibid.: 531):

“the blockade was from the start an integral part of an economic policy designed to harness the rest of Europe to France’s economic needs. In particular French industry was to be protected and the rest of the continent transformed – literally – into a captive market”.

The effect was reasonable damage to the British economy for the first two to three years, followed by a fast recovery once it had adapted to new markets, leading us to conclude that Napoleon’s only tangible piece of grand strategy was a total failure.

CONCLUSION

It is rather obvious to conclude that Napoleon, for all his tactical brilliance, was the worst strategist of the four. The France that he left was smaller than the France that he seized in 1799 (Lynn II, 2011: 59). His unwillingness to use diplomacy and co-operation to bring down Britain, and lack of grand-strategic aims ultimately meant that his victories were wasted. It is then interesting to compare this with Louis XIV, who also notably failed to implement effective diplomacy and was not gifted with the same tactical abilities or quality of army, yet by the end of his reign had enlarged France (ibid.: 58). This is because Louis had a strategic goal, therefore the victories he did win contributed towards something other than the perpetuation of his own reign.

Alexander is difficult to assess, for we can look at his accomplishments based on two separate criteria, and his early death means we will never know the full extent of what he could have achieved – or lost. If we look at Alexander’s strategic aim as being his own immortalisation

as a 'Greek' hero, then he was resoundingly successful. If we assess it based on his establishment of a great Empire, we must say that ultimately, he failed, for the sole reason that he did not beget an heir. Had he heeded the advice of his generals Antipater and Parmenio to produce an heir before the invasion of Persia (Brunt, 1965: 215), his Empire may not have immediately fractured upon his death.

And so finally we come to Frederick, and of the four he could be argued to be the most successful in his strategic aims. Using his reading of the international system he was able to pry the valuable territory of Silesia away from the Austrians. While he may not have been as inspiring as Alexander, or as good a field general as Napoleon, he then held Silesia against almost all the major powers of Europe practically alone for seven years through his ability to turn tactical superiority into strategic gains. While it could be argued that he was lucky that the death of Empress Elizabeth led to Russia's immediate withdrawal from the war, Frederick's aim for the Seven Years War was merely to stay afloat and wait until European diplomacy shifted in his favour, which it ultimately did.

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RETHINKING THEORY & PRACTICE

C O U N T E R - T E R R O R I S M , R E A L I S M

BEYOND SECURITY STUDIES: HOW ACADEMIA CAN INFORM THE UNITED NATIONS' COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

JULIEN FEHLMANN

ABSTRACT

The decade between 2006 and 2016 witnessed a global emphasis on security-based means for combatting terrorism, which have produced an extremely costly mixed-bag. As a result, The United Nations and the Swiss government co-hosted a two days conference in Geneva in April 2016 to devise guidelines regarding the prevention of violent extremism, in anticipation to the release, in June the same year, of the United Nations' Secretary General Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. The present study overviews the academic literature on terrorism with an aim to identify areas of research and resources worth considering to develop further the United Nations' strategy to prevent violent extremism. This research uncovered a consensus in academia regarding the failure of military-based counterterrorism strategies since September 11, 2001, and dismisses biological explanations for terrorism. While it stresses that attempts at discovering a typical psychological profile of terrorists have failed, recent avenues in psychological research are worth considering. Above all, however, the necessarily multidisciplinary nature of research related to terrorism ought to be complemented with insights from the development sector. The experience and up-to-date knowledge of development scholars and institutions working on the field represent an asset that has been so far vastly ignored.

KEYWORDS: Security Studies; United Nations; Extremism; Terrorism; Psychology Research.

THE SECURITY DILEMMA: SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY OR INESCAPABLE REALITY?

CLÉMENTINE EMERIAU

ABSTRACT

The security dilemma, a cornerstone of the realist approach to International Relations, is a disputed theory. While some claim it is an inescapable reality, others have described it as being a self-fulfilling prophecy. Here, the faulty assumptions of the security dilemma, its self-fulfilling logic, and ways to deactivate and transcend it, will be explored.

KEYWORDS: Security Dilemma; Realism; Security Paradox; Decision-making; International System.

BEYOND SECURITY STUDIES: HOW ACADEMIA CAN INFORM THE UNITED NATION'S COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

JULIEN FEHLMANN

The United Nations' (UN) counterterrorism strategy follows four main axes, which aim to prevent and fight terrorism, reinforce state capacities, and ensure the respect of human rights law (UN 2006, 2016). As the 2015 report of the UN Secretary-General (UN 2015) made clear, the decade between 2006 and 2016 witnessed a global emphasis on security-based means for combatting terrorism, and those measures now need to be supplemented with a greater attention to the contextual conditions conducive to terrorism, and an increased respect of human rights. Consequently, the UN supports counterterrorism strategies that focus on prevention (UN 2015) and (de)radicalisation in particular, in response to the recent trend in terror acts committed on religious grounds (Shughart, 2006; Lutz, and Lutz, 2016; Hough, 2018). As a result, the terminology within the UN system centres around concepts such as 'preventing violent extremism' (PVE). Interestingly, however, the UN defers the definitions of 'terrorism' and 'violent extremism' to its Member States (UN n.d.), whilst reminding them of their obligations under international law (GCPVE, 2016). Definitions of terrorism, therefore, remain both innumerable (Richards, 2014; Hough, 2018) and formulated in terms of self-interest (Cox, 1981).

As no consensus exists at the international level (Frazer, et al., 2015), the present paper will focus on the purpose of terrorism as the use of violence to generate a "psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack," (Richards, 2014: 146) because only the aim of achieving longer-term psychological impact over direct damage has achieved consensus among scholars (ibid.: 147).

PVE centres on uncovering what elicits people to resort to violent behaviour, a conundrum that touches upon a vast array of academic disciplines. This review will argue that (a) some approaches are both inappropriate and potentially dangerous, that (b) because the nature of terrorism is as varied as humankind, a multidisciplinary approach using insights from experts with experience in conflict zones is beneficial for a sound understanding of terrorism, and that (c) research in psychology is to be further (re)considered, as its potential seems vastly untapped.

Some theoretical approaches, despite 'scientific' endeavours, seem to bring more harm than good. Among those, life sciences (Thayer, and Hudson, 2010), and especially evolutionary theories (Thayer 2009), should be met with the greatest scepticism, for they strip human beings of their capacity to learn or

adapt. They tend to homogenise highly diverse populations and reify stereotypes in potentially dangerous ways. Those claims echo other works bearing essentialist overtones (Huntington, 1996; Kaplan, 2000), which oversimplify complex issues into harmful stereotypes, ultimately treating entire populations as unified bodies (Said, 2001: 273). Such perspectives, likely to create further resentment, do not provide adequate insights into tackling terrorism. Unfortunately, those arguments still seem to attract support in many spheres, political or otherwise.

No more pertinent for a counterterrorism strategy similar to that of the UN are the works of some military historians (Kilcullen, 2008), whose excessively conservative and military-centred answers to terrorism tend to obscure the fact that fighting fire with fire has so far achieved but a history of failure (Williams, and McDonald, 2018: 407). In the words of another military historian, time has come to understand that lasting peace is not that which is enforced upon the enemy, but one that is willingly accepted (Heuser, 2010: 505).

An analysis of the link between economic conditions and conflict can inform terrorism studies. In the broader context of war, Collier's seminal argument stressed the preeminence of greed over grievances as the leading cause of civil war (Collier, 2000). More recently, studies centred on economic incentives to terrorism conclude that economic issues, whether real (Enders, et al., 2016) or perceived (Choi, 2019), matter. However, as Keen rightly points out, if economics is a necessary piece of the violence puzzle, it is not a sufficient one (2008).

Political, ideological, and social influence cannot be left unconsidered. Similarly, other prominent terrorism scholars point to the multitude of causes that create a fertile ground for violence (Crenshaw, 2011; Frazer, et al., 2015; Williams, and McDonald, 2018). The very diversity in the causality of terrorism should encourage current scholarship to incorporate even more knowledge from other disciplines. For example, Keen argues that rather than looking at what goes wrong in conflict, a lot is learnt by looking at what actually goes well: who benefits from violence and what are the functions served (Keen, 2008) beyond the obvious stated goals of terrorist groups? Development studies scholars and other professionals from the aid sector who have direct experience of conflict, and hence, terrorism-prone areas, are important voices to listen to. They represent a source of knowledge that security studies have too often ignored. Together with other academic disciplines, they may, for example, contribute to the understanding of how grievances feed into violence, and hence, terrorism, too.

If the debate between greed and grievances has fostered the disentanglement of what contexts constitute fertile grounds for violence, the field of (social) psychology has a lot to offer in terms of individual and group behaviour. One could say, however, that early psychological studies on terrorism were lured into one of their main concepts, the fundamental attribution error (Hogg, and Vaughan, 2011: 92).

Indeed, initial attempts at establishing a terrorist profile led to a dead end (Monahan, 2012): as Crenshaw and others point out, such

endeavours bore the risks of "stereotyping [and] [...] oversimplifying the sources of terrorist actions" (2011: 44). Contesting another unhelpful axis of research in psychology, that of assumed mental illness among (suicide) terrorists (Victoroff, 2015), she argues that "the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality" (Crenshaw, 2011: 44). As a result, the focus of psychological studies has shifted from individual to situational aspects of terrorism.

If psychological research has experienced a difficult start, it nonetheless entails numerous prospects. First, there is a lot to be learnt in the unpacking of the 'terrorist organisation' as a homogenous entity: in that regard, recent publications in organisational or workplace psychology (Thoroughgood, et al., 2011; Ligon, et al. 2013) are promising for the design of future counterterrorism strategies. Another important area of research related to grievances concerns humiliation. McCauley's research (2017) is a welcome addition to a well-established driver of violent behaviour (Keen, 2008). Further, this far from exhaustive review shall not leave aside radicalisation processes, so visible in Western media and counterterrorism policies. Sarma's study (2017) sheds light on the risks and possibilities linked to risk assessment of suspected individuals. It both outlines potential pitfalls as well as viable procedures in an ethically sensitive process. Lastly, McCauley and Moskalkenko pertinently demonstrate that radicalisation actually flows both ways. Indeed, in responding to terror attacks, states often launch exceptional measures and policies (McCauley, and Moskalkenko: 223).

The UN's position regarding counterterrorism urges states to concentrate on prevention and (de)radicalisation. To further this perspective, this review demonstrated that multidisciplinary approaches were desirable, but that some perspectives, however, appeared less appropriate than others to sustain the prevention of violent extremism. The most encouraging avenues were found in development studies and research in (social) psychology, which may attractively advance the authoritative work of such experienced scholars as, for example, Martha Crenshaw.

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THE SECURITY DILEMMA: SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY OR INESCAPABLE REALITY?

CLÉMENTINE EMERIAU

INTRODUCTION

The security dilemma is considered to be a cornerstone of the realist approach to International Relations, and is thus defined in realist terms. It refers to states' unavoidable behaviour of self-help in the face of uncertainty (created by the anarchic structure of the international system) which often results in a continuous accumulation of power, and a simultaneous failure to increase the states' level of security (Tang, 2009: 9). A famous example of the security dilemma is the Cold War arms race between the USA and the USSR, whereby both superpowers, by repeatedly increasing their respective military capabilities, gradually appeared more threatening to the other to the point of being on the brink of war. However, the theory behind the security dilemma is far from being undisputed. On the one hand, some claim it is an inescapable reality, a naturally occurring behaviour in international politics which has been, is, and will always materialise itself (Mearsheimer, 2014: 35-36). On the other hand, there are claims it is a self-fulfilling prophecy, merely occurring because expectations of its existence constrain behaviours to align with the theory, and which can potentially be reversed (Collins, 2014: 3). In today's context of International Relations, the security dilemma has become a self-fulfilling prophecy which can be, if not escaped, at least transcended. Firstly, problematic approaches and assumptions surrounding the security dilemma will be

explained. Secondly, the self-fulfilling logic of the security dilemma will be analysed. Thirdly, the ways in which the security dilemma can be deactivated and transcended will be explored. Finally, a general conclusion will be formulated.

PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA

Here, the assumptions of an anarchic system and its resulting uncertainty will be explored, before moving on to the problematic amalgam made by some scholars between the security dilemma and the security paradox. Firstly, although it is assumed by realist scholars that the international system is anarchic by nature, the reality of the modern geopolitical landscape is closer to that of a managed, standardised anarchy. This means that although international politics are still centred around supposedly equal nation-state units, the types of interactions between these states greatly differ from pre-First World War dynamics (Collins, 2014: 8). More precisely, due to the economic, social, and other interdependencies between modern states, interactions in the international system are highly regulated (e.g. trade agreements, International Humanitarian Law, various conventions) (Bluth, 2011: 5). As such, the type of free-for-all behaviours that one could expect to occur in a purely anarchic structure are in fact largely avoided. One could think of the relatively unchanged borders as the result of

expansionist warfare since the end of the Cold War, with a few exceptions (Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981; Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014). Thus, one of the underlying assumptions of the security dilemma (i.e. the anarchic structure of the international system causes the security dilemma) is challenged: if the international system is not structured by pure anarchy, why would it always give rise to pure self-help, power accumulating behaviours such as the security dilemma?

Secondly, although it is assumed that the uncertainty of others' intentions leads to the security dilemma, it is misplaced certainty, rather than uncertainty, which triggers the security dilemma into action. According to Herz (1951: 7), the security dilemma occurs because a state cannot know the intentions of other states with certainty. In other words, uncertainty about others' motives, and more precisely whether they are benign or malign, leads to security dilemma dynamics. While it is true that a state cannot know another's objectives with complete certitude, uncertainty could lead to security dilemma dynamics when it is assumed that others' intentions are malign, just as it could lead to passivity when it is assumed that other's intentions are benign (Mitzen and Schweller, 2011: 9). Therefore, the security dilemma arises from a state's biased, pessimistic assumption about the other state's intentions, rather than from uncertainty of intentions. In the words of Mitzen and Schweller (2011: 34), the security dilemma is caused by "delusional beliefs of persecution and harm, that is, by misplaced certainties of external danger", a default assumption for malign intentions. These negative assumptions are then reinforced with

each new interaction between the two states, so that uncertainty is replaced by misplaced certainty (i.e. the other state has malicious intent), which becomes the new norm of interaction (Collins, 2014: 8). This raises a question about another concept closely linked to the security dilemma, namely, uncertainty: is there not an alternative to misplaced certainty when coping with uncertainty?

Finally, there is a problematic tendency among scholars to equate the security dilemma with the security paradox. The security dilemma, as defined by Booth and Wheeler (2008: 4), consists of two levels of dilemmas. First, a dilemma of interpretation: should a state interpret another state's development of military capabilities as offensive or defensive? And second, upon deciding on the first dilemma, a dilemma of response: assuming the initial interpretation of intentions was faulty, should the state respond by developing its own military capabilities, thereby risking generating mutual hostility, or should it not react and risk becoming exposed to coercion? The dilemma of response can then give rise to a security paradox or spiral, whereby states respectively accumulate power to increase their own security, entrenching themselves in an arms race, resulting in decreased security, and risking conflict (Collins, 2014: 3). While some scholars (Butfofy, 1977: 2; Snyder, 1984: 2) wrongly equate the two aforementioned concepts, the security paradox is only one possible outcome of the security dilemma. This faulty amalgamation is due to misplaced certainty, whereby the dilemma of interpretation is always answered in negative terms (i.e. the other state is offensive), compelling the dilemma of

response to be answered negatively (i.e. reacting aggressively, sparking mutual hostility), thus resulting in the security paradox being the standard outcome. As long as misplaced certainty is present, the relationship between the security dilemma and the security paradox resembles a self-fulfilling prophecy: (inaccurate) negative expectations force states into the security paradox. Hence, the initial curse of states, the security dilemma, is diffused into a new curse, the security paradox, and the two concepts are viewed as one.

SELF-FULFILLING LOGIC OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND PARADOX

Here, the self-fulfilling prophecy will be defined and analysed, before considering its reversal. Firstly, it is necessary to define exactly what a self-fulfilling prophecy is before analysing its manifestation with regards to the security dilemma. According to Jussim (2019: 1), a self-fulfilling prophecy is the “process through which an originally false expectation leads to its own confirmation”. This is absolutely in line with security dilemma and paradox dynamics; fixed and irrational pessimistic expectations become routines, and lead to the perpetuation of conflictual outcomes: the security paradox. Unlike realist scholars claim, anarchy and uncertainty are not what supports the security dilemma, rather, it is the sustained misplaced certainty of others’ malign intentions. In other words, as Booth and Wheeler (2008: 73) phrase it, “pessimistic predictions can become self-fulfilling prophecies as governments apply worst-case thinking and related policies”.

Secondly, the metamorphosis of the security dilemma into a self-fulfilling security paradox has interesting consequences for the dilemma itself. Namely, it has already been escaped. As Hopf (2010: 11) explains, “decision-makers rarely need to choose between options because in most cases one single option comes to mind”. This absence of choice and agency is antithetic to the definition of a dilemma, which presupposes a difficult choice between two (usually undesirable) options. Given misplaced certainty in the self-fulfilling prophecy, it appears that the security dilemma has been escaped for a consistent, persistent choice for its worst outcome: the security paradox. This allows for a rejection of the view that the security dilemma is an inescapable reality; rather, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Finally, it is fortunately possible to reverse the negative self-fulfilling prophecy into a positive one. Indeed, just as negative expectations lead to the perpetuation of negative outcomes, positive expectations will lead to the perpetuation of positive outcomes. As Booth and Wheeler (2008: 297; 257) explain, it is possible to turn this “vicious circle of security and power competition” into a “virtuous spiral of trust” and cooperation. There are many examples of this occurring in international politics, including Western European states after the Second World War (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 257), or Sri Lanka and India after their independences (De Silva, 2015: 16). The subsequent section will detail the ways in which the self-fulfilling prophecy can be reversed, and thus the security dilemma transcended.

SECURITY DILEMMA DEACTIVATION AND TRANSCENDENCE

Here, a three-step approach to reversing the self-fulfilling prophecy will be provided. Firstly, in order to defuse misplaced certainty, decision-makers must engage in security dilemma sensibility. Security dilemma sensibility refers to an explicit reflection upon security dilemma dynamics, a recognition that one's own defensive behaviour could be viewed as offensive, and a questioning of preconceptions about others (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 4; Collins 2014: 9). Examples of security dilemma sensibility are numerous: Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War, Sadat's empathy for Israeli fears (Collins, 2014: 10), Brazil and Argentina defusing a nuclear security dilemma (Wheeler, 2009: 9). Through security dilemma sensibility, misplaced certainty can be offset and a first move toward trust building is made.

Secondly, once security dilemma sensibility is undertaken, there needs to be efforts at building trust. Indeed, trust building represents a better alternative to misplaced certainty when coping with uncertainty (Wheeler, 2009: 8). It requires an initial "leap in the dark", as it is closely related to uncertainty and vulnerability (Collins, 2014: 10). In order to have more reassurance and minimise the risk of initiating a trust relationship, states can make use of their intelligence and diplomatic apparatuses. Indeed, intelligence can be used in order to check whether or not others are keeping their promises, while diplomacy can help communicate benign intentions (Pashakhanlou, 2018: 10; 12). When trust is built through repeated reassuring interactions, the security paradox is indefinitely escaped, and the security dilemma loses its salience.

Finally, once initiated, it is important to bind the trust relationship with more than words. In order to cement the trust between states, together they must develop organisations (e.g. NATO, UN), institutions (e.g. International Monetary Fund, World Health Organisation), and synergies (e.g. joint military exercises, trade agreements). By becoming interdependent, states further reduce uncertainty about others' intentions by simultaneously increasing the cost of offence and incentives for cooperation. The formalisation of interactions and trust can be done in many ways: treaties (Pohl, 2013: 17), organisations (Waltz, 2000: 22), trade agreements, joint low-level military exercises, cultural diplomacy (Murphy, 2010: 16), bilateral summit meetings (De Silva, 2015: 10). To summarise, as Booth and Wheeler (2008: 298) put it:

"The ultimate insurance against war [...] lies in political community, not nuclear threats. Predictable peace comes through norms, institutions, laws, multilevel social interaction, trust-affirming commitments"

In the transcender logic (Collins, 2014: 7), these formalised interactions reshape the very structure of the international system from anarchy to managed anarchy, under which international cooperation, or at least peaceful cohabitation, replaces spiralling competition. Since today's international system is one of managed anarchy it can be said that the security dilemma, once considered the norm, has already become the exception. In this way, the self-fulfilling prophecy becomes one of cooperation and interdependence, and the security dilemma is transcended, serving as a

reminder of a past, detrimental *modus operandi*.

CONCLUSION

Taking the preceding arguments into consideration, we have seen that concepts of anarchy and uncertainty in the international system, which make the security dilemma an inescapable reality, are not as clearcut as they seem to be. Instead, misplaced certainty has assimilated the dilemma and the paradox, turning the security dilemma into a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, through the management of anarchy and the institutionalisation of trust, the self-fulfilling prophecy can be reversed, and the security dilemma can be transcended, relegated to the status of distant memory. Naturally, the self-fulfilling cooperative prophecy may not be immortal, and the breakdown of managed anarchy and international institutions could lead to the resurgence of the initial, competitive self-fulfilling prophecy. There is thus a significant, alarming interrogation as to when and why such a disruption could occur, and whether this disintegration of cooperation would trigger the beginning of a Third World War.

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LEADERSHIP

C I V I L I A N A N D M I L I T A R Y

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP

WILLIAM JACOB DAVIS

ABSTRACT

Military and civilian leadership are often compared in an effort to borrow successful methodologies from each field for use in the other, with the militaries being considered as producers of some of the premier leaders in the world, regardless of country. What defines leadership and leaders though is contested. While leaders refer to anyone with followers, and leadership is the condition of having said followers, it is the operant conditioning, follower expectations/consequences of failure, and level of control over followers that create stylist leadership differences.

KEYWORDS: Leadership; Military; Operant Conditioning; Expectations; Goals; Risk; Control.

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP

WILLIAM J. DAVIS

TENTATIVE DEFINITIONS: WHAT MAKES A LEADER

Leadership has been near impossible to define in any scenario, with definitions involving influence, the idea of translating vision, and maximization of effort (Kruse, 2015). The most inarguable and simplistic definition of a leader is Peter Drucker's idea of someone with followers, though this should truly be amended to say 'voluntary' followers, or individuals who would willingly follow 'voluntarily' (2015: 16). Due to the range of opinions in regard to what leadership is, and most definitions being situationally based, creating a more narrow definition is merely theorizing as to what makes a good leader under the guise of defining what a leader is. According to this definition of a leader being someone with followers, leadership is merely the "condition of being" a leader (Ship, 2001: 3). What varies most significantly for leaders is operant conditioning, follower expectations/consequences of failure, and level of control over followers. It is these variables that create different leadership personalities and methodologies for success. With this idea of conditioning, consequences, and control over followers, stylistic leadership differences will be explored between the military, education, and medical fields.

POWER AND CONTEXTUAL DEPENDENCY

Leaders ultimately rely on different sources of power in combination in order to effect results in their arena (Murphy, 2017). While leaders who are also managers can often rely on titular power, or power that comes with position, the majority of leaders must tap into another source of power based on likeability, expertise, information, or discipline in order to most effectively accomplish their goals. These power bases are the same in any situation, although certain career fields such as medicine or education place more value in informational or expertise based power, while in the military disciplinary power holds more value than it might elsewhere, outside the legal career fields, due to the judicial authority of certain members over other members (Keddie, 2016). While these types of power must be leveraged differently across different leadership environments, the factors that leaders are judged on in regard to success tend to be universal: communication, optimization of efforts, setting and accomplishing goals, and ability to establish vision and strategy. It is the differences in the required methods and goals set, as well as the ultimate differences in vision and strategy that set the requirement for different leadership conditioning from the start of environment specific training (McCauley, 2006).

THE DECISION-MAKING DIVIDE

One of the primary tasks of all leaders is decision making. In the education field in the United States, teachers and administrators are conditioned to make yes/no decisions first, and then plan off of a singular answer, rather than eventualities. For example, did the child pass? If yes there is no further action, if no remediation is needed. Did the school meet expectations on standardized testing? If yes then increase funding, if no, decrease function and question teacher abilities (Gresch and Bögeholz, 2013). This leads to an environment where actions are based mostly on achieving high scores on standardized test methods as the definition of success, rather than critical thinking, individual student strengths being increased, or the acquisition of practical skills. This in turn creates a biased binary of , 'a or b', 'left or right', 'correct or incorrect' type quantitative decision-making process that is unsustainable in many fields. Medical professionals and military leaders and managers are opposingly taught a much more qualitative decision-making process that is iterative and process-based, such as deciding what actions to take in a firefight or in a triage situation (Djulgovic, Elqayam and Dale, 2018). Rather than conditioning leaders to accomplish a set goal, medical and military leaders are conditioned to constantly reassess the goal, and to review whether accomplishment of said goal is attainable or ethical. This comes into play in the following examples: killing high value targets vs. risk of collateral damage to civilians; extent of action for a patient who has signed a 'Do Not Resuscitate' order; when to disengage an enemy or close up a surgical site because risk of further damage is too great (Djulgovic,

Elqayam, and Dale, 2018). This constant reassessment of situations and accomplishment of goals is further complicated by the possible loss of referent power (the type of power based on a combination of likeability, expertise, respect, and perceived ability) if a doctor or soldier is deemed too 'risk adverse' or 'risk happy', and the idea that keeping the referent power due to 'success' may cause a loss of expert power, due to undue risk taken or failure to anticipate issues (Kudisch et al., 1995). While successful training for qualitative decision making in and of itself makes quantitative decision making easy, the side effect of such analytical training when too many options are presented and cannot be sorted mentally is "analysis paralysis" (Bisch, 2006: 5). This condition of mental overload provokes a lack of action in any manner, often leading to dire consequences, such as failure to direct action in a military engagement conducting to unnecessary death, or a patient bleeding out on the table due to an inefficient triage of internal injuries.

FACING CONSEQUENCES: HOW LEADERS LIVE THE FUTURE

These differences of consequences further create a fundamental divide in leadership decision making across separate fields, as motivation for success in uncertain (decision-requiring) situations may be outweighed by consequences of failure. Whether leader, follower, or uninvolved, all people are motivated by survival, and will take actions deemed most beneficial to the increase of certainty of survival, whether that means removal from danger, changing jobs to increase one's wage, or

following a leader or group deemed beneficial (Kellermann and Reynolds, 1990). This application of Uncertainty Motivation Theory is relatively straightforward in regards to motivation of education professionals, where the greatest risk taken for experimenting with a new method of instruction or a change in lesson plan may be failure, and after too many failures the loss of employment, but the reward could be expert, referent, and informational power simultaneously, as well as increased income or position, and thus increased survivability on a primal level (Kellermann and Reynolds, 1990). For medical professionals, the situation, although much more complicated due to qualitative decision making, is much the same. Losing a patient, although damaging to reputation, and thus capable of affecting job prospects in the future, as well as mental resilience, does not fully equate to decreased survivability. While leaders of medical teams are driven to reduce uncertainty for their patient, the uncertainty they are reducing is most often not their own. Due to socioeconomic status, as well as employment opportunities, and the advent of legal paperwork removing most liability, medical professionals can make decisions, and lead others in making high risk choices that do not directly impact their own uncertainty (Djulfbegovic, Elqayam and Dale, 2018). While the ultimate outcome for involved parties is not equitable for medical professionals versus educators (a poor education or death), the personal consequence largely is (job loss, and thus lack of power and stability). As such, this allows both parties to make high risk decisions, and err on the side of risk, in a much more detached way than a military leader. Military leaders' consequences, while often merely judicial punishment, loss of

rank, or loss of job, can extend up the scale to loss of life for themselves. Poor decision making, or lack of decision making can lead to death, thus forcing every tactical decision in a war zone into a much more acute and personal level of uncertainty. Military leaders are forced to learn to make decisions in regard to statistics like the number of acceptable casualties, something teachers and medical professionals will generally not face. This forces military leaders to constantly overcome their own motivation to reduce risk, as well as forcing them to convince their followers not to reduce their personal risk. This equates to military leaders having to both procure the power, the rhetorical skill, and the psychological ability to overcome the most basic of human instincts (Kellermann and Reynolds, 1990). This level of conditioning, nor consequence, is found in few other fields (Gray, 2015).

CONTROLLING FOLLOWERS

The final factor of fundamental separation of leadership styles and environments between the military, education leaders, and medical leaders is the level of control of subordinates. Within the education field, although hierarchy exists, it is not much different from the hierarchy of any business. Those in charge may hold sway over vacation dates, paychecks, time off, and ultimately employment, but involved parties are free to leave the employment should they deem other options more suitable, or more beneficial to their survival (Kellermann and Reynolds, 1990). The primary source of power for these leaders is often based on their position, and sometimes their level of informational or expert power (Kudisch et al., 1995). Ultimately, informal

leaders of no rank often arise, and hold high levels of referent power, particularly in unionized organizations. With enough time and effort, the referent power gathered by the group can lead to removal of those with legitimate authority. The same is partially true with medical professionals, although a secondary level of legitimate power exists outside the scope of the place of employment. As noted by De Raeve (2002), a conflict can arise between non-licensed medical professional in positions of power, nurses in position of authority (Charge Nurse or Chief Nursing Officer), and Medical Doctors, due to the MD's licensure, which provided a legal basis for medical related care authority over hospital administrators and nurses with high levels of legitimate power. Due to this situational legitimate power difference, power struggles can occur in hierarchies that do not relate to medical ability, for example in medical administration, where business prowess gains a leader more expert and referent power (Kellermann and Reynolds, 1990). The military, however, holds a separate level of authoritarian power not found elsewhere in liberal democracies. Due to the legitimate legal authority commanders and officers hold over members with less rank, and the power over such information as financial status, medical appointments, and living arrangements for single members, members hold little to no ability beyond their own rapport to speak against poor leadership without reprisal (Merritt et al., 2012). This also can create internal leadership conflicts, as members with multiple deployments and decades within the organization, who hold the highest levels of referent and expert power, can technically be put under the orders of a newly commissioned officer with little to no experience. Undoubtedly,

those circumstances could determine levels of uncertainty in the organization, which would be mitigated elsewhere by leaving the organization or acquiring a new leader (Allison, 2004: 805-807). In the military, leaving illegitimately would be a crime, and acquiring a new leader is near impossible without higher level echelons choosing to remove the current leader. Thus leaders who are officers are put into positions of control they have not earned, with little to no authority past coercive and legitimate power, make leadership difficult (Kudisch et al., 1995). Those leaders who are non-commissioned officers, as well as junior enlisted, must combat or assist in training the aforementioned leaders, and attempt to increase certainty amongst their own men and women, without disregarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This creates a situation that can be replicated in both the educational and medical communities, where leaders who hold referent power are responsible for training those ones who hold legitimate power (Hunt and Michael, 1983).

CONCLUSION

Though leaders are the same regardless of their level of power, and leadership is purely the 'condition of being a leader', leadership methodologies and personalities are all fundamentally different (Gray, 2001). While this paper accepts that no in-depth cross-disciplinary analysis of corporate leadership has been conducted in this case, the nature of leadership is fundamentally the same regardless of location, as leaders are graded per se on their ability to accomplish goals, and their ability to do the tasks that get those goals accomplished (Ship, 2015). It is the tasks themselves that differ, and the situations that make the people

capable of accomplishing them that differ as well. By analyzing the conditioning required to succeed in each independent situation, the consequences of failure and how they relate to risk taking and uncertainty, and finally the level of legal control the leader has over their followers, a proper analysis of what contributes to a successful situational leader can be conducted. While fundamentally all leaders are the same by definition of having followers, and they are goal oriented and graded as good or bad leaders based on their ability to accomplish the goals and their ability to do so efficiently, no two situations are fundamentally the same. While similarities can be compared and contrasted, researchers must be aware of the risk of overgeneralization in leadership research, in order to avoid invalidating their own analysis.

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SPECIAL SECTION

POPULAR CULTURE AND
MILITARY HISTORY

“I WILL NOT DIE DISHONOURED”: POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF SAMURAI WARFARE IN THE ONLINE VIDEO GAME LEAGUE OF LEGENDS

LAUREN BERGIN

ABSTRACT

In a world where the virtual realm dictates our knowledge of history, it is essential to understand the power of video games in public conceptions of historical warfare. Using the case of the samurai warrior Yasuo from the online game League of Legends, I have shown that despite the game’s fantastical nature the character design is influenced by historical facts. Yasuo’s character exhibits several hallmarks of the original Japanese samurai, specifically in his weaponry and his ability toolkit. I therefore argue that Yasuo presents a different but by no means inaccurate portrayal of bushidō warfare.

KEYWORDS: Strategy; Video Games; Popular Culture; Military History.

"I WILL NOT DIE DISHONOURED": POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF SAMURAI WARFARE IN THE ONLINE VIDEO GAME LEAGUE OF LEGENDS

LAUREN BERGIN

Described by developers Riot Games as a "team-based strategy game where two teams of powerful champions face off to destroy the other's base", League of Legends (LoL) has come to dominate the online gaming scene (Riot Games, 2020). With Riot boasting an impressive 8 million players a day, LoL has influenced the lives and conceptions of gamers across the globe (Goslin, 2020). Based in a fantasy world where mages run free and a giant crocodile has a jackal as a brother, it can be questioned as to whether or not there is any educational value to the game. While the game itself should hardly be taken as historical fact, the concepts that underpin certain characters contain kernels of historical truth. Taking the samurai warrior Yasuo as my case study, I will argue in this article that his weaponry, in-game abilities and combat methods are historically sound in their portrayal of bushidō warfare. I have elected Yasuo as my case study as he is currently the fourth highest played champion in the game out of 148 options, making him an incredibly popular and, in turn, influential pick (Tierlist, 2020). To begin I will explain the meaning of bushidō and its relation to samurai warfare, before going on to integrate this into my study of Yasuo's historical value.

In his 1716 text the *Hagakure*, contemporary samurai Yamamoto Tsunetomo writes that bushidō is the warrior code of the samurai and the rules that they were taught to abide by. At its core, however, is that the "way of the warrior is fulfilled in death", meaning that one should be willing to die or live dishonoured (2002: 3-4). The bushidō mindset came to dominate Japanese military thought, rearing its head as recently as World War II. With historian Albert Axell stating that the 7,000 kamikaze pilots who sacrificed themselves towards the close of the war did so under the notion that they would "continue to live with the living and the dead", bushidō culture clearly maintains a place in Japanese military society (2002: 2). It is these fierce fighters that have become heavily popularised in Western media, with films such as *The Last Samurai* continuing to promote bushidō-style ideals. It is therefore no surprise that LoL, a game which has assimilated different conflict styles from across history, has chosen to integrate bushidō warfare into its virtual world in the form of Yasuo. Framed for murdering his master, Yasuo exists as a lone wolf, travelling in search of a purpose wielding only the katana that became so synonymous with his infamy (Riot Games, 2020).

It is this sword that the player is drawn to when playing Yasuo. Featuring prominently in both the champion's splash art (Figure 1) and in-game appearance (Figure 2), the sword's design is heavily influenced by that of the Japanese katana. Described by historian Stephen Turnbull as "the finest edged weapon in world military history", the katana is characterised by its curved blade and deadly appearance (2011: 4). It was at the heart of the samurai way of war, with philosopher Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza citing one swordsman as saying that "when I am polishing a sword [...] I am polishing my soul" (2014: 464). The katana was more than a weapon. It was the core component of a ritual-based military lifestyle that the samurai practiced, therefore its inclusion in Yasuo's character design adds historical authenticity to LoL's portrayal of the bushidō warrior. Yet, it is not only his sword that is accurately represented, but the way in which his abilities perform around it.


While some elements of Yasuo's combat abilities are more fantastical in nature, the katana lies at the heart of Yasuo's fighting style. However, its offensive utilisation is particularly risky. His 'Steel Tempest' requires the player to be in close proximity to the enemy champion, and his 'Sweeping Blade' hurtles him towards the enemy, often landing them in the middle of team fights (League of Legends, 2020). Just as the samurai were forced to choose between life and death in an instant, the player has to make game changing decisions every time they choose to engage the enemy. While considerably less lethal, the player's choice heavily influences the remainder of the game, especially as Yasuo is a high value champion in

comparison to lesser value support champions. By building highly offensive features into Yasuo's kit, LoL forces the player to think as a samurai would have, creating a unique historical experience. Not only this, his abilities also mirror historically documented samurai techniques.

Figure 1: Yasuo Splash Art (The Author, 2020)



Figure 2: Yasuo In-Game Appearance (The Author, 2020)



Legendary swordsman Miyamoto Musashi's *The Book of the Five Rings* explains the fundamental techniques of samurai warfare which clearly inspired Yasuo's in-game combat. His 'Steel Tempest' resonates with Musashi's 'Piercing the Heart', where the warrior strikes in a straight line aimed at the opponent's chest. Similarly, his 'Sweeping Blade' echoes Musashi's instructions on movement: quick and led by synergy with the sword. Musashi describes these techniques as applicable to both the solo fight as well as against large numbers of opponents, again demonstrated by Yasuo's domination in positive team fights (2010: 48-49, 58). While embellished with fantastical attributes, Yasuo's technique is highly representative of those utilised by the true samurai of feudal Japan. Not only does LoL provide insight into the samurai mindset, but it teaches the player how the samurai warrior moved and fought their opponent. The gamer is tasked with constructing unique tactics for each in-game situation in the same way the samurai were taught to read the battlefield and adapt their techniques accordingly. Therefore LoL successfully translates the samurai warrior into a consumable form, subliminally informing public conceptions of bushidō warfare.

When a player chooses Yasuo as their champion, he claims that "death is like the wind, always by [his] side" (2020). This article has provided a brief analysis of the portrayal of samurai warfare in League of Legends, using the character of Yasuo as a case study. Both Yasuo's reliance on the katana, as well as his 'all or nothing' style of engagement, using real-life techniques, are clearly informed by historical conceptions of bushidō warfare, which has

dominated Japanese warfare since the feudal era. The game represents an interactive experience in historical learning, reaching out to millions of people across the globe who likely would have little interest in written history. In Yasuo's words, he "will not die dishonoured", and games such as LoL are keeping history alive in the virtual generation, even if in their own slightly fantastical way (2020).

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CONTACT DETAILS

A N D P R E S E N T A T I O N O F T H E
3 S J B O A R D

CONTACT DETAILS:



GMAIL: 3SJ.JOURNAL@GMAIL.COM



FACEBOOK: FACEBOOK.COM/3SJOURNAL



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