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FOREWORD

B Y T H E 3 S J B O A R D

The Student Strategy and Security Journal (3SJ) is proud to present this Second Edition of research, commitment, and collaboration which demonstrates an outlet of cooperation and productive discourse in an increasingly chaotic and uncertain world. This Edition examines conceptions of Grand Strategy, non-state governance, International Relations, and more.

In the first section, and in line with 3SJ's mission of challenging prior knowledge in the IR discipline, Susanna Karvinen's contribution retraces the history of International Relations in order to unpack its assumptions and biases, shedding light on its marginalised voices. Accordingly, Blair Graham's inquiry into the Six-Day War questions Israel's motives for waging conflict by interrogating overlooked empirical considerations.

Aware of changing power outlooks in the wake of a US-China confrontation, the second section of the Journal delves into issues of foreign policy, with Alexander Olteanu's article on the Sino-Western conundrum, its erroneous assumptions, and the risk of falling prey to a misinterpretation of Thucydides' trap. Then, Timon Ostermeier investigates the missed opportunity of a post-Cold War West-Russia defence architecture, and Robert Hart interprets the French National Strategy in light of an ever-changing Europe, thirsty for geopolitical assertiveness, but oblivious of the ways of power.

The third section focuses on non-state actors who engage in daily governance activities, representing a middle layer between geopolitics and the public sphere. To address these matters, Steph Wallace compares the rebel governance projects of the LTTE

and ISIS, while Salla Lampinen brings the voice of NGOs back into the discourse on governance, by exploring the role of these non-state actors in the refugee crisis.

In its last section, this Edition of 3SJ hosts Sinan Kircova's unexpected portrayal of Napoleon, which questions the concept of Caesarism and the relationship between Bonaparte and the Revolution, paving the way for greater interrogatives about Grand Strategy. It is Paul Gallienne's contribution, ultimately, which examines the intertwined effects of culture and technology on Strategy itself, through a journey across the pasturelands of the Mongol Empire, Russia's war mindest, and the Vietnamese struggle for resistance.

NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICY

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CRITICAL IR

I N T H E O R Y & P R A C T I C E

SILENCED VOICES – WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT THE HISTORY OF THE IR DISCIPLINE?

SUSANNA KARVINEN

ABSTRACT

The orthodox narrative about the history of International Relations (IR) outlines that the sovereign state and the anarchic state-system were born in 1648 in the Treaties of Westphalia, and that IR as a discipline itself was born in 1919 as an attempt to solve the problem of war. The impact of the years 1648 and 1919 is, however, a myth that distorts the history of the discipline. Adapting this simplistic view of the history of the discipline is dangerous as it underplays or ignores the imperialistic, Eurocentric, racist and patriarchal origins and development of IR. The debate has excluded certain voices, such as feminist or postcolonial approaches, and thus helped to perpetuate a distorted and partial world view that reflects the power of the privileged. Theory cannot be separated from the real world but it is instead an active contributor in the process of reshaping it, and thus it is vital to understand how Eurocentrism and both imperialistic and masculine hegemony have, throughout the development of IR theory, affected and continue to affect real-life policymaking and the current world order.

KEYWORDS: International Relations Theory; IR Critical Studies; Westphalia; Imperialism; Eurocentrism; Masculine Hegemony; Sovereignty.

AN ALTERNATIVE LOOK AT THE SIX DAY WAR

BLAIR GRAHAM

ABSTRACT

According to the official narrative of the Six-Day War, Israel was forced to act preemptively following near-genocidal threats from Egypt and its Arab neighbours. In addition to incredibly fiery rhetoric from Cairo and its allies, Israel's Arab adversaries took a series of highly provocative measures which, if not responded to, put the future existence of the Jewish State in serious jeopardy. Therefore, the war that followed and the subsequent occupations of Arab territories were entirely justified on the strict grounds of national security. This essay seeks to challenge the conventional view of this conflict. As this essay will demonstrate, Israeli planners felt absolutely no threat from its Arab neighbours and certainly did not fear for the continued existence of their state. Instead, claims that Israel was under imminent threat of genocide were concocted to give Tel Aviv's aggressive military actions a veil of legitimacy. Israel, then, cannot be said to have been acting in self-defence; rather, they were exploiting an opportunity to pursue their long-standing territorial ambitions.

KEYWORDS: Israel; Egypt; Middle East; Six-Day War; Rhetorics; Threat; Warning; Conflict Revisionism; Military Strategy.

SILENCED VOICES - WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT THE HISTORY OF THE IR DISCIPLINE?

SUSANNA KARVINEN

INTRODUCTION

Traditional history taught to students of International Relations follows the narrative outlining that the sovereign state and the anarchic state-system were born in 1648 in the Treaties of Westphalia and that IR as a discipline itself was born in 1919 as an attempt to solve the problem of war. The impact of the years 1648 and 1919 is, however, a myth and the conventionally orthodox narrative relying on these mythical origins about the birth and development of the discipline has obscured its real history. There are important reasons to study the history of IR, but most crucially to allow for the exposure of the Eurocentric, racist and patriarchal origins of the discipline. This can be done by taking a revisionist approach and unfolding myths about its origins, while highlighting how some important voices and topics have been excluded from it.

This essay will hence explain why 1648 and 1919 are myths and what the problems of these myths to IR are. It will then discuss how the reliance of mystic origins contributes to the marginalisation or exclusion of certain voices and highlights that acknowledging the disciplinary history and the marginalisation of certain theories matters because theory cannot be separated from the real world but is instead an active contributor in the process of reshaping it.

THE MYTHS OF 1648 AND 1919

The myths of IR (the Westphalian Treaties in 1648 and the year 1919 after the First World War) are traditionally seen as the important historical events forming the basis of the discipline and therefore its ontological and epistemological foundations. The conventional narrative tells us that the sovereign state and anarchic state-system were born in 1648 in the Treaties of Westphalia at the end of the Thirty Years' War (de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011: 738-40). These Treaties are seen to mark the beginning of the modern international system as a one composed of sovereign states with exclusive authority within their geographical territories (Krasner, 1995: 115). Revisionist scholars, however, have shown that the concept of sovereignty precedes the Westphalian Treaties and that sovereignty was actually restricted rather than invented in them. The idea that rulers had authority over their territories was already present, for example in the Peace of Augsburg a century earlier (de Carvalho et al., 2011: 738-40). The Treaties also included a number of restrictions regarding the domestic authority of each state's ruler, for example on religious practices (Krasner, 1995: 115). This notion that the concept of sovereignty was not simply born out of a single set of peace treaties is far more plausible than the conventional narrative about the meaning of the Westphalian Treaties. Although it is possible for a single event to cause a massive transformation in the political world order and

state relations, most often transformations are likely to happen over decades of political practice. This is true at least for the concept of state sovereignty. Therefore, the emphasis on Westphalian Treaties is an oversimplification of a complicated and long process of change. This kind of false assumption about the origins of one of IR's basic concepts can set challenges for understanding the complexity of the global world order (de Carvalho et al., 2011: 737).

One of the problems of this simplified interpretation of history is that it ignores how Eurocentric IR is. There are some links in the Westphalian Treaties to the concept of sovereignty, such as the rights of states to have their own foreign policy. The Treaties, and hence the right of states for their own foreign policy, however, were only applicable to states within the Holy Roman Empire (de Carvalho et al., 2011: 740). Yet, many scholars misinterpret that the Treaties applied to Europe in general. The Eurocentric approach to the history of Europe and the world thus assumes that state sovereignty became the universal feature of world politics after Westphalia (de Carvalho et al., 2011: 742). Yet, since the year 1648 neither the global nor the European political system have been solely based on an anarchic system of states. Alongside anarchy they have exhibited combinations of "sub-systems hierarchy" (Hobson and Sharman, 2005: 64) whereby imperialist hierarchies centered on states in possession of sovereignty were the dominant actors of international relations at least until the Second World War (Hobson and Sharman, 2005: 70). It was only during the postcolonial era that the sovereign state started to feature as the central unit in global politics (de Carvalho et al., 2011: 742). Non-sovereign political formations have therefore remained in world politics

throughout the modern era long after Westphalia (Hobson and Sharman, 2005: 70). Even today imperial legacies continue to affect world politics to some extent (de Carvalho et al., 2011: 742), for example in the form of humanitarian intervention later discussed in this essay.

The second myth of IR equally contributes to a problematic interpretation of the history of the discipline. According to the conventional narrative, the end of the First World War and the year 1919 marks the creation of the study of IR. This myth claims that IR was born following the devastation of the First World War when Idealists sought to find a solution to the problem of war (Henderson, 2013: 89). They believed that there exists such a thing as positive progress that contributes to a better understanding of the global system and answers to the problem of war (de Carvalho et al., 2011: 745-46).

This myth about how the discipline was born is equally Eurocentric for various reasons. One reason is that reading IR history through the aforementioned ideal lenses of positive progress further allows the discipline to gloss over its racist and imperialist origins (de Carvalho et al., 2011: 737). As said, through this approach, IR was seen as a noble discipline that would solve the problem of war and, therefore, serve all people. However, no matter how noble IR and its solutions to war were thought to be, the fact remains that mainstream IR has been concerned with retaining and promoting Western ideas and concepts to the world, often with a racist lens (de Carvalho et al., 2011: 750). As Vitalis (2015: 2) powerfully notes, the scholars of IR were often concerned with proceeding strategies to protect and expand their

hegemony over the marginalised. The early scholarly focus of IR was on race and colonial administration, and built on a “wilful forgetting” of the imperialist origins of the discipline (Bell, 2009: 8).

A closer examination of the Treaties of Westphalia and of the ideologies behind the creation of IR as a field of study thus clearly reveals that the discipline has read its own history in a selective and inaccurate way. Yet, especially in mainstream IR, the conventional picture has remained largely unchanged (Hobson and Sharman, 2005: 63) and many IR textbooks still maintain the traditional storyline (de Carvalho et al., 2011: 143). Continuing to teach the history of IR through the myth of 1919 allows scholars to ignore the importance of colonialism and white supremacy as central to the origins of the field (Henderson, 2013: 89). Therefore, as long as this distorted history reading prevails, it remains important to highlight the revisionist literature debunking the myths and the serious consequences this history has to both the making of current theory and world politics.

THE WORLD IS MORE DIVERSE THAN THE SCOPE OF MAINSTREAM IR SUGGESTS

But what are the consequences of an inaccurate history reading on political theory and practice? Most importantly it has resulted in mainstream scholars, especially those in the camps of liberalism and realism, interpreting the world from narrow perspectives and excluding or marginalising critical approaches. Mainstream IR theories reflect the desires of those in power, which throughout history has mainly meant the desires of white Western males and powerful Western states.

This is not to argue that there are no alternative voices. The discipline has undoubtedly broadened its theoretical lens to include both approaches and topics from a variety of other disciplines that include critical thinkers and those of marginalised identities such as feminist theories or African American studies. These critical views indeed demonstrate that the arena of international politics is more diverse than what mainstream IR suggests. For instance, while the emphasis on the myth of the Westphalian Treaties has contributed to the hegemonic position of realism and its main unit of analysis, the state, various feminist approaches have challenged the realist approach and revealed the gendered nature of IR by focusing on social relations and individual experiences in social and political settings (Tickner, 1997: 616). For example Cynthia Enloe, one of the key scholars during the emergence of feminist approaches in the late 1980s, has argued for the importance of the lives and experiences of ordinary people in understanding violence and how violent practices are related to gender constructions (Enloe et al., 2016: 539).

To suggest that IR is obtuse does also not mean that marginalised critical voices have only arisen recently. Critical scholars were already addressing the problematic racist origins of IR during the interwar years. African American scholars W. E. B. Du Bois, Alain Locke and the Howard School challenged the dominant idea that the global world order is based on racial superiority. These academics were originally at the forefront of the development of IR. However, they were eventually relegated to separate disciplines such as African American studies, allowing privileged voices to continue dominating and defining IR (Vitalis, 2015: 158).

Its logic has therefore been based on racist white supremacy (Vitalis, 2015: 1). In the late 19th and early 20th century, the general understanding of the global world order was biologically rooted and white social scientists created theories based on the fundamental belief that there were inferior beings who threatened white supremacy (Vitalis, 2015: 26-27).

Eurocentrism becomes visible in the way that racism was ignored or pushed to the margins of the discipline around the era of its supposed creation. IR discipline was thus initially developed to help maintain a system and world order that excluded countries and people that were not white or Western (or male). To this day, the silencing of voices who would discuss racism in IR perpetuates. According to Henderson (2013: 89), there is a "norm against noticing" racism in IR that makes it difficult to get critical views on white supremacy published in any major Western IR journals. Content that does get published discusses racism in ways that allows for white individuals and the IR discipline to distance themselves from taking responsibility for white supremacy. While there are of course differences between the development of the discipline in different countries even within Europe (Schmidt, 2013: 7), it can nevertheless be argued that IR has been a mainly Western discipline and has its leading scholars in the US and Europe. In 2015 in the US, IR scholars still consisted mostly of white individuals (Lake, 2016: 1112).

The same argument about the Western and masculine world order applies to the current position of feminist voices within IR. They still remain marginal because issues of gender continue to be considered less important in

politics (Youngs, 2004: 79) than the state and international structures (Tickner, 1997: 616). There is a lack of dialogue and understanding between feminist and mainstream IR scholars, which ultimately results from their diverging ontological and epistemological approaches. For example Realists focus on sovereign states operating in an anarchical international system and are not concerned with analysing how armed conflict and the behaviour of states affects the life of individuals, or how these are constructed through unequal gendered power relations (Tickner, 1997: 616). Those mainstream scholars who engage with feminist arguments, such as Kehone, argue that in order to have a place within IR, feminist scholars should use "publicly known methods" which are "checked by a community of scholars" (1998: 196). The problem is, because Feminists ask different questions to those of mainstream scholars, their methodology is often also different to that of methodologies in mainstream IR. Their questions cannot necessarily be answered by framing them in terms of testable hypotheses (Tickner, 2005: 1). Furthermore, if this community of scholars Kehone refers to consists of mainstream IR theorists, the accepted methods are those accepted by the mainstream scholars. Attempts to make feminist approaches to comply with mainstream accepted methods further demonstrates the fact that men have historically dominated both international politics and the discipline of IR, and that knowledge construction has happened from a male perspective which is taken as a given by mainstream scholars (Youngs, 2004: 77).

THEORY IMPACTS REAL LIFE

Engaging critically with IR theory is crucial because it fundamentally contributes to shaping the world and thus is not something occurring hermetically in academia and research institutes. Theory can in itself be seen as a form of practice since it affects the world. By advancing a theory, it is possible to change mindsets and therefore, social realities (Kurki and Wight, 2016: 31-31). Since theory and practice can be seen as interrelated, studying the history of IR as a discipline is crucial in understanding why world politics are organised the way they are. By engaging with a critical view of the history of IR, it is possible to understand how this history affects the ways in which IR scholars interpret the world and produce knowledge that in turn is utilised in real-world policymaking. Theory participates in classifying and conceptualising actors and events in global politics, for example when deciding who is a terrorist or what means a civilised state (Bell, 2009: 17). We often take these concepts for granted without realising that alternative interpretations can be made. Since Western and male voices have been dominant in the construction of IR theory, it can be argued that the dominance of these voices has influenced what is considered important in IR and which voices and topics are excluded.

One example of the imperialist history of IR and the implications thereof is the concept of humanitarian intervention. It has been asked whether the principle behind the concept of humanitarian intervention is the idea that states have a responsibility to protect, or if these interventions are a Western imperialist project with motives of national self-interest (Daombeck, 2012: 1). By tracing the imperialist origins of IR,

we can understand how modern social and political thought continues to use imperial policies, for example by intervening in the matters of a sovereign state under the justification that the state has internal shortcomings such as lack of good governance or failure to protect human rights of its citizens (Jahn, 2017). The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle was adopted in 2005 by the UN and was a result of a debate on how the international community should react to systematic violations of human rights in a world of state sovereignty after the mass atrocities in Rwanda and the failures in Kosovo. R2P includes the notion that sovereignty is not only protection from external interference but also a positive responsibility of the state to protect its citizens. Should the state fail in this task, it is then the matter of the international community to provide this protection (The Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect). It is, however, the unequal imperial power relations that make policies of, for example interventions, possible in the first place (Jahn, 2017). The mere fact that the Security Council has the power to decide whether to invoke R2P demonstrates that. Scholars on humanitarian interventions have shown that states have not intervened unless there has been a vital interest at stake and that especially the permanent five members of the UN Security Council with veto power use the SC as means to promote their interests in the world. Interventions have hence been highly selective rather than based on the principle of protecting civilians from human rights violations committed by the targeted state of intervention (Hehir, 2013: 156). For example, the R2P was applied to Libya (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 825) but in Myanmar the SC has not intervened even though the situation of the Rohingya clearly counts as gross violations of human rights (Hehir, 2017).

Feminist approaches to war and security provide another example of how the limited mainstream IR theory can bear consequences in real life. While conventional IR scholars view states as the best entity to ensure the safety of individuals, feminists have shown how the lived experiences of women in war are all but safe. Violations of all kinds on women demonstrate that sometimes the state and militarism are the reasons for certain aspects of insecurity (Tickner, 1997: 625). The impact that war has on women as well as on men and other gender identities highlights that states are not always adequate security providers for civilians. Mainstream IR scholars, many of whom contribute to advising policymakers in real life, do not consider how gender matters in politics. Focusing on the state-level analysis of foreign policy makes it easier to distance oneself from the fact that each decision has consequences on the lives of individuals in the affected state, for instance civilians in times of war. Could the foreign policy decisions of states perhaps be somehow different if decision makers were more informed by critical perspectives such as feminist or postcolonial theories?

CONCLUSIONS

It is crucially important to study the history of IR because it has been distorted. This becomes evident in the disciplinary myths of the creation of the sovereign state and the modern state-system in the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 and the birth of the discipline itself in 1919 as a response to the horrors of the First World War. A critical review of this mainstream narrative of IR disciplinary history reveals that neither the initiation of the concept of a sovereign state nor the discipline itself is that simplistic.

Furthermore, adopting an oversimplified view of IR's history is dangerous as it underplays or ignores the disciplines racist, Eurocentric and patriarchal roots. Based on white supremacy and an upholding of the imperial system, as well as on the focus on the state as the main unit of analysis, the discipline has failed to include certain voices because they were initially seen as inferior or irrelevant. By excluding some voices, mainstream IR helps to perpetuate a world view that reflects the power of the privileged instead of the full social reality of all people (Youngs, 2004: 76).

Therefore, if we ignore analysing the narrative of how the discipline of IR was born and developed, we might miss the fact that the production of knowledge and power interests are interrelated. There is always a reason why a particular theory has been formed. It would be dangerous to use a theory in current world politics while not understanding how historical events and power dynamics that were dominant at the time of the construction of the theory affected the shaping of it. Studying the history of IR thus enables us to be self-reflective so that we do not merely accept what the textbooks tell us about its origins.

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AN ALTERNATIVE LOOK AT THE SIX DAY WAR

BLAIR GRAHAM

In light of recent speculation concerning possible annexation of the West Bank, there is no more apt an occasion to review just how this territory came to be under Israeli occupation in the first place. If Israel is to be believed, the Six-Day War – which resulted in the occupation of not only the West Bank, but East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip – was a necessary security measure as the very “existence of the Israeli state hung by a thread” (Hasan, 2017) on account of threats stemming from Egypt and its Arab allies, the country’s then-Prime Minister Levi Eshkol insisted. Thanks to Israel’s preemptive warfare, the “hopes of the Arab leaders to annihilate Israel were dashed”, Eshkol continued (Hasan, 2017).

The official Israeli narrative of the war also represents scholarly conventional wisdom. By way of example, the respected Just War theorist Michael Walzer (1977: 84) argues that in the weeks leading up to the war, “Israeli anxiety” was “an almost classic example of ‘just fear’”, and, accordingly, the “Israeli first strike” was a “clear case of legitimate anticipation”. Similarly, Michael Oren maintains that in going to war all “Israel strove for was an end to an immediate threat, and for an indefinite period of quiet thereafter” (Oren, 2002: 169).

This essay seeks to challenge this interpretation of events, arguing that the orthodox account just alluded to is a serious exaggeration of reality and that Israel, in fact, did not sincerely

fear for the continued existence of their state. Tel Aviv’s preemptive actions were instead in no way defensive and were far more self-serving in nature. Before delving into the specifics of what actually took place, however, a more detailed review of the official narrative is in order.

THE OFFICIAL STORY

According to the official telling, the war’s origins date back to some time in mid-May 1967. The catalyst was false Soviet intelligence reports informing Egypt of a mass build-up of Israeli forces along the Syrian border. In response to this news, Egypt placed its own forces on ‘maximum alert’ before deploying large numbers of their own forces into the Sinai peninsula. Such a build-up would not have sat well with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) – stationed in the Sinai following the British, French, and Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956 – which is probably why Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser ordered their removal very shortly thereafter (Aburish, 2005: 252). To make matters worse, Egypt proceeded to sign a series of defensive pacts with a number of Arab states, who themselves began to amass troops along the Israeli border.

Escalating matters further still, on May 22, Nasser ordered the blockade of the Straits of Tiran, thereby preventing Israeli access to this vital shipping lane. This was an unacceptably aggressive act on Egypt’s part as, Oren (2002:81) informs us, the Straits of Tiran constituted “a

lifeline for the Jewish state". It is for this reason, Walzer (1977: 83) argues, that the war could be said to have begun on "May 22, and the Israeli attack of June 5 described simply as its first military incident".

The implicit argument of the above is that Egypt had committed an act of war against Israel with its attempts to destroy the Israeli economy through its blockade. This, coupled with the huge troop presence on Israel's border, left Tel Aviv with no choice but to launch its preemptive strikes in June. There is, of course, one problem with this interpretation of events: it is a serious distortion of reality. As General Mattityahu Peled, the Israeli chief of Logistical Command during the war, put it, the official narrative was "nothing but a bluff which was born and bred after the war" (Hasan, 2017). Peled was not the only senior figure to reveal the true nature of Israel's official portrayal. Mordechai Bentov, a member of the war-time government, stated "this whole story about the threat of extermination was totally contrived [...] to justify the annexation of new Arab territories" (Hasan, 2017). So, if the war was not a product of Israel's sincere fears stemming from Egypt and its Arab allies, what, then, did happen?

THE COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE

Contrary to the assertions of Israel and much of academia, the roots of this war date back much further than May 1967. In fact, an honest portrayal of events will place the war's origins as early as November of 1966. Specifically, on November 13, Israel launched a massive raid on the Jordanian village of Samu, in response to what they insisted were incursions from guerillas. The air-strikes reportedly killed 15 soldiers and a further five civilians, triggering a massive outcry in the Arab world (Schemes and

Tlamim, 2002: 152).

In this time of crisis, Arabs turned to their de-facto leader, Nasser, and demanded that he act in response to Israel's aggressive acts. Yet Nasser was very reluctant to escalate matters further. Contrary to the popular portrayals of his Western detractors at the time, Nasser was not a warmonger and harboured no illusions about Egypt's relative strength against Israel. He was fully cognisant that a military contest with his Israeli neighbour was not one he would win and, therefore, sought to avoid it at all costs. Accordingly, ignoring the demands of his people, Nasser forewent retaliating for the Samu raids.

Nasser's military reticence became far more unsustainable, however, following Israel's April 1967 downing of six Syrian planes. Just as with the Samu raid, there were calls from all quarters of Arab society for the Egyptian president to respond to these seemingly unending acts of aggression. Radio Jordan, for example, mocked Nasser's restraint and prodded the Egyptian leader to "hit Israel where it hurts" (Finkelstein, 1995: 127). Seeking to placate domestic critics but not actually escalate matters with Israel, Nasser opted for a series of symbolic responses (Pappe, 2017). In an internal memo, U.S. National Security Adviser Walt Rostow perfectly captured Nasser's thinking, stating that Egypt's president "probably feels his prestige would suffer irreparably if he failed a third time to come to the aid of an Arab nation attacked by Israel" (Office of the Historian, 1967a).

It is in this context that we can begin to understand the aforementioned troop deployment in the Sinai. Although ostensibly a provocative move, some authors have argued that Nasser never intended for these forces to pose any real threat to Israel – as Tel Aviv instantly recognised and has subsequently

acknowledged (Finkelstein, 2018). Despite the insistence of Israeli historiography that the Sinai build-up constituted an existential threat to the Jewish state, the then-IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin has, for example, conceded “the two divisions he [Nasser] sent into the Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to launch an offensive. He knew it and we knew it” (Finkelstein, 1995: 134). Similarly, former prime minister Menachem Begin, who served in the Unity Government at the time of the war, candidly admitted “the Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us” (Finkelstein, 1995: 135). In an eerily familiar manner, then-foreign minister Abba Eban remarked “Nasser did not want war; he wanted victory without war” (Remnick, 2007). In other words, Nasser was merely seeking to achieve his political goal of standing up to Israel in the face of their aggression, without having to resort to force to do so.

With respect to removing the UNEF, Nasser never actually sought their full withdrawal; instead, he simply desired that they re-position themselves on the peninsula. It was only after being informed by the then-U.N. Secretary General U Thant that such a “face-saving” option would not be permitted that Nasser ordered their complete withdrawal (Finkelstein, 1995: 127). In other words, this was not quite the provocative act proponents of the official narrative insist. Moreover, also omitted from the orthodox account is the U.N.’s follow up proposal. After failing to reach a compromise with Egypt, U Thant proposed that Israel house the UNEF on their side of the border. This offer, needless to say, was steadfastly rejected by Tel Aviv (Oren, 2002: 72).

Nasser’s second symbolic response was the closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and preventing foreign vessels from reaching Eilat, an important Israeli port city. The reality of this measure is totally at odds with the hysterical proclamations of Israel and much of scholarship who maintain the blockade constituted an “act of war” for it was an “attempt at strangulation” of Israel, as Eban put it (Finkelstein, 1995: 137). Firstly, the survival of Israel’s economy was not dependent on free passage through the Tiran Straits as just 5% of Israeli trade travelled through Eilat (Finkelstein, 2012: 167). Moreover, as Finkelstein (2012: 167) observes, the only “significant commodity possibly affected by a blockade was oil, which could have been rerouted to the ports of Haifa and Ashdod, and anyhow Israel held in reserve an ample supply of oil carrying it over for many months to come”. So, on this evidence, it is quite clear the continued existence of Israel was not in immediate jeopardy, meaning the blockade was not necessarily a threat which necessitated large-scale preemptive action, as Israel insists.

For the sake of argumentation, however, if we were to accept that the blockade of the Straits of Tiran did pose a real threat to Israel’s economy, Tel Aviv’s subsequent actions remain indefensible. Article 2 (3) of the *United Nations Charter* unequivocally states that all disputes between nations must be settled using “peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered” (Charter of the United Nations, n.d.). Simply put, all diplomatic initiatives available must first be exhausted to settle interstate disputes before war is even contemplated. With respect to the Straits of Tiran, only one party was prepared to abide by their international commitments. Egypt proposed to Israel that the issue be taken to the International Court of Justice for arbitration, but

to no avail.

All of this, however, is academic. In truth, there was no 'blockade' of the Straits of Tiran. Just days after closing the shipping lane to Israeli vessels, Nasser quietly lifted the blockade, privately informing Israeli officials that they could travel freely through the straits as before. As touched on above, Nasser did not wish to seriously respond to Israel's aggression; rather, he wanted to merely appear as though he was coming to the Arab world's defence, without actually doing anything tangible that risked triggering a conflict with his militarily superior neighbour. It was for this reason that Israeli officials internally described the blockade as a "not crucial" issue and a simple "political symbol" on Nasser's part (Finkelstein, 2012: 168). Similarly, Abba Eban said that Nasser had "decided not to disrupt shipping" but simply to put himself in a "position where he could brandish this sword" (Finkelstein, 2012: 404).

What we have seen so far, then, is that the two central justifications for war – the troop deployments and blockade of the Straits of Tiran – were not actually sincerely viewed as threats by Israeli officials. It should be noted, Israel was not the only party to recognise the true nature of the Arab 'threat'. On June 1, 1967, the then-head of Mossad, Meir Amit, travelled to Washington to request intelligence. Amit firstly asked his American counterparts about the likelihood of an Arab attack against the Jewish State. The response was that there was absolutely no American intelligence to suggest that Egypt or its Arab allies had any plans for initiating a war against Israel. As an internal American intelligence assessment read, "our best judgement is that no military attack on Israel is imminent" (Office of the Historian,

1967). In response to this information, Amit asked a follow up question. Hypothetically, he inquired, if there were to be an Arab attack, what would Israel's prospect of success be? To this, President Johnson emphatically replied that "you will whip the hell out of them" (Finkelstein, 2012: 172). In fact, Defence Secretary McNamara would later boast of his prescient prediction that the war would last between six and ten days. Put simply, Israel was unequivocally and unambiguously informed by the world's leading intelligence-gathering power that the threats from its neighbours were non-existent. Not that they needed reminding, though. Amit informed his U.S. hosts that their intelligence "agreed entirely" with Israel's own conclusions (Finkelstein, 2012: 172). Naturally, this raises an important question: if Israel did not in any way feel threatened by Egypt or any of its other Arab neighbours, why, then, did they attack on June 5?

A LONG PREMEDITATED WAR?

During its 'War of Independence' in 1948, Israel forewent incorporating the West Bank into its new state, instead allowing Jordan to annex the territory. This, the country's first prime minister David Ben-Gurion would later remark, was a "fatal historical mistake" (Pappe, 2017a: 69). It was for this reason that Israeli planners sought any opportunity they could find to right this historic wrong. One such opportunity presented itself in 1956. During the planning phase of the aforementioned British, French, and Israeli invasion of Egypt, Ben-Gurion suggested to his French counterpart Guy Mollet that the invasion be extended into Jordan to allow Israel to help itself to the West Bank. This may have gone ahead had Washington not gotten wind of this conversation and vetoed the proposal (Pappe, 2017b: 17).

Israel would not have to wait long for its next opportunity, however. In April of 1957, Jordan

was in the midst of political chaos, with King Hussein's position at serious risk. Sensing an opportunity to satisfy their territorial ambitions, Tel Aviv believed they could take full advantage of this instability and launch an invasion of Jordan, certain that the Jordanian army would be too distracted and weakened to stop Israeli forces from occupying the West Bank. Unfortunately for Israel, they waited too long to act. By the time they had drawn up their war plans, the situation in Jordan stabilised, depriving Tel Aviv of the opening they needed (Pappe, 2017b: 17).

Just one year later, another regional crisis presented itself as a new window of opportunity. In May 1958, civil war broke out in neighbouring Lebanon, which was followed by revolution in Baghdad just two months later. Israeli planners had no designs on either Lebanon or Iraq, however, they were hopeful that the radical spirit gripping these countries could spill over into Jordan reigniting the political crisis of the previous year. If this were to transpire, Israel would once again have the opening they needed for intervention (2017b: 20). Accordingly, the Israeli army drew up blueprints for a small military operation in the West Bank with a view to taking over the territory (2017b: 23). However, revolution did not return to Jordan, meaning this plan never came into fruition.

Despite their repeated failures to achieve their aforementioned ambitions, Israel's will would not be broken. In 1960, Israel provocatively entered the no man's land on its border with Syria, leading to a sharp rise in hostilities. In response to these increased tensions, Egypt stationed its forces in the Sinai. Israeli policymakers viewed this as a potential

opportunity for preemptive strikes and launched *Operation Rotem*. The plan called for, among other things, the military takeover of the West Bank, along with the Gaza Strip. Although tensions diffused shortly thereafter and Israel did not need to put its plan into action, this experience "turned out to be a grand rehearsal for 1967", as Pappe (2017b: 24) observes.

Finally, perhaps in opportunistic anticipation of a looming crisis, in 1966, Israel was preparing for the administrative, legal, and military takeover of both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As Pappe (2017b: 27) points out, these plans were based on "the one already implemented in the Arab areas of Israel" taken over as a result of the 1948 war. This therefore meant that "the army was prepared, as was the framework, for occupation". All that was needed was the opportunity that presented itself in the spring of 1967.

It seems clear, then, that the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza was not the necessary result of a defensive war Israel was forced into. Rather, the empirical record strongly suggests the Occupied Territories were long-coveted by Israel, and 1967 merely represented the first opportunity for Israel to actualise this long-standing objective.

CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to Israel's talking points and the assertions of much of mainstream scholarship, the Six-Day War was not a necessary security response in the face of existential threats to the Jewish State's existence. Almost every aspect of the popular narrative of this conflict does not withstand serious scrutiny. Firstly, the orthodox account omits the crucial context of Israel's periodic aggressive acts against its Arab neighbours; most notably, the bombing of Samu and the downing of Syrian fighter jets. These

provocative acts resulted in mounting pressure on the Arab World's de facto leader, Nasser, to do something in response. Yet, harbouring no illusions about Egypt's relative strength versus Israel, Nasser did not wish to seriously retaliate; instead opting for symbolic gestures. It is in this context that we must understand the two principal threats invariably cited by supporters of the war: the mass troop build-up and the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. Both of these measures did not pose a significant threat to Israel, as Tel Aviv instantly recognised and have since acknowledged (or, at the very least, a number of earnest officials did in retirement). With respect to the former, the troop presence was so infinitesimal that it could not have possibly mounted a serious challenge to Israel. As for the latter, the blockade lasted no more than a few days and was very quietly re-opened to Israeli shipping as before; meaning, in short, that the 'blockade' also could not have possibly posed a serious threat to Israel – and this is ignoring the fact that Israel's reliance on this shipping lane was grossly exaggerated. This gives us strong grounds to look for alternative explanations for the war. An examination of the internal record reveals one such explanation. More than a decade before the commencement of the Six-Day War, Israeli planners were already desperately searching for opportunities to take over the West Bank, along with the other territories they would eventually occupy. For a variety of reasons, Israel's plans were scuttled. 1967, then, was not so much a fight for Israel's survival but, rather, merely the first opportunity Israel was able to successfully exploit to satisfy its long-standing territorial ambitions.

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FOREIGN POLICY

C H I N A , R U S S I A , F R A N C E

THE REQUIRED READING FOR A NEW TRANS-ATLANTIC GRAND STRATEGY: THUCYDIDES' TRAP OR TOCQUEVILLE'S TREATISE?

ALEXANDER OLTEANU

ABSTRACT

This submission argues that the deployment of the 'Thucydides Trap' analogy by Western realist academic analysts and policy-makers to explain the current U.S.-China global rivalry is both anachronistic and misguided. China's authoritarian internal policies and aggressive external military, economic, and intelligence moves are due, above all, to the Chinese Communist Party's justified perception of its own vulnerabilities as the country's ruling oligarchy and its resultant fear of losing its vast privileges and its monopoly on power. This essay draws on Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of the French Ancien Régime and of the Great Revolution that toppled it in 1789 to claim that the greatest threat to the U.S.A. and to its Western allies is therefore not a rising China bidding for global hegemony, but their own unwillingness and inability to reform their domestic and Trans-Atlantic systems of governance in line with the increasingly pressing demands of their citizens for more political participation, prosperity, pluralism and peace.

KEYWORDS: Thucydides' Trap; U.S.A.; China; Trans-Atlantic Community; Tocqueville; International Order; COVID-19 Pandemic; Foreign Policy; Revolution; Faith and Fatherland.

RUSSIA - TOO BIG AND TOO WEAK? WHY THE WEST AND RUSSIA DID NOT DEVELOP A JOINT SECURITY STRUCTURE

TIMON OSTERMEIER

ABSTRACT

At the end of the Cold War, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev promoted the idea of a 'Common European Home', and after President Boris Yeltsin took office, following the implosion of the Soviet Union, it seemed like Russia was heading for a Western foreign policy direction. However, relations with Western institutions and countries crumbled gradually and turned hostile, hitting rock bottom with the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014. This essay analyzes why no joint security structure between the West and Russia emerged, though post-Cold War initiatives had been brought forward in the international arena. Four factors are pivotal: 1) the failure in progressing the CSCE/OSCE process, 2) Russia's struggle with its identity as a fallen superpower, 3) the continuity of Cold War mindsets in elite groups, and 4) Russia's opposition towards NATO's gradual Eastern expansion. Concluding the analysis, four causal links and a juxtaposition of the competing Transatlantic and Russian security concepts will be derived.

KEYWORDS: Russia; NATO; OSCE; Common European Home; Transatlantic Security; Russian Security; Security Dilemma; Putin.

THE PROGRESSION TOWARDS AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPE UNDER FRANCE

ROBERT HART

ABSTRACT

With the collapse of the bipolar world system of the Cold War and the emergence of a new multipolar system, France has consistently made a concerted effort to remain legitimate and relevant on the global stage. Moreover, in light of Brexit, France seemingly sees itself as the next possible emerging leader of a new European order, however, at the same time, they are confronted by many strategic challenges in a new multipolar world order. Uncertainty and unpredictability in the international system drive and influence French strategy at a time when French military capabilities are spread thin, thus suggesting that the budgetary constraints and the practice of semi-dependency (which French strategy paradoxically rejects) poses a very problematic hurdle for France to overcome in their ascent to dominance in Europe. France's privileged position as the now sole nuclear power in the EU, as well as their strategic position as a permanent member on the UN Security Council, has positioned France and its decision-makers to take advantage of its supreme military capability in comparison to like-sized 'medium states' in order to exert its influence both regionally and internationally. Consequently, the main complexity that arises from the French strategic plan is its balancing act. Therefore, the main goal of this article is to examine how France attempts to maintain complete autonomy for certain preconditioned national operational engagements while simultaneously pursuing European ambitions where cooperative and state-level partnerships will directly enhance military capabilities within France's full-spectrum approach.

KEYWORDS: French National Strategy; European Autonomy; European Integration; French Autonomy.

THE REQUIRED READING FOR A NEW TRANS-ATLANTIC GRAND STRATEGY: THUCYDIDES' TRAP OR TOCQUEVILLE'S TREATISE?

ALEXANDER OLTEANU

OF MYTHS AND STRATEGIES IN THE EMERGING WORLD ORDER

The greatest danger in constructing false enemy images based on anachronistic historical analogies is that of adopting the wrong strategy at the wrong time, at the wrong place, against the wrong opponent – and in the process downgrading or even ignoring the real critical threat lurking in the background (Kaplan, 2017: 34-36). Yet this is exactly the mistake perpetrated by those realist academic authors and policy-makers who have devised the mytho-historical story of Thucydides' Trap (Wolin, 2001: 511-12). This narrative draws on the growing rivalry and ensuing devastating wars between the ancient Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta and their respective allies, in the fifth century B.C.. It derives its name from Thucydides, a historian who lived in that period and recounted this conflict in his famous work entitled *The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians* (Kagan, 2005). Realist analysts deploy Thucydides' Trap as a template for the current Chinese-American relationship and as justification for its portrayal as the latest in a long line of rivalries between a declining hegemonic power and a rising opponent challenging the established world order (Mastro, 2019). The best-known exponent of this representation of the Thucydides Trap is U.S. foreign policy analyst and rational choice specialist Graham Allison, who formulated it as a perennial rule of geopolitical dynamics, exemplified by the classic Anglo-German rivalry

preceding the First World War:

“When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, alarm bells should sound danger ahead. China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war – unless both parties take the difficult and painful actions to avert it” (Allison, 2017a: vii)

Yet the United States of America of 2020 is not the United Kingdom of 1900 and, most importantly, today's People's Republic of China is neither Imperial Germany nor the U.S.A. of that same era (Kissinger, 2011: 514-530). In fact, contemporary China bears more similarities to the Russian Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century (Pei, 2016). The Russia of 1901 was a highly militarised multi-ethnic autocratic empire ruled by a Russian-chauvinist aristocratic oligarchy, with a human geography characterised by a growing number of rapidly industrializing modern urban islands immersed in a vast hinterland of technologically backward rural provinces. Most importantly, it was just a few years away from internal upheaval and eventual collapse as a result of unsustainable political stasis at home and a tragically misguided armed conflict abroad (Figes, 2017: 213-252). The Chinese Communist Party's leadership is well aware of this and bears no illusions about the actual resilience of the People's Republic of China's political system or its current capacity to take on the might of the United States in a direct military confrontation (McGregor, 2010). This is why the book that for

some years now has become essential reading among top Chinese Communist Party members is not Thucydides' *The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians*, but rather Alexis de Tocqueville's much more relevant *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (Huang, 2013). This article will first investigate why Tocqueville's work has recently become so popular with Beijing's ruling political elite, then explain why Thucydides' narrative continues to inform grand strategists' thinking across the Trans-Atlantic Community, and finally conclude by highlighting the real lessons leaders in Washington D.C., Brussels and Beijing would be well advised to draw out from these two authors' intersecting historical insights.

DECODING TOCQUEVILLE'S TIMELY TREATISE

French author and politician Alexis de Tocqueville had famously foretold as a young man, in his celebrated *Democracy in America*, published in 1835, that "two great nations [...] have suddenly placed themselves in the front rank among the nations" of the world – America, embodying Freedom and Russia, embodying Servitude and that each of them "seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe" (Tocqueville, 1990: 412-13). Two decades later, near the end of his life, after retiring from the political scene following the 2 December 1851 coup that led to the instauration of the Second French Empire by Napoleon III, Tocqueville revisited this theme of a dialectical clash between Freedom and Servitude from a rather different perspective. He cogently reflected on the failures of the French *Ancien Régime* and the forces leading to the revolutionary upheaval of 1789 that resulted in catastrophic consequences for its entire

ruling aristocracy and for its centralised, hierarchical, corrupt and ineffective monarchy (Tocqueville, 1983). Sheldon Wolin shows, in his major work on Tocqueville *Between Two Worlds*, how the Frenchman again observed presciently – for both his era and ours – in his "late masterpiece" that "under despotism where 'men's imagination' is preoccupied with money rather than public affairs, 'men tremble at the very idea of revolutions'" (Wolin, 2001: 4, 529). Wolin thus argues that Tocqueville hereby introduced the emancipatory concept of civic "resistance" to an authoritarian-driven "scramble for wealth" that "drains the citizenry of all common passion, all mutual need, all necessity of acting in concert, all occasion for common action; it walls them, so to speak, into private life" (Wolin, 2001: 530).

Wolin proceeds to highlight the little-known fact that Tocqueville also provided despotic regimes with the conceptual tools enabling them to avoid or at least disarm the explosive transformative power of revolutionary movements by explaining that there were two "ideological elements still capable of holding class-ridden societies together [...] the myths of religion and nationalism" (Wolin, 2001: 534). Tocqueville thus clearly gave to understand despots and revolutionaries alike that in the emerging modernising world, the coveted prize for all those aiming to wield sovereign power over fragmented societies displaying high levels of socio-economic divisions and inequalities was "the immense central power" of the bureaucratic-administrative state; but that this prize could be acquired and held onto only by establishing and maintaining an ideological monopoly over the unifying and mobilizing cultural myths embodied in the notions of Faith and Fatherland (Wolin, 2001: 535). He spelled out his deepest insight – and greatest fear – in his tragic forecast that democratic governments,

like that of the United States, and despotic ones, like that of Second Empire France (1852-1870), were both experiencing, as they sought to retain control of the ever-expanding might of the modern state's bureaucratic-administrative apparatus, mirror-image political processes inexorably moving, from opposite directions, towards the same destination – an end-point that would prove to be fatal to both individual and civic freedoms. These processes, driven by similar dialectical dynamics between the unifying force of cultural myths and the legitimating power of popular mass movements, forced democratic governments to increasingly appeal to religion and nationalism and despotic regimes to periodically deploy procedurally democratic mass plebiscites. The ultimate outcome for both would be “the product of a new time” consisting in different emanations of the same type of rule, unique to modernity – that of an all-powerful central state deployed in service of the mythical notions of Faith and Fatherland by an ideology of “democratic despotism”, which “in Tocqueville’s formulation signifies simultaneously the conquest of democracy and the mimicry of it” (Wolin, 2001: 569).

The central thesis underlying Wolin’s entire study on Tocqueville therefore holds that the celebrated French author outlined the deep dialectical cleavages between the notions of civil society and market economy, public duty and private interest, liberty and equality, democracy and despotism, resistance and repression, revolution and archaism, Faith and Fatherland to explain their complex dynamic interplay in any organised attempt to capture or retain a modern polity’s main levers of power ensconced in the institutional structures of the centralised state (Wolin, 2001 : 552-66). In doing so,

Tocqueville provided his readers with a Cassandra-like visionary forecast of how European and global history would continue to dramatically oscillate between the opposite poles of Freedom and Servitude, both domestically, within states, and internationally, across states, for the foreseeable future – and eventually move beyond them with the ultimate rise of various forms of democratic despotism vehiculating different articulations of the mythological construct of sovereignty (Tocqueville, 2009). Whereas in democratic polities democratic despotism would emerge primarily from the destruction of public civic diversity in the name of liberal individual equality within the state so as to achieve a mythical individualistic sovereignty, in despotic ones it would result mainly from the repression of private individual differences for the sake of equal collective liberty between states in order to bring about an equally mythical collectivist sovereignty (Wolin, 2001: 568-72).

The deeply-rooted insecurities and self-doubts of the Communist China regime about its long-term viability outlined previously are thus stoked by Russia’s tragic historical precedent as well as by Tocqueville’s insightful analysis of late eighteenth century pre-revolutionary France (Shirk, 2007). These insecurities and doubts are the main causes of the Chinese leaders’ constant fear of an imminent and irreversible loss of control over a growing number of highly-visible critical Chinese intellectuals active at home and abroad, mirroring the final stage of the collapse of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev’s rule, from 1989 to 1991 (Nakazawa, 2020). They fuel the Chinese authorities’ growing anxiety over loyalty to the Chinese state and the ruling Party of increasingly restless and discontented distinct cultural communities across the vast multi-ethnic Chinese Empire (Terrill, 2003). They explain the Chinese Communist Party’s renewed

strict authoritarian and harshly repressive policies at home over the past decade, justified by alleged wars against internal terrorism and corruption (Yu and Graham-Harrison, 2020; Shepherd, 2019). They also undergird its refusal to entertain even the most reasonable demands for autonomy from the embattled people of Hong Kong, desperately rising up to defend their rights, freedoms and rule of law guaranteed to be respected at least until 2047 by the *One Country, Two Systems* principle enshrined in the 1985 *Sino-British Joint Declaration* (Lian, 2020; Ramzy, 2019). Finally, they are instrumental in triggering the Chinese government's repeated military threats against any attempt by Taiwan to assert any measure of independence as a sovereign nation, in violation of the Chinese Communist Party's unilateral *One China* doctrine (Baker, 2020; Detsch, 2020).

Above all, the Chinese political elite's accurate perception of its own vulnerability as China's ruling oligarchy is the primary underlying reason of the Chinese leadership's deployment of a virulent hyper-nationalist stance imbued with Chinese Communist characteristics, not only within its borders but especially in the international arena (Ward, 2019). This is evidenced by China's vast military build-up, its unjustifiable territorial ambitions in the South China Sea and its expansionist policies even further afield, across the Eurasian landmass and surrounding oceans – as exemplified by President Xi Jin Ping's flag-bearer strategy of *One Belt, One Road* (Chatzky and McBRide, 2020). In short, it is first and foremost their fear of socio-economic paralysis and political-institutional collapse rather than their desire of global hegemony that is pushing China's leaders to foolishly practice this *fuite en avant* and to adopt the radical nationalist rhetoric, repressive


authoritarian policies, and aggressively expansionist aims they are so flagrantly exhibiting today (London, 2020). Their paranoid quest for internal secrecy has resulted in an outright refusal to interact and cooperate in an open, honest, transparent and responsible manner with the outside world – and in particular with the Trans-Atlantic Community (Ching, 2020). It also constitutes one of the main causes of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis that has upended the world's political, economic and social life-cycles over the past six months and has directly led to untold hardship, suffering and death for millions and millions of members of the global civil society (Shih, 2020). Predicting, like Allison and the realist school of international relations, an almost inevitable military confrontation between China and the U.S.A. in the short-to-medium term only serves to fuel the Chinese rulers' internal insecurities and external paranoia and could contribute to precipitating a global military conflict between the world's two great powers - a clash that would necessarily endanger the very future of the international community as a whole (Lee, 2011).

DISCOVERING THE REAL THUCYDIDES' TRAP

Drawing and applying the wrong lessons from Thucydides' analysis of the Peloponnesian wars about the nature of the threats the Trans-Atlantic Community faces today thus carries with it the significant risk of transforming Allison's qualified prediction that China and the U.S.A. "are currently on a collision course for war" into a virtually self-fulfilling prophecy – whilst at the same time missing the real warning the old Greek historian embedded within his narrative for future generations (Allison, 2017b). It is therefore critical to distinguish realist analysts' erroneous portrayal of the Thucydides' Trap as a timeless warning about the high likelihood of

conflict between hegemonic and rising powers, from the real trap that led to Athens' defeat and downfall – a mostly overlooked story that actually constitutes Thucydides' true message to his discerning readers across the ages and that bears retelling here (Bagby, 1994).

Figure 1: Circular map of Anaximander (c. 610-546 BC) displaying the Greek world centred on the Aegean sea and comprised between the pillars of Hercules and the river Phasis.



The Mediterranean city-states system of ancient Greece is often portrayed by realists as a useful foil for our contemporary global community of nation-states (Monten, 2006). They superficially compare the military stand-off between the Athenian and Spartan coalitions to which this evolving system of polities eventually led and the ensuing Peloponnesian wars spanning three decades with the increasingly tense current relations between a hegemonic United States and the rising power and ambitions of the People's Republic of China. They also use it as a template for the Anglo-Spanish rivalry of the sixteenth century, the Anglo-French conflicts spanning the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Anglo-German power

struggle between 1890 and 1945, as well as the Cold War pitting the U.S.A. against the U.S.S.R. during the second half of the twentieth century (Kennedy, 1988). In doing so, realists boldly claim that both the ancient regional Greek city-states system and our modern international community of sovereign nation-states can best be understood as constituting two similar historic emanations of a timeless and universal paradigm of an anarchic international socio-political environment where individual states constitute the basic units of analysis of their respective orders (Walker, 1993; Kuhn, 1970). According to them, these units always seek security, survival, and power maximization based on a rational-choice theory unfolding within primarily zero-sum game action frameworks, where strong states inevitably impose their will on the weak and accordingly shape the rules of the entire system in their favour (Gray, 1999: 55; Waltz, 2001).

The realists' misrepresentation of the perennial validity of these alleged principles of power politics governing relations between asymmetric adversaries reaches its paroxysm with their misreading of a key passage in Thucydides' book detailing a critical episode of the Peloponnesian wars, famously known today as the Melian Dialogue (Taylor, 2018). This passage, recounting the events leading to Athens' destruction in 416 B.C. of the small island of Melos, a minor Spartan ally, is today mythically embedded at the conceptual core of the realist doctrine, which its proponents attempt to substantiate by quoting what has perhaps become the most famous passage of Thucydides' entire work – namely the Athenians' reply to the Melians' plea for justice, conceived as their city's right to preserve its autonomy and honour (Kagan 2005, 247-48):

“You understand as well as we do that in the human sphere judgements about justice are relevant only between those with an equal power to enforce it, and that the possibilities are defined by what the strong do and the weak accept” (Thucydides, 2013: V-89: 380).

In doing so, realists conveniently fail to specify that Thucydides also states that the key drivers of the Peloponnesian wars were the principles of honour, fear, and self-interest characterising the decisions and actions of all Greek city-states, Athens and Sparta included. To focus primarily on the latter two principles and only pay lip-service to the first one is to greatly misunderstand both the constitutional structure and the moral ethos of ancient Greece. Christian Reus-Smit argues, in his seminal work entitled *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations*, that the concept of honour constituted the core of the three normative components of this complex society – namely, its defining belief about the moral purpose of the state, its dominant organizing principle of sovereignty, and its foundational systemic norm of procedural justice (Reus-Smit, 1999: 6). He goes on to demonstrate that each of these three normative components of the ancient Greek system of politics is radically different from those of the realist doctrine developed in the second half of the twentieth century for our international system of sovereign nation-states. Reus-Smit argues that the moral purpose of the Greek *polis* was to develop and maintain a legitimate moral authority based on principles of deliberation and persuasion, its organising principle of sovereignty was defined by the acceptance of conflict resolution by means of third-party arbitration, and its norm of procedural justice

required its members to strictly follow the rules and values of this system in their interactions with each other so as to maintain both legitimacy and moral authority at home and abroad (Reus-Smit, 1999: 62). These three normative principles were encapsulated in the concept of honour, to which Thucydides gives precedence over both fear and self-interest in his narrative of the Peloponnesian wars and which the modern doctrine of realism cannot adequately explain or account for.

Above all, realists profoundly misread the very purpose pursued by Thucydides in recounting the Melian dialogue, as well as the lesson this tragic event is supposed to teach us today. Far from setting out the generally accepted rules and standards of rational behaviour and power maximization of the ancient Greek city-states, the Melian dialogue represents a vivid illustration of the decline of moral authority of Athens, whose wanton obliteration of Melos was harshly judged by friend and foe alike. As ancient Greek tragedian Euripides dramatically implies in his remarkably current play, *Trojan Women*, Athens' destruction of this city, among a number of other city-states, resulted practically in the gradual collapse of its legitimacy as the undisputed leader of the Delian League – the once-dominant maritime coalition it had formed and led for almost three-quarters of a century, between 478 B.C. and 404 B.C. – and justified ethically its ultimate defeat at the hands of Sparta and its allies (Tritle, 2010: 139). For the Greek historian, the Peloponnesian wars as a whole therefore illustrate the decline and fall of the ancient Greek city-states system, not its apogee. The consequences of these wars for all Greek city-states were best summed up in the evaluation of this historical period by Justin, a Roman writer who likely lived in the second century A.D.:

“The states of Greece, which each had wished to rule alone, all squandered sovereignty. Indeed, hastening without moderation to destroy one another in mutual ruin, they did not realize, until they were all crushed, that every one of them lost in the end” (Buckler, 2003: 527).

THUCYDIDES' AND TOCQUEVILLE'S CAUTIONARY TALES FOR THE TRANS-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Thus, if Thucydides actually meant to teach future generations a lesson with his narrative of Athens' fateful entanglement in a three-decades-long armed struggle with Sparta, the true morale of his history of the Peloponnesian wars surely is that this great city's eventual decline was primarily due to its leaders' misguided and short-sighted policies, resulting in the gradual abandonment of the legitimate moral authority of its internal democratic system of government, as well as in the eventual collapse of the Delian League – the institutional cornerstone of its external relations (Reus-Smit, 1999: 56-62). The Athenian leaders' catastrophic inability to develop over time a viable grand strategy – capable of achieving and sustaining this critical twin existential objective of legitimate and effective governance both internally within their democratic *polis*, and externally across their voluntary alliance network, perhaps most tragically exemplified by the well-documented life and sudden death in the middle of a plague epidemic of Athens' great strategist, Pericles (c. 495-429 B.C.) – resulted in their morally indefensible and militarily ineffective deployment of external military aggression to mask the creeping decay of their entire system of governance (Kagan, 1991: 228-45). Wolin argues that Thucydides' rendition of this fatal Athenian strategic blunder, constituting in effect

the real Thucydides' Trap, remarkably shares with Tocqueville's study of France's *Ancien Régime* and of the Great Revolution that dismantled it a similar mytho-historical methodological approach “examining the forms of greatness and exposing their tragic character [...] where excess of virtue and vice, power and weakness rather than moderation, prevails” (Wolin, 2001: 509). It is this dilemma, highlighted by both Thucydides and Tocqueville, that our own strategic thinkers must urgently endeavour to address today and which they must now try to devise a realistic, comprehensive and sustainable solution for – rather than vainly continue to concoct outdated and ineffective realist solutions for manufactured geo-strategic crises (Palmer, 2020).

The United States of America and its allies in Europe and across the world therefore commit a strategic error of historic proportions by concentrating their economic, diplomatic, intelligence, and military resources against a rising China allegedly bidding for global hegemony (Kissinger, 2011: 522-530; Rettman, 2020). Meanwhile they fail to seriously focus on the real and imminent threat to the very survival of the Trans-Atlantic Community and to the values of freedom, democracy and the rule of law it has valiantly striven to uphold for over three-quarters of a century (Sayle, 2019). This paramount threat consists in their own leaders' dramatic failure to reform both their domestic political systems and the supranational governance structures of the Trans-Atlantic Community, resulting in a glaring inability to meet the pressingly insistent demands for participation, prosperity, pluralism and peace of their increasingly disillusioned and angry citizens (Paris, 2020; Cave, Albeck-Ripka and Magra, 2020).

By becoming ensnared in this actual Thucydides Trap due to their mirror-image failures to creatively chart a strategically sustainable course forward at a critical moment of structural bifurcation in the history of the twenty-first century, the entrenched political elites governing China, the U.S.A. and the European Union show that they have much more in common than their current policy-makers, academic strategic thinkers and media opinion-shapers care to imagine or are willing to concede, as they all head, via entirely different paths, towards the same endpoint already forecast by Alexis de Tocqueville almost two centuries ago – namely, that of democratic despotism (Wallerstein, 1995: 248-51; Zakaria 2003). To avoid this outcome, the Washington and Brussels governing elites would therefore do well to urgently follow their Beijing counterparts' example in two critical respects, and to adopt an entirely different course of action in another. First, they should start soon – before it's too late! – to read up on Tocqueville's insightful and relevant history of the events leading up to the 1789 French Revolution, that dramatically altered the future course of France, of Europe and of the entire world and laid the foundations of the international order we still live in today. Second, they should cease to stubbornly misrepresent in a culturally deterministic and historically anachronistic manner the core message of Thucydides' classic narrative of an ancient war fought twenty-five centuries ago by long-vanished Greek city-states dwelling "like ants or frogs about a [Mediterranean] pond" (Reus-Smit, 2019; Welch, 2003). Finally, unlike China's current rulers, who ruthlessly enforce repressive principles of democratic despotism deeply embedded in aggressive hyper-nationalist rhetoric, responsible politicians in Europe and North

America should heed their own citizens' urgent demands for transformative systemic institutional renewal both within and across their nation-states and thus facilitate the emergence throughout the Trans-Atlantic Community of a democratic, accountable, effective and legitimate system of multi-level governance capable of rising up both morally and practically to the critical challenges we face in the 21st century as a global civil society.

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RUSSIA – TOO BIG AND TOO WEAK? WHY THE WEST AND RUSSIA DID NOT DEVELOP JOINT SECURITY STRUCTURE

TIMON OSTERMEIER

INTRODUCTION

Until 30 years ago, the NATO alliance and the Russian-led Warsaw Treaty bloc defined the international order. The unexpected implosion of the Soviet Union, however, gave a blow to the Warsaw Treaty and thereby to global bipolarity. Initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev's reform policy and 'New Thinking', this process was accompanied by a new rapprochement between East and West. Therefore, the dissolution of the communist bloc raised the question of how to transform the former rivalry into a new international order.

Correspondingly, the last leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, formulated the pan-European idea of a 'Common European Home'. The American scientist Francis Fukuyama, meanwhile, invented the notion of the "End of History" – predicting the global implementation of the Western liberal democracy model (Fukuyama, 1989: 4; Fukuyama 1992). Both remained wishful thinking. Today, there is no Common European Home, and instead of liberal democracy, Russia has been described as a "competitive authoritarian" system, being more authoritarian than democratic (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 3; 2002: 51). Quite contrary to the high expectations, a new confrontation between Russia and the West manifested itself: Russia and the European Union eventually competed over the regional integration of Ukraine, which tore the country apart. The Russian Federation annexed the Crimean peninsula, and NATO

bolstered military presence on its Eastern flank, close to its borders with Russia. Beyond Europe, Russia returned as a decisive veto player in the Middle East, especially in the Syrian war.

This essay aims to account for the failure to include Russia in joint security structures in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse. In the following sections, four major factors which inhibited a successful integration will be illustrated: the missed opportunity of establishing a new pan-European security structure within the CSCE/OSCE framework; Russia's struggle with its identity as a fallen (and possibly future) superpower; the continuity in hawkish leaders and cold war mindsets in both Russia and the West; and – as the most crucial point to the argument – the overarching security dilemma of NATO's Eastern expansion and Russia's inability to ally with Central and Eastern European states.

THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE): TOO MANY TASKS AT ONCE

Why did the Russian Federation and the West fail to construct a joint security structure, a 'Common European Home'? One crucial point of this issue is the question whether there had been the will to do so: what were the intentions and perspectives in the East and the West? As it will be discussed later, NATO remained the pivotal institution, bolstered by subsequent expansions into the former adversary

communist bloc. Accordingly, it was mostly Russia who tried to give incentives for an alternative security architecture with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), later renamed into Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Smith, 2018).

Apart from the continuity of Cold War mindsets among decision-makers, Horst Teltschik, former chief advisor to German chancellor Helmut Kohl, explained the failure of the CSCE-process by highlighting structural factors: too many challenges overwhelmed the actors at an accelerating pace. Germany was occupied with socio-economic incorporation of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), and the European Union gained new momentum in its integration process (including the formulation of a common foreign and security policy); NATO remained in place as the main Western security structure; the liberalization of global trade progressed with the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995; the First Gulf War and the Yugoslav Wars overshadowed all events (Teltschik, 2019: 58–68). On the Russian side, Moscow struggled internally with the disintegration of the former Soviet empire: ethnic conflicts (foremost in the North Caucasus), an economic reform process culminating in economic and financial crisis, a democratization process disrupted by the coup against Soviet leader Gorbachev, and two years later the illegal dissolution and shelling of the parliament by the Russian president Boris Yeltsin.

However, the *Charter of Paris For a New Europe* (1990) carried the idea of a joint security architecture stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok; Gorbachev expected it to be a

blueprint for the 'Common European Home' (CSCE, 1990; Teltschik, 2019: 58–62). The subsequent CSCE conventions encompassed political, military, economic, and environmental dimensions, including conflict prevention mechanisms and – with increasing emphasis – human rights monitoring. However, the multitude of topics put on the agenda and the large number of involved member states overstretched institutional capacities. In the end, the OSCE lacked prioritization and selective pragmatism in accommodating the West and Central-Eastern European integration processes alongside the concurrent disintegration of the former Soviet Union (Teltschik, 2019: 79–84).

Additionally, the humanitarian dimension of the OSCE led to conflicts with Russia about its domestic development (the case of Chechnya, elections, and human rights violations). Thus, Russia found itself in an organization in which it could not actively implement its objectives – instead, Moscow became a rather passive recipient of criticism. Consequently, Russia's cooperativeness declined, and Moscow even limited the access for OSCE election monitoring (Smith, 2018: 382–85). Still, the annual Foreign Ministers' meetings mostly take place, but the summits of the heads of state were suspended between 1999 and 2010. The reactivation of the OSCE process passed fruitlessly.

RUSSIA'S IDENTITY AS A FALLEN SUPERPOWER UNDER AMERICAN PRIMACY

Nalbandov (2016: 24) defines four pillars of Russian political culture: identity, the notion of power, views on authority, and the historical role of territory in the nation-building process. Before turning to the pivotal role of NATO, it therefore seems imperative to stress the role of Russia's geopolitical identity. With the collapse of the

Soviet Union, Russia obviously lost the ideological rivalry with the capitalist West. Moscow even lost territories which had been conquered by the Tsarist empire. In economic terms, Russia hit rock bottom in an utmost humiliating manner, as it found itself requesting financial aid and food assistance from America and Western European countries (Reuters, 1991; Kramer, 1999). Consequently, every second Russian indicated feeling ashamed of this decay, and around 75% demanded that Russia maintain its role as a superpower (Levada Center, 2019). Despite being close to a developing country, Russia preserved distinctive superpower features: its geographic vastness as the largest country in the world, its status as a nuclear power, and as a permanent member with a veto right in the UN Security Council. Alongside these structural preconditions, Russia's richness in natural resources suggested its potential to compensate for technological and economic backwardness, to some degree. On these grounds, Russia represented a 'halted' superpower, too big to be treated as a junior partner – what it actually was at the very moment (for a discussion on why Russia was not a superpower, see MacFarlane, 2001). As suggested by Tsygankov (2012), honor and its interplay with foreign recognition and domestic perceptions plays a constitutive role in Russian foreign policy.

Furthermore, the 'End of History' did not annul the persistent factors which shaped Russian policy throughout history, namely its problem of "porous frontiers" as a multi-ethnic state (Rieber, 2010: 208). The historical challenge to keep control over its territory contributed to collective memory, creating a "fortress mentality" (Miller, 2016). Today, the popular saying 'Russia has only two allies: its army and its navy' by Alexander III

is still well-known and, for example, exposed at the entrance of Moscow's history park, *Moya istoriya*. A powerful alliance close to Russian borders has constituted a risk throughout history. At the same time, these factors pose a problem for accommodating Russian identity (and interests derived therefrom) in an alliance in which Moscow would have had to give up some authority.

SHIFTING LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL DIRECTIONS

Most notably, Russian foreign policy experienced two gradual shifts in its direction. The first was introduced by Gorbachev's New Thinking and was marked by the subsequent pro-Western government under Boris Yeltsin. The Atlanticists were represented by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who saw Russia as a European country and "NATO nations as our natural friends and future allies" (Forsberg and Herd, 2015: 44). This perception, however, did not represent public opinion, nor elite consensus. Although a growing number of Russians supported rapprochement with the West, the majority of Russians was wary of NATO and Western culture, demanding that the government counter America's growing influence, which allegedly tried to turn their country into a second-rate power and mere supplier of raw materials (Levada Center, 2020; 2017; 2015). The still existing Supreme Soviet was dominated by nationalist and communist politicians (which led to Yeltsin's shelling of the parliament). Thus, the liberal government faced a strong Soviet-educated elite advocating for an identity in distinction from Europe. Against this backdrop, Yeltsin replaced Kozyrev by the Eurasianist Yevgeny Primakov, who, in order to balance against the West, realigned Russia's focus toward Asia and the former Soviet Republics. Primakov's foreign policy doctrine called for 'multipolarity', opposing American

hegemony (Ziegler, 2018: 130–31; Shin, 2009: 6–8).

At the same time, an anti-Russian lobby in the USA, which Tsygankov (2009: xiii) dubbed “russophobic”, tried to counter such developments by supporting the Russian Atlanticist opposition, pushing Cold War stereotypes and framing Russia as an inherently aggressive empire. Among them were prominent politicians like Dick Cheney, who stressed the significance to control Russian energy reserves, John McCain, and Joe Biden. Indeed, some sympathized with the idea of keeping Russia in its weakness (Tsygankov, 2009: 21–46). Zbigniew Brzezinski published an influential book, describing Eurasia as a “grand chessboard” on which the USA had to play well in order to preserve global primacy (Brzezinski, 1997: 1). Such political tendencies were unlikely to be overheard by Russian policymakers, hence the lobby might have reinforced anti-Western security bias in Moscow.

NATO AND THE RUSSIAN SECURITY DILEMMA

At the same time, NATO’s continued existence itself may have been the major reason why Western states did not show more inclination to the OSCE integration project. NATO turned out to be more powerful than ever before and the Baltic and Central-Eastern European countries actively sought to become members. Nevertheless, the first years after the fall of the Soviet Union have been described as a “honeymoon period” between NATO and the Russian Federation (Forsberg and Herd, 2015: 44). US Secretary of State James Baker even proposed that Russia should join the alliance (Forsberg and Herd, 2015: 43–45). At the

beginning of 2000, Vladimir Putin still saw the possibility of a Russian membership, but stressed that he expected to be treated as an equal partner and that Russia’s interests should be reckoned with (Hoffman, 2000).

The notion of national interest and equal partnership, however, did not imply a ‘one state, one vote’ principle, but carried the veiled demand to grant Russia a veto right in security issues. Eventually, the honeymoon turned out to be a “dormant security dilemma” triggered by NATO’s Eastern expansion plans (Priego, 2019: 257–259). From the beginning, the unpopularity of NATO as a Cold War institution made Russia hesitant to join cooperation in which it was just granted the same status as Lithuania or Hungary. US President Clinton promised Yeltsin not to engage in NATO enlargements before Yeltsin had passed his parliamentary and presidential elections in 1995/96. In 1994, however, NATO announced a study for future memberships of Central and Eastern European countries as well as former Soviet Republics. This triggered Russian fears of an encirclement and created an anti-NATO consensus within the Russian government, including Yeltsin. Washington tried to mitigate irritations by establishing the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). Yet, this arrangement could not break Russian objection (Forsberg and Herd, 2015: 44–45). Obviously, Russia was the very reason for these countries’ urge to join the alliance – and therefore the prospective members undeniably shaped the character of NATO as a defensive alliance ‘against’ Russia. Thus, Russia’s inability to arrange good bilateral relations with its former allies must be seen as one crucial factor why no joint security structure could emerge.

The Permanent Joint Council, however, did not grant Russia the chance to influence political decisions, as it was bluntly disclosed by the

exclusion of Russia from the formulation of NATO's (1999) new strategic concept. Critically, the document permitted the organization to operate out of defence and out of the area, even without a mandate by the UN or OSCE (NATO, 1999). *Nota bene*, this undermined Russia's opportunity to make use of its veto right within the UN Security Council, the only superior security structure. To make matters worse in the Russian perspective, NATO practised this violation of international law just one month later by bombing Russia's ally, Serbia. After freezing relations and deploying troops to Kosovo, Russia eventually backed down and cooperated with NATO peacekeepers. Nevertheless, Russia rejected a NATO office in Moscow and kept cooperation on a minimum level (Forsberg and Herd, 2015: 45–46).

In his pro-European speech in the German parliament in 2001, in which he recalled the idea of Gorbachev's Common European Home, Putin complained that old stereotypes from the Cold War remained:

"[I]n reality we have not yet learned to trust each other. [...] Today decisions are often taken, in principle, without our participation, and we are only urged afterwards to support such decisions. After that they talk again about loyalty to NATO. [...] Let us ask ourselves: is this normal? Is this true partnership?" (President of the Russian Federation, 2001).

In the following years, the PJC was substituted by a renewed format, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). In fact, political cooperation increased especially around the issue of terrorism, which ushered a new momentum after 9/11. Russia participated in military exercises and welcomed the opening of a NATO office in Moscow; Putin

praised progress (Forsberg and Herd, 2015: 47–48). The new council, however, remained symbolic in reality. New conflicts arose: Russia complained about the second round of NATO enlargement and NATO air control flights over Baltic states. Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defence, publicly questioned the legitimacy of the persistence of a Cold War institution. On the American side, Senator John McCain publicly accused Putin of a coup against democracy and blamed him for challenging the territorial integrity of sovereign states in his neighborhood (Forsberg and Herd 2015: 48–49).

The accusation that NATO had broken its promise not to expand eastwards became a widespread myth, mostly brought forward by Russian diplomats. This allegation stems from the German unification process, when the membership status of a unified Germany was discussed under the initial assumption that NATO jurisdiction and troops would not expand to the territory of the GDR. By discussing a theoretical case in which a member of the Warsaw Pact sought NATO membership, the German Foreign Minister indeed considered generalizing this premise officially for any case of potential eastward movements. However, this idea did not prevail: Western governments deliberately never formalized any pledge of non-enlargement. At this time, no-one anticipated the implosion of the Soviet Union and subsequent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (Sarotte, 2014; Gorbačev, 2015: 371). The discourse, nevertheless, highlights two crucial implications: First, Western actors were aware of the sensitive nature of NATO's expansion. As Russia's identity and legal status defined it as the Soviet Union's heir, this sensitivity applied *a fortiori* for the post-Soviet space. The controversy among NATO partners in the 1990s expressed the continuing awareness: Clinton actually assured Yeltsin that no significant forces

would be transferred into new territories (Forsberg and Herd, 2015: 45). However, the presumption of the 'End of History' and the intermediate loss of Moscow's great power status superseded such cautious assessments. Second, as discussed above, history did not end, nor did Russian identity and security discourse. Even though factually incorrect, the Russian claim of a non-enlargement promise showcases a basic principle under which Russian elites operate. The Thomas theorem can be read as a warning: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas and Thomas, 1928: 572).

CONCLUSION

Russia was too big to be integrated on Western terms and, at the same time, too weak to assert its own terms. Its geographic vastness and richness in raw materials, alongside social collective memory and intellectual discourses, produce an identity which defines Russia as an inherently global power. The present economic and technological status does not matter here as much as the future potential. Though Russia had been closer to a developing country than a modern developed country in the 1990s, it could have been foreseeable that the largest country on earth would act as a temporarily halted superpower, given that it – against all odds in the Caucasus – did not further collapse. Under the centralized rule of Vladimir Putin, indeed, Moscow kept control over its territory and resources.

To conclude, four causal links, stemming from the above-analyzed factors, explain why the integration into a joint security structure, be it a new one like the OSCE or an updated NATO regime, failed:

- Russia did not develop the liberal state model which the West expected and called for. Therefore, NATO ignored Russian objections and sidelined its demands.
- Through this behavior, Russia was not treated in a manner consistent with its self-perception and potential power. The Russian request for an equal partnership of unequals was not accepted.
- Therefore, Russia did not accomplish its abstract interest (being treated as a superpower with a veto right), nor its material interests (e.g. Kosovo 1999, NATO enlargements), and thus started heckling these institutions.
- As a decisive matter, Russia failed to arrange and reconcile with its former allies and republics, which reinforced NATO as an alliance 'against' Russia. As a result, two conflicting security concepts inhibited the emergence of a full integration beyond partial co-operation:

<u>Transatlantic Security</u>		<u>Russian Security</u>
Unipolarity	vs.	Multipolarity
American Primacy	vs.	Russia as a Veto Power
Democracy	vs.	Stability
Human Rights	vs.	Principle of Non-Interference & Russian Sphere of Influence

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THE PROGRESSION TOWARDS AN AUTONOMOUS EUROPE UNDER FRANCE

ROBERT HART

INTRODUCTION

In the post-Cold War era, France has been an extremely militarily proactive state on the global stage. With the collapse of the bipolar world system of the Cold War and the emergence of a new multipolar system, France has consistently made a concerted effort to remain legitimate and relevant. Notably, the role of France as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council has created a need to justify its privileged place on the world stage, leading decision-makers to take advantage of its supreme military capability in comparison to like-sized 'medium states' (Pannier and Schmitt, 2019: 901). Furthermore, with the rise of a more complex and advanced operational environment, France is committed to a revamping of its military capabilities to maintain a more concrete sense of national autonomy in order to sustain its global image in a world system that creates extreme uncertainty and unpredictability. France seeks to avoid dependency in any military sense; however due to budgetary constraints, France is making a move to incorporate 'minilateral partnerships' (i.e. partnerships outside of the structural confines of traditional strategic institutions such as NATO and the EU) with willing and able European countries complemented by continued bilateral relations with the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States in order to drive a shared strategic culture through a stand-alone, autonomous Europe.

A HISTORY OF MILITARY CAPABILITY

Early French military operations revolved around the concept of "missionary interventions" highly reminiscent of its colonial heritage (Pannier and Schmitt, 2019: 899). To better understand current French strategic culture, it is beneficial to explore the historical French strategy of military engagement post-Cold War. From this, one can see a reinforcement of France's primary strategy, "namely its willingness to use force independently, especially in zones of traditional French interest" (Pannier and Schmitt, 2019: 900). Expanding on its ambition to participate in wars of choice, France has played a noteworthy role in many NATO-led coalitions outside of the traditional zone of French influence, noticeably in Afghanistan and the military campaign in Libya (Pannier and Schmitt 2019). An important point here is that whether or not involvement in both of these conflicts was triggered by implicit or explicit national security concerns, such involvement is illustrative of France's willingness and exceptional responsiveness to participate in wars of choice based on a collective goal, and in this case, combatting the war on terror. While France has enjoyed a high level of military capability in recent years, it is important to understand that despite their capability and willingness, France has historically relied heavily on its allies in both independent and joint military campaigns. This is most notable in its military operations in the Sahel and the Central African Republic (CAR) through *Opération Serval* in Mali (intervention at the request of local

government), *Opération Sangaris* (humanitarian intervention in an attempt to prevent genocide in CAR), and *Opération Barkhane* (an extension of Serval focused more specifically on counterterrorism in the dispersal of jihadist groups in response to Operation Serval) (Pannier and Schmitt 2019: 916). In all of these operations, France relied heavily on the logistical support of multiple fellow European countries, specifically the UK, Denmark and Belgium, and most importantly the United States in intelligence gathering. This involvement, on top of the fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, is illustrative of a movement by French leadership towards a more pragmatic approach, downplaying its historical missionary intervention policies following a brutal wave of terrorist attacks in 2015-2016. This new approach is evidence of an ideological shift in French decision-making to account for the link in external instability and internal stability by complementing military engagement with structural and economic development (Lasconjarias and De Saint-Victor, 2017).

Therefore, in this context, the response to jihadist terrorism has primarily been focused on the military dimension in the form of deployment both abroad, and more importantly, domestically. Immediately following the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, France launched its largest domestic military deployment operation (*Opération Sentinelle*) since the Algerian War, with approximately 10,000 troops to protect points of interest within French borders. However, in the overarching context of the French 360-degree outlook on global security, one can begin to notice that its military engagements in the MENA (Middle East and Northern Africa) region as well as its exhaustive fight against terrorism, added on to its commitments to NATO and its

renewed deterrence and defense policy on the Eastern Flank, are beginning to take a toll and potentially constrain explicit French strategic plans.

STRONGER CAPABILITIES IN THE SHADOW OF BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS

The 2017 White Paper begins by depicting the world as a volatile strategic environment that poses both challenges and opportunities to the French and European strategic cultures (Lasconjarias and de Saint-Victor, 2017). Furthermore, France sees the spread of modern and conventional equipment to a number of both state and non-state actors as effectively challenging the maintained military and technological superiority of the West. Consequently, it is not surprising that France outlines its plan to maintain and even further its own strategic autonomy.

France, in the context of its privileged post-Brexit position as the European Union's sole nuclear power and permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, sees itself as an exceptional state with a sense of legitimacy and relevance on the global stage. Therefore, in the wake of Brexit, France sees itself as the new emerging leader of Europe, directly impacting its own strategic vision: "France must have two objectives: preserving its strategic autonomy and helping to build a stronger Europe to address the growing number of common challenges" (Ministère des Armées, 2017).

Firstly, as stated above, France is an extremely proactive state when it comes to military engagement around the globe. However, the strategic document sets out to both maintain and expand its military capabilities to "the model of a full-spectrum and balanced military" (Ministère des Armées 2017: 3) in an attempt to

secure its freedom of action and national autonomy. This is in direct response to a more demanding environment of operation. As seen first hand in the jihadist terrorist attacks, as well as its engagement with jihadist terrorist groups in the MENA region, France recognizes that new asymmetrical actors are now capable of more advanced operations allowing them to “level the force ratio” (Lasconjarias and de Saint-Victor, 2017). The proliferation of new and advanced weapon systems and the ability to seize and hold territorial gains are a lethal combination creating a strategic environment of instability and unpredictability.

With this in mind, France seeks to enhance its ability to obtain knowledge directed towards anticipation efforts through a strengthening of its intelligence apparatus. Such a focus is not new, but rather a continuation of the strategy laid out in the 2013 White Paper. However, the threat and need for a consolidation of its anticipation efforts are much more dire due to the fact that the perceived threats elucidated in the 2013 White Paper have materialized more rapidly than expected. Therefore, the 2017 document attempts to better align the continued six strategic functions: “deterrence, prevention, protection, intervention, knowledge and anticipation in a move to consolidate their strategic autonomy” (Ministère des Armées, 2017). Lastly, France outlines its plan to upgrade its nuclear deterrent on land, air, and sea in an effort to assist in their armed force’s capability to exercise autonomous action.

However, the strategic review is incredibly ambitious considering that France is recovering from a minor economic crisis as well as pre-existing budgetary constraints. The document was produced in a record three months, a direct

representation of Emmanuel Macron’s presidential pledge to incrementally increase defense spending in order to reach its two per cent GDP goal by 2025. The political means by which the strategy was created follows a “strategy first, budget later” sequence (Arteaga, 2017). In this specific case, the strategic plan directly informs the budget rather than adjusting strategies and structures to meet the budget available. This poses a massive constraint to the French strategic plan due to the expected cost of the nuclear deterrent upgrade, as well as the domestic fight against terrorism to consume a rather large portion of the defense budget (Taucas, 2017). This investment would be in the form of raising the defense spending from 32 billion Euros to 50 billion Euros in the span of seven years, justified by growing insecurity and the positive industrial impact the generation will have (Artaega, 2017). Consequently, the overextension of French global involvement has forced France to challenge its own idea of independent autonomy through its aggressive push for European Autonomy.

AN AUTONOMOUS (FRENCH) EUROPEAN STRATEGIC VISION

The main complexity that arises from the French strategic plan is its balancing act. France asserts that it must maintain complete autonomy for certain preconditioned national operational engagements while simultaneously pursuing European ambitions where cooperative and state-level partnerships will directly enhance military capabilities within France’s full-spectrum approach.

French President Emmanuel Macron has introduced a recasting of the role of allies in French and European strategic culture (2017). Even in the withdrawal of the US and UK from European affairs, Macron still finds salience in

the central role that those two countries play. Furthermore, France sees importance, though in a limited nature, of regional security institutions such as NATO; however, an emphasis is placed heavily on engaging European partners outside of the NATO structure in order to create a more efficient and shared strategic culture based on 'minilateralism' (Pannier and Schmitt, 2019: 907).

With the instability and unpredictability that has arisen in the wake of Brexit and the US election of Donald Trump's 'America First' policy, France believes that Europe can no longer count on traditional allies in this current political atmosphere, which is stated explicitly in the foreword of the strategic document: "We can no longer be certain to count, everywhere and always, on our traditional partners" (Ministère des Armées, 2017). This is a clear jab at the United States and the United Kingdom, opening the door to an approach that correlates with France's disdain for the inefficiency of NATO and the lack of a shared strategic culture in the EU.

After Macron's seminal speech at the Sorbonne in September 2017 (Macron, 2017) where he defined a new strategy that would create a framework for Europe to participate in military engagements outside of the confines of NATO, he explained that Europe should have a common strategic culture under shared budgetary policies and doctrine in order to achieve a strategic European autonomy. The European Intervention Initiative (EI2) was proposed in order to "avoid replicating the misunderstandings, European reluctances and eventual French strategic isolation that characterized the operations in Mali and CAR" (Pannier and Schmitt, 2019: 909). In the aforementioned military engagements, European cooperativeness was crucial to the

ultimate French success. However, there was a massive lag in response time as well as the sharing of burdens in the eyes of the French, which has been seen again in the interim period of the Libyan conflict where the US and France had to take charge of bombings as NATO could not immediately take over.

France sees the minilateral relationships with other willing and able European powers as a way to further implement its own national autonomy at a time that French resources are spread thin. France relies a great deal on its assertion that autonomy must be achieved. However, autonomy does not mean that France has to do this on their own, but rather they must be able to do this through charting their own course of action.

CONCLUSION

France is confronted by many strategic challenges in a new multipolar world order. Uncertainty and unpredictability in the international system drive and influence French strategy at a time when French military capabilities are spread thin. President Macron sees the movement by traditional global players towards a more isolationist approach to foreign policy as an opening for France to emerge as the new 'leader' of Europe in the security sector. However, France must obtain a more cohesive form of national autonomy in order to cement itself as the new head of Europe. Consequently, the question must be asked: Is France able to rise to the challenge? While France has enjoyed a privileged position on the global stage as a nuclear power and a permanent member on the UN Security Council, France has always suffered from an identity and confidence problem. It constantly seeks to assert itself over similarly sized medium powers through its privileged position, oftentimes

spreading itself too thin with its resources. Consequently, the budgetary constraints and the practice of semi-dependency (which French strategy paradoxically rejects) poses a very problematic hurdle for France to overcome in their ascent to dominance in Europe, even in the reclusiveness actions of the United States and the United Kingdom.

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NON-STATE ACTORS

NGOs, REBEL GROUPS & GOVERNANCE

REBEL GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CASES OF THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM AND OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA

STEPH WALLACE

ABSTRACT

Some rebel groups engage in extensive governance activities whilst others take the decision not to. This essay considers the cases of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in an attempt to understand what motivates rebel groups to provide governance in the first instances and what factors may account for the disparity observed in the level of governance supplied across diverse groups.

KEYWORDS: Rebel Governance; Conflict Studies; ISIS; LTTE; Strategy; Organisation.

NGOs AND THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

SALLA LAMPINEN

ABSTRACT

Since the outset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, there has been a high influx of refugees escaping Syria due to destruction, human rights violations, and lack of access to necessities. Most Western states are normatively or legally bound to offer refuge and protection for those fleeing persecution and violence. However, during the Syrian refugee crisis, European solidarity and collective response has been absent and the limitations of the European Union's (EU) common border control and burden-sharing system, and lack of respect for human rights have been exposed. States have the power to control their borders, and as domestic restrictions increase, any international efforts to protect refugees can be trumped. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is caught in a difficult position between the norms of sovereignty and the need for international responsibility. However, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other non-state actors (NSAs) hold a special position in societies: a public sphere of associational life above the individual, below the state and across national boundaries – an ideal position to fill the gap between national governments and international responsibilities to protect the refugees. This essay demonstrates the extent to which NGOs and other NSAs can assist in this through their advocacy work and by acting as humanitarian actors themselves with reference to the Syrian refugee crisis. These actors are a major contributor in helping refugees where others have limitations. NGOs have a growing role in changing political, security, economic, and social environments while extending the discourse of international law beyond the interests of states.

KEYWORDS: Non-State Actors; NGO; UNHCR; Refugee Crisis; Syria; Civil War; Border Control; Humanitarian Crisis.

REBEL GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CASES OF THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM AND OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA

STEPH WALLACE

INSURGENCY AND GOVERNANCE: INTRODUCTION

When insurgent groups usurp governments in state building activities, their actions can result in the amelioration of civilians' quotidian lives. For the purpose of this essay, rebel governance will be conceptualised and operationalised as the full range of practices that contribute towards consolidating territory - including taxation - the provision of public goods and the establishment of a series of political rules which regulate life for citizens living under the rebels' control (Weinstein, 2009). The presence of determined population attributes and rebel group characteristics across different rebel groups account for the variation observed in their behaviour and, subsequently, the tendency for some to engage in governance activities within the territories they control (Arjona, 2011). The cases chosen for the purpose of this essay are the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) who, as they operate in de facto states, share the same over-arching objective of seceding from the government (Buhaug, 2006; Klem and Maunaguru, 2017). Consequently, according to current theory, they should be incentivised to demonstrate their capacity to proficiently govern the territory under their control to local populations (Martínez and Eng, 2018). However, given their parallel objectives, the variation in terms of their governing priorities and the extent of provisions

undeniably emerges as a puzzle and it is for this reason that they have been selected.

This essay will begin by providing a brief contextual outline of the governance carried out by the LTTE and ISIS. It will then consider the significance of secession from the parent state as a long-term objective which demands that rebel groups engage in governance practices to consolidate their power. This strategy is intricately connected to the core ideological foundations upon which the groups came into existence. Thereafter, it will discuss the most relevant factors explaining ISIS' and the LTTE's propensity to govern and acknowledge the observable variation in their behaviour, analysing the extent to which these cases corroborate the theoretical claims summarised by Arjona (2011). In line with this framework, it will consider state penetration and the expectation of civil resistance as influential population characteristics. The essay will then proceed by considering access to resources and external support, namely financial and military, as explanatory factors for motivating or disincentivising state-building practices. Finally, it will look at the potential competition from other factions and periods of ceasefire which prove relevant for promoting governmental behaviour in each case. The article will then conclude with a discussion to briefly compare the cases of ISIS and the LTTE, analysing the disparity observed, and suggesting the stronger impact that access to immobile resources and external support

may exert on state-building tendencies.

CONTEXTUAL OUTLINE: THE LTTE & ISIS

According to Mampilly (2011), the process of achieving effective governance involves engaging in a range of institutional practices initiating with strategic services (police and judicial forces), then evolving to provide technical services (primarily health and education), with the final stage being the development of legislative bodies which will represent the interests and meet the subsequent demands of civilians. These stages are intrinsically connected to the three fundamental characteristics of modern governance – security, welfare, and representation (Mampilly, 2011). In its prime, the LTTE maintained a de facto state administration in northern Sri Lanka. This consisted of some basic revenue collection and various economic initiatives with a predominant focus on developing an intricate and extensive network of judiciary and police services (Aryasinha, 2001). Within the confines of their 25-year war with the Sri Lankan state, the LTTE prioritised the internal and external security of their territory (Stokke, 2006). Therefore, through the establishment of these rigorous security institutions and the maintenance of core services, the LTTE was successful in garnering local support and legitimising their rule. With that being said, the expansion of their economic activities and welfare provision was lacking in comparison. These areas undeniably assumed a subordinated role in the insurgent group's agenda. Whilst some research has indicated the presence of very basic services offered across the health and education sectors, they were severely limited and underfinanced, or offered directly by the parent state government (Stokke,

2006).

Conversely, ISIS' governmental structures have evolved to a greater extent with even some discernible instances of civilian representation (Ünver, 2018). At the rebel group's most advanced phase of governance, the institutions were not only comprehensive and sophisticated in nature, but also contained hierarchical structures within them, conveniently reflecting government departments already in place (Al-Tamimi, 2015). The stronghold, Raqqa, represents ISIS' most developed government infrastructure, with a variation of services ranging from the implementation of checkpoints to the introduction of dispute courts (Martínez and Eng, 2018). In less strategically important areas, ISIS demonstrates a more frugal deployment of resources and establishes more temporary programmes, such as Islamic workshops which aim to educate children on Islamic practises (Caris and Reynolds, 2014). Yet, once territory had been consolidated, ISIS was inclined to pursue more intricate and specific programmes under the religious police and education institutions as a means of indoctrinating the next generation of their de facto state (Zelin, 2014). The provision of welfare spans to include soup kitchens and even medical services which offer vaccinations against polio (Brown, 2015). The expansion of an elaborate tax system and the implementation of robust infrastructure corroborates ISIS' long-term strategy of proficiently governing these areas (Caris and Reynolds, 2014; Ünver, 2018).

The time horizon of an insurgent group was identified by Arjona (2011) as a potential explanatory factor for the variance observed across rebel strategies. However, the benefits that accompany the act of ruling over populations are not instantaneous (Weinstein, 2009; Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra, 2017).

Therefore, predatory actors who are motivated by immediate rewards will not invest the time or money into developing governmental infrastructure (Arjona, 2011). However, in the cases of the LTTE and ISIS, their parallel objectives of secession become the most significant aspect in initially demanding a basic supply of governance, whilst the establishment of key institutions proves fruitful in the long term (Klem and Maunaguru, 2017). In each of these cases, ideology assumes an important role in directing rebel strategy, which may promote the provision of services to satisfy the basic needs of their populations. On the one hand, the LTTE was driven predominantly by the perceived need to serve the oppressed Tamil people and in doing so, they displayed remarkably comparable behaviour to that of a traditional nation-state (Mampilly, 2011). On the other hand, ISIS is compelled to represent the Islamic cause and, ultimately, establish the Caliphate in order to unite Muslims under a supranational government (El Damanhory, 2019). Therefore, it becomes apparent how these ideological considerations contribute to the insurgent groups' propensity to govern. In the case of ISIS, their strict adherence to Islamic rule could potentially be responsible for a stronger urge to provide more extensively for their local population. For both insurgencies, the development of infrastructure is undoubtedly related to the desire to derive legitimacy from the social contract implemented and the need to ensure longevity of the rebel rule.

POPULATION ATTRIBUTES

As far as pre-existing government characteristics are concerned, state penetration emerges partially responsible for influencing the variation observed across rebel governance. If the

bureaucratic state has profoundly penetrated into the public psyche, and subsequently displayed competence in the provision of public services, then the population will be habituated to a certain reciprocal relationship and expect a similar standard of governance from the insurgent group (Arjona, 2011). With regard to the population living under the rule of the LTTE, their expectations were high as a result of their previous experiences with the Sri Lankan government (Mampilly, 2011; Klem and Maunaguru, 2017). Consequently, this put some pressure on the rebel group to deliver, at the very least, some minimal services. Equally, these civilian expectations would have influenced ISIS' behaviour, where the opportunity to undermine the state would have also motivated their provision of welfare. In Iraq, the quotidian experiences of Iraqi central administration were etched on society's expectations of the government, and this contributed to the subsequent demands articulated by civilians. However, a slightly different situation was discernible in Syria, where the breakdown of government and heavily restricted services meant that civilians would be inclined to support any group that delivered public goods, regardless of their quality and quantity (Martínez and Eng, 2018). Bearing in mind these considerations, habituation to state-building competencies generates greater demands from civil society, and it is in the rebels' interest to satisfy these in order to ensure compliance and stifle potential uprisings. Consequently, deep state penetration in the case of the LTTE and ISIS in Iraq specifically has led to stronger patterns of governance (Arjona, 2011).

Expanding on the notion of state penetration, a tactic to mitigate the possibility of civilian resistance and to facilitate an easier transition of power is for the rebels to co-opt pre-existing institutions and insert themselves into current

power structures (Arjona, 2011). Moreover, motivated by the possibility of exploiting and benefiting from current infrastructure, insurgent groups would be encouraged to partake in government activities. This practice is illuminated in both cases. The LTTE assumed control of the most viable state institutions which proved relevant to their initial implementation of strategic institutions, and fundamental to their securing of the territory (Aryasinha, 2001). Where other sectors were concerned, predominantly education and health, the LTTE ensured the continual delivery of these by the parent state. Consequently, the LTTE's reluctance to reject or replace these existing institutions resulted in a dual and multi-layered government structure within their alleged territory (Stokke, 2006). ISIS pursued a similar tactic, subjecting the local councils to their rule and restricting their resources according to the needs of the insurgency (Al-Tamimi, 2015). With co-optation, there is a stronger possibility that civilians will willingly accept the power transition if it does not present such drastic alterations to their current way of life. Following on from this, state penetration in both instances has fed into each of ISIS and the LTTE's respective long-term strategies and seems to have contributed towards their propensity to expand state infrastructure, offering the possibility to legitimise the rebel's influence whilst minimising the incurrence of unnecessary costs.

The presence of civilian resistance is a feature considered to adversely impact the likelihood that rebels will engage in governance. The theoretical underpinning of this assumption claims that if there is substantial civilian disobedience, then the insurgent group will have to direct resources towards enforcing

compliance, by deploying a mixture of coercive and persuasive tactics (Terpstra and Frerks, 2017). Consequently, this will consume potential resources that could be otherwise invested into developing further institutions and providing better welfare services, resulting in an overall expected decrease of governance. Furthermore, if a hostile relationship exists, civilians will be less inclined to play their societal part in guaranteeing the continual smooth running of institutions and services. Specifically considering the case in Sri Lanka, the LTTE faced little resistance from their population as they quickly declared themselves to be the sole representatives of the Tamil cause (Klem and Maunaguru, 2017). The group frequently deployed coercive tactics, but simultaneously managed to succeed in acquiring legitimacy due to their effective police and judicial institutions (Mampilly, 2011). Furthermore, the initial support garnered was further enhanced when the rebels' capacity to protect the population and serve their needs surpassed that of the parent state's. The degree of civilian compliance can be deciphered by considering the numerous volunteers who joined the movement and the sheer volume of Tamil families who offered financial assistance and/or shelter to LTTE cadres throughout the conflict (Terpstra and Frerks, 2017). Conversely, concerning ISIS, the balance between coercion and legitimacy has not been as well achieved. In one instance, the harsh condemnation of political activists and brutal treatment of everyday civilians has catalysed protest in the form of an online campaign, *Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently* (Caris and Reynolds, 2014). Potentially, this civilian dissatisfaction could construct a fundamental obstacle to ISIS' capacity to proficiently run state institutions, namely extraction in the form of taxation, and consequently the provision of basic services would be detrimentally impacted. However, Caris

and Reynolds (2014) have indicated that aid projects in a severely underfunded and impoverished state are still highly unlikely to generate civilian resistance. Overall, the continuation and exacerbation of civilian resistance would reduce the legitimacy of ISIS' rule and institutions, which may result in a stronger need to depend on coercion, dramatically decreasing the sustainability of their reputation as anything more than a bandit rebel group (Terpstra and Frerks, 2017). However, in the case of the LTTE, substantial civilian compliance has potentially enabled the insurgent group to prioritise investing time and money into the security infrastructure which facilitated the continuation of their fight against the state.

REBEL GROUP CHARACTERISTICS AND WAR DYNAMICS

Access to assets strongly influences rebels' behaviour and their short-term strategies. However, the direction of influence on state building practices is entirely contingent upon whether they are mobile or immobile assets (Terpstra, 2020). Generally, according to theory, environments which host an abundance of exploitable assets will drive rebels towards predation rather than state-building, as there is reduced motive for them to establish a functioning state apparatus for revenue generation (Martínez and Eng, 2018; Terpstra, 2020). ISIS has demonstrated a desire to capitalise on the numerous oil fields across its territory, developing lucrative industries so that oil now constitutes a primary source of revenue for the rebel group (FATF, 2015). This contributes to ISIS' financial security and, therefore, to its capacity to strengthen its social contract with civilians.

Theoretically, with regard to immobile assets, rebels should be incentivised to stimulate economic growth by developing industries around these resources (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). In particular, the agricultural industry has been subject to ISIS' domination, presumably due to it constituting a sustainable means of facilitating food security. Furthermore, silos have also proven to be a strategic financial asset when other sources of income are compromised (Jaafar and Woertz, 2016). Being in control of the distribution of food also provides another opportunity for ISIS to coercively articulate their potential, impeding supplies to whom they perceive to be non-cooperative citizens - namely Christians and Yazidis who may oppose their ruthless imposition of Islamic rule (FATF, 2015). The attention paid towards these agricultural industries demonstrates the rebels' commitment to the long-term governance of the territory. In addition, the tendency of ISIS to tax even these industries exposes a fundamental tenet of their strategy that goes beyond raising revenue: that is, the ideologically driven desire to inculcate certain beliefs and behaviours in their civilians, inspired by the Islamic notion of charity - *zakat* (Ünver, 2018). In this instance, ISIS' practices reveal a divergence from the theoretical framework given that, in spite of access to an abundance of oil, they have still chosen to assume control of immobile assets and have developed intricate patterns of governance around these. As such, underlying ideological considerations may be driving the rebel group to pursue a governance strategy which prioritises the tax regime and civilian welfare, in line with their long-term objective of seceding from the Syrian and Iraqi states.

External financial support is another characteristic which has been highlighted in connection with decreasing a rebel group's propensity to govern. Generally, such assistance

reduces the likelihood that an insurgent group will be required to set up a taxation system as an additional source of revenue (Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra, 2017). Specifically considering the LTTE, their initial financial sponsorship from predominantly India over a four-year period granted them the opportunity to redirect their attention towards securing their territory and sustaining themselves in the fight against Colombo (Stokke, 2006). In the process of doing so, they managed to consolidate their monopoly of violence across northern Sri Lanka, predominantly through the strengthening and reinforcement of judicial and police institutions. Corroborating this theoretical tenet is the event of India eventually withdrawing funding in 1987 (Hashim, 2013). Consequently, this impelled the LTTE to develop their own viable industries and expand the versatility of their network of financial sources. In order to offset the loss, they began to pursue other lucrative enterprises, predominantly narcotics smuggling, human trafficking and money laundering (Aryasinha, 2001). In addition, their successful targeting of the large Tamil diaspora for both voluntary and forced donations also compensated in part for their loss of financial support from India (Hashim, 2013). Following this, the LTTE attempted to develop their taxation regime to include formal as well as informal extraction. In spite of the slow and uneven nature of its expansion, the taxation system targeted different sectors of society, from Tamil public servants to agricultural labourers who could donate in the form of cash or produce (Stokke, 2006). Conversely, from the outset, ISIS has shown substantial self-sufficiency in its finances, deriving the majority of its revenue from the industries it has established or seized, with oil profits and taxation accounting for 80% of its income (Jaafar and Woertz, 2016). Previous

research has identified significant contributions to the Islamic cause from wealthy private donors in the Gulf countries (FATF, 2015). Moreover, there has been suggestions that, despite officially opposing the terrorist organisation, Saudi Arabia and Qatar may also be funding ISIS (Jaafar and Woertz, 2016). Nonetheless, this potential income is dwarfed by their industries and tax regime, contributing to the theory that they may have been driven to engage in greater governance as a means of maximising revenue, due to limited external financial support at the onset of the movement.

Concerning other forms of external assistance, military support may inspire the rebels to grant more attention to the military facet of their strategy (Mampilly, 2011). In doing so, they make a conscious decision to overlook the state-building agenda, and consequently dismiss the demands of the local population (Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra, 2017). This is exemplified through the LTTE who, as well as financial assistance, were also in receipt of equipment and expertise from India and the regional government of Tamil Nadu in the preliminary stages of their rebellion (Hashim, 2013). As a result, they prioritised the military aspects of their governance which contributed to strengthening and sustaining the whole movement (Mampilly, 2011). However, the direction of this relationship may also be reversed as external military assistance may enable the rebels to readjust their focus so that it also encompasses welfare and the development of legislative bodies (Terpstra, 2020). This is illuminated in the case of ISIS, who recruited volunteers in the form of foreign terrorist fighters that arrived equipped with valuable material resources such as gun parts, cartridges and military supplies (FATF, 2015). In this instance, the military support, despite not being directly supplied from another state, facilitated greater governance as the additional

military support freed up resources so that ISIS could invest more money and effort into meeting the demands of the population. Generally, this functioned to enhance the legitimacy of the social contract between ISIS and the population they govern, and consequently, they may receive greater support for their military cause which could increase the probability of successfully recruiting from the local population. Equally, external military support could increase the rebel groups' competence in stifling potential opposition groups, also contributing to the substantiation of their rule.

Similar to the impact of external military support, fragmentation can influence rebel governance in both directions. Mampilly (2011) highlights the limitation that infighting, as a result of fragmentation, may exert on a rebel group's capacity to establish appropriate statelike infrastructures. However, the converse effect that fragmentation can engender seems more applicable in the cases of the LTTE and ISIS. The logic behind this outcome is that factions will exploit the strengthening of key institutions as a platform upon which to compete, generally resulting in a greater quality of services for the local population (Grynkewich, 2008; Kasfir, Frerks and Terpstra, 2017). From relatively early on, the LTTE declared to be the only representative for the Tamil population, publicly condemning competing factions whilst relying on brutal tactics to prevent them emerging as potential threats (Klem and Maunaguru, 2017). This simultaneously functioned to guarantee the obedience and compliance of the general Tamil community, presumably through implementing a rule of terror, allowing the LTTE to continue strengthening their strategic services and

security infrastructure (Klem and Maunaguru, 2017). Interestingly, in the case of ISIS, continual infighting provoked the insurgent actors to redirect resources, withdrawing from ambiguous territory and instead concentrating on consolidating Raqqa and Eastern Aleppo. This resulted in ISIS participating in extensive state-building activities in these defined areas - demonstrating significant competence and assuming more statelike features in the process (Al-Tamimi, 2015). In these strongholds, they could easily impose their rigid expectations of public conduct and idealised morality. Equally, the strict police forces, within ISIS proclaimed territory, have severely constrained the possible emergence of competing factions who may attempt to undermine ISIS' perceived authority (Al-Tamimi, 2015). In both cases, the initial presence of competing factions encouraged the insurgent groups to bolster security institutions, which had the dual effect of also consolidating their territory.

Finally, Mampilly (2011) has indicated, in the context of warfare, how a period of ceasefire will inevitably provide rebels with an opportunity to continue expanding statelike apparatuses and engage in other relevant governance activities. This is exemplified through the case of the LTTE, whose twenty-five year armed struggle only benefited the local population during periods of ceasefire (Stokke, 2006). Particularly after the third war, there was a dramatic shift in their priorities, from military-orientated ones to developing and enhancing basic political infrastructure (Klem and Maunaguru, 2017). The new state-building agenda, rooted in economic considerations, offered new hope of a potential solution as the threat to physical security subsided (Stokke, 2006). As such, the situation on the ground of the LTTE corroborates the theory that periods of ceasefire will inspire rebel groups to turn attention inwards as they look to

cultivate statelike provisions.

DISCUSSION

In comparing the two cases, it is undeniable that local population attributes, rebel group characteristics, and war dynamics during ISIS' insurgency were more favourable to their state-building agenda (Arjona, 2011; Caris and Reynolds, 2014). In particular, environmental conditions differed between the LTTE and ISIS, given that the latter had access to immobile assets which has spurred on governmental activities. Undoubtedly, this has encouraged the development of viable industries, where the produce proves reliable and lucrative in the long-term. Another divergent characteristic identified is the external assistance – financially and militarily – that was provided to the LTTE. The considerable dearth of this in the case of ISIS would have been instrumental in determining the need to implement a taxation regime, which would constitute a dependable source of income and strengthen their social contract with the local population. In turn, this may have functioned to enhance their legitimacy and potentially generate a recruitment pool for their military cause. Furthermore, in the case of ISIS, a few divergent characteristics emerge which may contradict the current theoretical framework. In spite of the presence of an abundance of oil, ISIS was still incentivised to deliver welfare to local citizens, and even the instances of civilian resistance were not sufficient in inhibiting this aspect of governance. Therefore, in these instances, it is possible that ISIS' ideology may have assumed an influential role in still encouraging the care of its citizens. However, it is also likely that other characteristics, such as the lack of external support and the presence of immobile assets,

had a stronger impact in promoting ISIS' initial engagement with a variety of government activities (Lia, 2017). Conversely, for the LTTE, given their limited access to mobile assets, they would theoretically be more inclined to expand their government activities in order to generate a reliable financial source, but India's assistance instead likely compensated for such a loss. Nonetheless, welfare provisions and economic activities have assumed a subordinate role in the LTTE's agenda. Their financial extraction was substantially limited and, inevitably, by extension, so was their delivery of services. Instead, the LTTE were more oriented around the military aspects of their ruling, and particularly concerned with the constant perceived security threat to their territory.

CONCLUSION

Initially, ISIS' undeniably more expansive and varied government infrastructure emerges puzzling given that the LTTE's predominant objective was also secession from the Sri Lankan state. This was vital in determining some basic level of provision in the first instance whilst also necessitating long-term bureaucratic commitments from each of the rebel groups. However, after analysing the characteristics of each rebel group according to the appropriate theoretical framework, it becomes clear how such divergent circumstances would inevitably engender different behaviours. The divergent approaches to state-building observed between the LTTE and ISIS were not only due to the presence or absence of key characteristics, but also to the result of the varying combination of these, where certain characteristics took precedence over others. In particular, it would be reasonable to suggest that the most influential factors for explaining ISIS' greater propensity to govern are the presence of immobile assets and the lack of external

support. Both characteristics resulted in a greater investment of resources. This allowed ISIS to develop lucrative industries and, ultimately, provide more extensively for the local population in terms of health and education. Furthermore, for both groups, it is likely that the ideological underpinnings of the movements may also have driven them to expand statelike apparatuses in order to ensure that some degree of protection was provided to their citizens, whether that be physical or financial. In their engagement with statelike activities, the LTTE and ISIS established a de facto social contract with the local population, which proved fundamental in attributing some degree of legitimacy to their behaviour (Lia, 2017). Ultimately, this reduced the need to resort to complete coercion, whilst simultaneously enabling the rebel groups to undermine the parent state's competence through the usurpation of their governance duties (Grynkewich, 2008).

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INTRODUCTION

According to Barnett (2002: 258), The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “is caught in a difficult position between traditional notions of respect for territorial sovereignty and the need for international responsibility”. This gap between the norms of sovereignty and the norms of international responsibility is a particularly acute dilemma when thinking about refugees’ rights. This essay will discuss the extent to which non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other non-state actors (NSAs) can help overcome the gap with reference to the Syrian refugee crisis.

UNHCR is the leading international organization in refugee affairs (Kennedy, 2004), and was founded with a mandate to provide international protection to refugees and solutions to the problems they face, in cooperation with national governments, NGOs, and other international organizations (IOs) (Barnett, 2002). According to the United Nations *1951 Conventions*, a refugee is defined as a person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (European Parliament, 2015: 1). Today UNHCR’s approach also fosters civil society and builds democratic governance while working with people excluded from the official refugee-definition, such as asylum seekers and internally displaced persons (2015). The above-mentioned

dilemma becomes inherent as UNHCR has widened its scope. Now, states have the power to control their borders, and as they increase their domestic restrictions, international efforts to protect refugees can be overturned (Barnett, 2002). UNHCR’s advocacy has become a struggle to find normative links between an international status and national political solution, which ultimately determines the treatment of refugees (Kennedy, 2004).

Since the outset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, there has been a high flux of refugees (Dany, 2019). Over 5.6 million people have fled Syria since then, to seek safety in other countries (UNHCR, 2020) due to violence, destruction, human rights violations, and lack of access to basic necessities (Fierros et al., 2017). Millions of them have arrived in Europe, exposing the limitations of the European Union’s (EU) common border control and burden-sharing system along with lack of respect for human rights (Greenhill, 2016). Many EU member states prioritized national interests over European solidarity, reinstated internal border controls, and chose not to accept the needed numbers of refugees: responsibilities for monetary, social, and political costs were not equally shared (Greenhill, 2016). Frontline states, such as Italy and Greece, have been bearing unfairly higher costs in Europe, and Syria’s neighboring countries, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan, have not received sufficient aid (Greenhill, 2016). Additionally, Turkey, which has held the largest numbers of Syrian refugees, was expected to indefinitely provide protection even without the EU’s credible commitments to assist them (2016). Debates over national responses to the

crisis generated striking benefits to the right-wing nationalist political parties in many EU nations (Greenhill, 2016). These parties have in turn responded by taking a hard line on immigrations, trumping any universalistic, supranational efforts to protect the refugees and therefore, worsening the perceptions of them within governments and citizens (Greenhill, 2016). Therefore, as the global refugee regime lacks sufficient state- or intergovernmental organization -level support, the implications for refugees have been multifaceted.

Although states have long been considered the primary actor in refugee control and regulation, other actors have recently proven to have influence (Danis and Nazli, 2018). NGOs and other NSAs have a growing role in changing political, security, economic, and social environments (European Commission, 2020). These actors can help overcoming the gap between the norms of sovereignty and international responsibility on two levels: by helping to minimize the dilemma itself by advocacy, as well as by softening the material effects of this dilemma for the refugees caught in its crosshairs by acting as humanitarian actors.

Firstly, the essay will discuss the position of NGOs and other NSAs in the refugee regime. Secondly, it concentrates on how they can influence policies and perceptions by advocacy and lobbying. This is followed by a more practical perspective of their work, concentrating on Turkey and the Syrian refugee crisis.

NGOs AND NSAs

First, it is important to define what NGOs and NSAs are, and how they are situated regarding the refugee regime, to understand why they are relevant in overcoming the discussed dilemma. NGOs can be defined as institutionalized groupings of people and resources, often from multiple societies, operating outside the direct authority of any particular government or collection of governments, which can, and will work cooperatively with states or controversially, to oppose them (Suri, 2005). NSAs, which include NGOs, are not always as organized and as multinational as NGOs, and rarely challenge states explicitly, but use their resources to affect policies, perceptions and behavior across societies (2005). Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), on the other hand, are distinguishable from NSAs and NGOs as they are formed by nations and created by a treaty (Harvard Law School, 2020). The United Nations (including the UNHCR), the EU and NATO are all examples of IGOs (2020).

UNHCR often has limited power in refugee affairs as sovereignty of its member states undercuts its authority (Kennedy, 2004). NGOs, while developing their relationships with IGOs, have also been strengthening their relations directly with states to receive executive tasks, but also established a deep, cooperative tradition with civil society (Irrera, 2017). The special position NGOs and other NSAs have in societies translate into a public sphere of associational life above the individual, below the state and across national boundaries (Jaeger, 2007) – an ideal dimension to fill the gap between national governments and international responsibilities to protect the refugees. NGOs are the primary representatives of global civil society and global governance that are a counterweight to states and IGOs (Jaeger, 2007).

They help to extend the discourse of International Law beyond the interests of states, and operate across the threefold political system of states, international institutions and the public sphere (2007). Therefore, states are no longer the sole actors, and power appears to be more fluid (Suri, 2005). In other words, power is not fixed or confined to states and can be expressed in different forms (Milner & Wojnarowicz, 2017). Other subjects, such as NGOs, do have power in international politics - though this often takes non-traditional forms that do not always appear political (Ahmed & Potter, 2006).

ADVOCACY AND POLICY CHANGE

NSAs, including NGOs, can achieve success by lobbying for policy changes, rallying international allies and building agendas for the public discourse about the refugee crisis (Yang & Saffer, 2018). NGOs can attempt to influence states by framing problems, solutions, and justifications for political action (Joachim, 2003) or by applying pressure to national governments and international institutions by fostering accountability in political and economic systems from below (Jaeger, 2007). According to Roth (2004), the biggest strength of NGOs is the ability of shaming: investigating misconduct and exposing it to the public, therefore shaping their opinion and suggesting moral analysis. Shaming can bring normative and discursive change on national and international levels (Joachim, 2004). Public discourse on issues such as the Syrian refugee crisis can profoundly influence policies and social change (Yang and Saffer, 2018). The refugee crisis has sparked heated debates among citizens and stimulated a surge of political populism in the EU (Zaun, 2018). According to Wike et al. (2016) the recent surge

of refugees into Europe has featured prominently in the anti-immigrant rhetoric of right-wing parties across the Continent. Similarly, Greenhill (2016) notes that the popular discourses in the EU have nationalistic sentiments: refugees reduce national living standards by taking away social resources, committing crimes and bringing tension from their home state (Greenhill, 2016). These perceived threats among societies, be they legitimate or not, affect policies: if refugees are seen as liability to national security, societal stability and cultural identity, individuals and groups will mobilize to oppose both their acceptance and the policymakers in favor of them (Greenhill, 2016). Even though in the beginning some traditional recipients of refugees, such as Germany, were more willing to host additional refugees, national electoral pressures, mobilized by populist parties, eventually resulted in them trying to minimize their asylum application numbers (Zaun, 2018). Without public support or demand, policymakers lack motivation to support refugees (Roth, 2004). NGOs and other NSAs can therefore assist refugees by attempting to influence domestic and/or international policymakers, but also as a result of managing behavior throughout the world by changing citizens' perceptions (Jaeger, 2007). Affecting change in voluntary and customary practices within societies through citizens can ultimately lead to changes in public affairs and the treatment of refugees (2007).

States are obliged to consider principles of human rights, economics, foreign policy, public opinion, security, and social issues when developing their refugee laws (Barnett, 2002). Furthermore, most Western states are normatively or legally bound to offer refuge and protection for those fleeing persecution and violence (Greenhill, 2016). However, during the Syrian refugee crisis, European solidarity and

collective response has been absent: aid provided for Turkey or the frontline EU states has been insufficient and some EU members refused the entry of any refugee (2016). Shaming activities by NGOs demonstrate how their advocacy can bring international attention to the issue. To illustrate, in 2014 multiple major NGOs, such as Amnesty International and the Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado, denounced the international response to the Syrian refugee crisis as shameful (Galvez-Rodriguez et al. 2019). Additionally, more than 20 NGOs released a report card claiming that the United Nations Security Council had failed the Syrian people on four criteria: protection of civilians, political developments, financial support to the humanitarian response, and humanitarian access (Dyke, 2015). Although the causality cannot be proven, soon after in 2015, the European Commission called for a more global approach to the management of refugees and published an emergency plan to relocate some 160,000 refugees in the EU with quotas for distribution among member states (Galvez-Rodriguez et al. 2019). Spain was assigned a quota of 14,931, which was a major development of Spain's original offer to receive only 130 (2019).

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is a humanitarian NGO which has been exercising political agency during the refugee crisis by adopting outspokenly confrontational strategies aimed at societal mobilization and increased public contestation against governments and the EU (Dany, 2019). MSF criticized policies in public, refused funding from the EU, accused political actors, operated dangerous rescues at sea which questioned EU policies and practices, and networked with the wider civil society (2019). The NGO also established hospitals in refugee

camp to provide medical, psychological and nutritional care for the refugees (Yang and Saffer, 2019). MSF's actions demonstrated the extent to which NGOs can have political agency to enhance contestation and mobilize public opinion (2019) while also having pragmatic operations. However, actions which blur the lines between humanitarian aid and the international political sphere can sometimes also have detrimental effects: the danger of losing principle-oriented characters leading to reduced credibility, decreased donations, criminalization, and ultimately, the inability to reach the people in need (Dany, 2019). Understanding these limitations and possible consequences can assist NGOs in planning effective actions.

NSAs AS HUMANITARIAN ACTORS

NGOs and other NSAs have moved from solely advocacy to being actual humanitarian actors (Jaeger, 2007). According to Barnett (2002) these actors have a key role in conflict management strategies because of their access to conflict areas. Humanitarian NGOs' actions often clash with states and IGOs, however, they regularly likewise interact with them to contribute in shaping the humanitarian system as a whole (Irrera, 2017). Working in parallel with UNHCR, NGOs often fulfil specific functions such as peacebuilding, reconstruction, as well as deploying materials and logistics. For refugees, NGOs' work has been translated into the provision of healthcare, shelter, food, water, sanitation and education in refugee camps (Worldvision, 2020), but also into assistance with refugee resettlement (Yang and Saffer, 2018) and legal matters (Aras and Duman, 2019). Irrera (2017) points out that humanitarian NGOs have professionalized their tasks with governmental and other non-governmental actors, however there are still many barriers to cooperation, such as different mandates, sectoral interests and

operating principles amongst actors. UNHCR (2020) has reported that it relies heavily on NGOs to implement a wide range of projects, demonstrating how NGOs are a major contributor in helping refugees where other subjects face limitations. This manifested clearly in 2015 when the United Nations had to cut aid provision in many areas for the Syrian refugee crisis due to limited funding, therefore reducing essential services that NGOs had the ability to provide (Greenhill, 2016). A closer discussion on the NSAs' operations in Turkey, which has received a majority of the refugees, is offered next to illustrate the practical aspects of their work.

In April 2020, the Turkish government reported the number of registered Syrian refugees within their borders to be more than 3.5 million, a number which is significantly higher than any other country receiving the majority of refugees: Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq (UNHCR Operational Portal, 2020). These refugees have found shelter in camps mostly in the regions near the Turkish-Syrian border, but also in Istanbul and border cities of Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, and Hatay (Aras and Duman, 2019). However, the Turkish state's lack of experience in managing settlements of this scale, the limited capacity of refugee camps, the continuation of conflict and absence of a working cooperation between the EU and Turkey, as well as tensions between Syrians and Turks, have caused serious problems (2019). A high number of national and international NGOs are operating in areas where the concentration of Syrian refugees is high, assisting in specific areas such as health, accommodation, food, and education, as well as socio-cultural and psychosocial support (2019). For refugees who have settled outside refugee camps, NGOs are offering services such as legal assistance and

repatriation, registration, education, employment, and livelihood (2019). However, many refugees are facing obstacles in registration, which creates various problems such as working illegally – work which often violates their rights further - or lack of access to proper healthcare (Danis and Nazli, 2018). Obstacles in registration also indicate that the actual number of refugees in Turkey could be significantly higher than the number the government has reported.

NGOs have been able to assist refugees with their day-to-day problems where the states have failed them. *Mülteciler Derneği* (MD) was able to obtain a fingerprint machine to be used in the Sultanbeyli District Police Department in order to speed up the registration process (2018). MD also operated an outpatient clinic, where Syrian doctors and nurses provided services for Syrians, giving jobs to doctors unable to obtain work permits, while treating patients who had no access to proper healthcare otherwise (Danis and Nazli, 2018). Arguably, the actions of the NGO were illegal, however, they show the extent to which NGOs can help refugees where UNHCR itself is failing. Many Turkish NGOs, such as Hayata Destek, currently receive donations from international organizations and conduct joint projects with UNHCR (Aras and Duman, 2019). These co-operations contribute to demonstrating the NGOs' participation in the international humanitarian system. The assistance of these subjects is vital in dealing with the problems affecting Syrian refugees in Turkey at a time when the Turkish state and IGOs such as the European Union and the United Nations have had limited success (Aras and Duman, 2019).

Yet, there are major limitations to NGOs' fieldwork and the extent to which they can assist refugees. Aras and Duman (2019) reported that

NGOs in Turkey are sometimes suspected by the government of cooperating with anti-state minorities or political groups and, therefore, suspected of endangering the national unity of the state. Many NGOs, such as Mercy Corps and DanChurchAid, were closed by the Turkish government as they were suspected of cooperating with Syrian Kurds, and NGOs have found themselves in a place where relations between civil society and the state are complicated (2019). The entry and the activities of NGOs remain under the strict control of Turkish authorities. The government also promotes certain non-governmental actors to fulfil the responsibilities of the state regarding refugee reception – often the ones which are considered to be loyal to the state (Danis and Nazli, 2018). The Turkish government is not the only one that has failed to serve the needs of refugees. In Lebanon, the presence of NSAs has replaced the void left by the central state, and refugees have been forced to rely on their own local support, social networks and NGOs (Danis and Nazli, 2018). Furthermore, Aras and Duman (2019) highlight that as the majority of the NGOs working with Syrian refugees are funded by Western governments, their motivations might be largely the prevention of the flow of refugees reaching Europe, instead of the rights and wellbeing of refugees.

CONCLUSION

The literature shows how NGOs, NSAs, states and IGOs form a network to respond to the dilemma between the norms of sovereignty and norms of international responsibility. Considering the work of NSAs, if we take overcoming this dilemma to mean minimizing it, then we see that the actions of these actors have had an effect through advocacy and

obbying. By using their political voice, NGOs and other NSAs can impact policymakers through shaming and influencing public perceptions, ultimately changing how public affairs are governed, as well as how refugees are treated in the societies they have settled in. If we take overcoming it to mean softening the material effects of the dilemma for the refugees, then we see the role of NGOs and other NSAs have had a major effect through their humanitarian aid.

Ultimately, as long as nationalism is on the rise in the EU, the lack of motivation for truly reaching solidarity and the level of mutual respect for human rights these states claim to have will be a challenge. The special position NGOs and other NSAs have in societies enables them to be ideal actors for overcoming the dilemma, rather than states or intergovernmental organizations alone. Ideally, next time the world faces a similar situation, there will be no necessity to label it as a 'crisis'. To reach such a long-term objective, NGOs should work together with states, intergovernmental organizations and with one another to foster practical, normative and discursive change which will enrich the groundwork already laid out.

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GRAND STRATEGY

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, TECHNOLOGY & CULTURE

THE NAPOLEONIC REGIME: ANATOMY OF A DICTATORSHIP

SINAN KIRCOVA

ABSTRACT

What sort of a regime was France under Napoleon? In pursuit of this central question on the character of the Napoleonic regime, this article argues that an accurate characterization of the Napoleonic regime depends on how one assesses its relationship with the Revolution, for which this article develops two metrics: one assessment line is between political idealism and pragmatism, and the other between positive and negative definitions of the goals of the French Revolution. In line with these two metrics, the article examines the ambiguous relationship of the Napoleonic regime with the Revolution. The article also addresses the parallels between the rules of two Caesars and that of Napoleon in light of the concept of Caesarism. The article also rejects the two alternative characterizations of the Napoleonic regime as a military dictatorship or enlightened despotism for the reasons of the civilian dominance in the first Empire, and the mismatch of historical contexts between enlightened despotism and the Napoleonic regime respectively.

KEYWORDS: Napoleon; Dictatorship; French Revolution; Caesarism.

THE GREAT DEBATE: EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE ON STRATEGY

PAUL GALLIENNE

ABSTRACT

In this discussion is argued that, although heavily dependent on technological advances, strategy is defined by culture. The influence of culture and technology is analysed through sets of empirical evidence, disseminated through four case studies. The study of diverse Asian societies – namely, Mongol, Soviet, Vietnamese, and Japanese – enlightens us about the factors of success and failure driven by culture or technology across ages. From the Mongol empire's boundless pasturelands to Vietnam's impenetrable mountains and jungles, a disparate panel of opponents, which offers different forms of challenges, is exposed to fuel the debate. Particular attention is given to the Mongolian empire, a society particularly underrated in academic studies, but which holds many surprises.

KEYWORDS: Culture; Technology; Mongol Empire; Soviet Strategy; Japanese Culture; Viet Minh Strategy; Asia; Military Strategy.

THE NAPOLEONIC REGIME: ANATOMY OF A DICTATORSHIP

SINAN KIRCOVA

INTRODUCTION

"We stand on the threshold of a new beginning. In order to ensure our security and continuing stability, the Republic will be reorganized into the first Empire, for a safe and secure society, which I assure you will last for ten thousand years. An Empire that will continue to be ruled by this august body and a sovereign ruler chosen for life. An Empire ruled by the majority, ruled by a new constitution!"

Contrary to what you might think, the above-mentioned passage is not a speech by Napoleon during his coronation as the emperor of France. Rather, it is taken from George Lucas's immortal franchise, Star Wars, right out of the part in *The Revenge of the Sith* when the Republic supported by the Jedi Order was being replaced by the Galactic Empire of Chancellor Palpatine. Leaving aside the Manichean overtones, I think that the passage fits in well with this article's discussion and hints at several qualities of the Napoleonic regime quite remarkably: the reorganization of the old Republic, the persisting nominal allegiance to the old regime despite obvious dictatorial inclinations, and the emphasis on stability and security. I am not entirely sure whether Lucas was inspired by the downfall of the First French Republic in the Star Wars universe, but the resemblance is too strong to be coincidental. Regardless, one can say that the degeneration of democratic regimes into corrupt forms is a recurrent theme both in fiction and politics, but it never ceases its political relevance. Of course,

Napoleon Bonaparte was not the first one in history to transform a democratic republic into a personal autocracy. Republics throughout history, the Weimar being the most notorious one, gave rise to tyranny quite often; therefore, a discussion about the Napoleonic regime is thought-provoking. I believe that examining the continuations and disruptions between the Napoleonic regime and the First Republic of France is the key to understanding the nature of such transformations. Moreover, the conjuncture, too, calls for attention to the Napoleonic regime: just as I was writing this article, President Duterte of the Philippines was preparing to make amendments to the constitution, which, according to the journalists, would open the gates of an "imperial presidency" (Hayderian, 2019) for him. The emergence of the so-called 'strong men' in Europe and around the globe requires looking into the internal dynamics of dictatorships.

CAESARISM, DICTATORSHIP AND NAPOLEON

Scholars (Baehr & Richter, 2004: 2) sometimes use the concept of 'Caesarism' to describe the Napoleonic regime. Hazareesingh (2004: 129) defines Caesarism as a political system in which ultimate political power predominantly resides in a single individual. As an introductory concept, the term 'Caesarism' addresses certain aspects of Napoleon's rule successfully. Apparently, it draws parallels between the rule of Napoleon and that of Julius Caesar, and there

are good reasons to bring this up when one thinks of many similarities: both Napoleon and Julius Caesar were generals beforehand, and both initiated coups to seize power and claimed a monopoly over it. Of course, the bloodless coup d'état of *18 Brumaire* is incomparable to the civil war between Julius Caesar and Pompey. Napoleon's ascendancy to power was, therefore, smoother largely due to the politically incoherent structure of the Directory (Doyle, 1989: 370) while Julius Caesar found the unified forces of the Senate against him (Toynbee, 2019). Another point of similarity is how Julius Caesar imposed a personality cult to the extent that his supporters deified him later on. Napoleon followed Julius Caesar's footsteps in forming his own cult. To substantiate this point, one could use two paintings of his contemporary, Auguste-Dominique Ingres.

Both paintings (see Figures 1 and 2) were often commissioned by different government authorities, one by a city council and the other by a body of the central government. *Napoleon on His Imperial Throne* perfectly demonstrates the cult of personality, so often found in dictatorships: the emperor sitting on the throne with a god-like posture with the classical wreath on his head. In its rich iconography, it surpasses even the portraits of the last monarch before him, Louis XVI. The idea of immortality is so much stressed in this painting that Napoleon's face almost looks like that of a living corpse – an observation also shared by Glover (2012). The painting was eventually acquired by a legislative body (*corps législatif*) under Napoleon (Young, 2017), and it exposes the radical rupture in terms of political imagery between the First Republic and the Napoleonic regime. To understand the extent to which Napoleon had embraced the figure of a

demigod in politics, one should contrast this painting with an earlier one, again by the same painter, Auguste-Dominique Ingres. When *Bonaparte, First Consul*, was painted, the Napoleonic regime still had a nominal allegiance to the First Republic, which poses a great opportunity for comparison: two paintings could not be more different. The first Consul to the Republic, though acquiring extraordinary executive powers, still had the outlook of a civic administrator working in his office, conveying the image of the servant of the people still in touch with them as represented by the view of the capital from the window in the painting.

Figure 1: Bonaparte, First Consul, Auguste-Dominique Ingres (1804)



Figure 2: Napoleon I on His Imperial Throne, Auguste-Dominique Ingres (1806)



If one should dig deeper into the term Caesarism, it is possible to suggest that Napoleon had also followed the footsteps of another Caesar, those of Octavian who turned Rome into a de facto empire of his own family. Similar to Napoleon, Octavian, too, pursued expansionist policies abroad. In addition, both shifted the balance of powers at the expense of the legislative branch of the government. Octavian restructured the Senate in line with his need for a staunchly loyal aristocratic class (Talbert, 1984: 56-57), and Napoleon and Sieyès crafted the new constitution after the coup of 18 Brumaire with almost identical motives, which was approved by a plebiscite in 1799. Though the Directory regime before Napoleon's rule also controlled both chambers of the legislature, it was only thanks to informal means such as electoral fraud and purging dissident MPs. Napoleon admits this resentfully in a letter to Talleyrand: "for a nation of 30 million inhabitants in the eighteenth century, it is a tragedy to have to call on bayonets to save the state" (Doyle, 1989: 375). This situation was absolutely reversed by the subsequent constitutional amendments under Napoleon. The right to initiate legislation was exclusively given to the consuls, and the legislative branch which was divided into three separate bodies was responsible only for oversight and approval. Napoleon was the only consul who had ever proposed legislation, of course. The members of the newly formed Council of State were chosen directly by Napoleon himself in addition to the fact that the members of the Tribune and the Senate were chosen for life by consuls (Grab, 2003: 37). Napoleon took advantage of his powers as the first consul only to advance his constitutional powers further, as demonstrated by the sequence of events: he first became consul for life in 1802 and then, was given the

title 'emperor' in 1804, just like how Octavian was proclaimed by the Roman Senate as the "father of the *patrie*" and '*imperator*'.

Though the term Caesarism is useful to identify certain aspects the Napoleonic regime shares with other two transitional periods in Roman history, it is not a sound approach to generate a concept in political science for every ruler in power, since concepts are useful only to the extent that they highlight common patterns between separate phenomena and certainly not because they particularize them. Otherwise, one would drown himself in an endless sea of obsolete words. Perhaps, scholars prefer using concepts like Caesarism and Bonapartism because they prefer euphemisms for dictatorship. On the other hand, there should not be much debate on the typological question of whether the Napoleonic regime was a dictatorship or not. Unchecked by any constitutional power, Napoleon certainly enjoyed dictatorial powers. Woloch (2004: 33) even writes about an instance, in which the Minister of the Interior Lucien Bonaparte fabricated votes "out of thin air" to distort the results of the plebiscite of 1800 in order to exaggerate Napoleon's strength. Therefore, the real conundrum lies in the relationship of Napoleon's personal dictatorship with the principles of the Revolution and the Enlightenment rather than in typological issues or the *modus operandi* of his dictatorial regime.

HOW TO SOLVE THE PARADOX OF THE NAPOLEONIC REGIME

There are two main characterizations of the Napoleonic regime with regard to its relationship with the Revolution: one sees it as the political heir of the Revolution, the other as a divergence from the Revolution. Two scholars, Isser Woloch and David Jordan, represent the above-

mentioned opposite viewpoints on this issue. Jordan (2014: 1-3) writes:

“The fear he instilled in the kings, priests, and the elites of the *ancien regime* was not just that he would destroy their armies or make them vassals, although he certainly did so. The greater threat was that he would make their states into revolutionized France, destroy privilege, and unleash the resentments of subjects long repressed [...] Napoleon was the child of the Revolution.”

Woloch (2002: 242), on the other hand, writes that:

“[...] during the later years of the Empire, Napoleon sucked the air out of his regime. The latitude for independent opinion within the government vanished, as the emperor began to elevate mediocre sycophants to higher positions. In Paris, the regime’s center of gravity shifted from the Council of State to the servile atmosphere of the imperial court.”

Jordan (2002: xiii) claims that Napoleon knew very well what he was doing – the work of the Revolution. In opposition to this, Woloch (2002: 243) argues that the idea of France ruled by a liberal emperor was nothing but a wish, or rather a fantasy. Any progressive vision the Empire might have had or pursued under Napoleon, Woloch further elaborates, was owed to the ex-revolutionaries surrounding him from the coup of *18 Brumaire* onwards.

How can one explain this controversy over Napoleon? Could one serve the Revolution by undermining its core principles? When expressed as such, the issue sounds quite paradoxical. Let’s unpack this seemingly

paradoxical problem. One can approach the issue through the lenses of two separate lines of evaluation: one is that which is between political idealism and pragmatism. The other line is that which is between positive or negative definitions of the agenda of the Revolution.

The first dilemma must have preoccupied the minds of countless revolutionaries throughout history as every practice of an idea inevitably comes with a cost on part of its ideal characteristics. Of course, one could very well serve the Revolution through a blind idealism without any concern for *realpolitik*. In such cases, greater risks of causing a counter-Revolution are likely. What would the most liberal and idealistic Revolution mean if it were to last for a few months or years? After all Napoleon, despite a generous withdrawal from the Revolution’s fundamental principles, prevented a truly royalist restoration during his reign. Therefore, the Napoleonic regime is at the very pragmatic end of this first evaluation. The Concordat is a great example: Napoleon shook hands with the Pope and curbed the Revolution’s inspiring anti-clericalism (Grab, 2003: 43), but by doing so, he further weakened the royalist opposition. One can rightfully raise the question of what was left of the Revolution by 1815 that could legitimize the concessions made by Napoleon. To answer this question, the second part of the analysis is essential.

The second line of evaluation depends on two distinct ways to define the agenda of the Revolution that can radically alter the judgement on the Napoleonic regime. One can argue that the goal of the Revolution was freedom from the *ancien regime* in France and Europe, which leads to the conclusion that the Napoleonic regime performed remarkably. Through waging countless wars against absolutist kingdoms of Europe, Napoleon’s empire shaped Europe in its

own image. It abolished medieval institutions of serfdom in nearby neighbours of France: “an enormous and bloody attempt to realize the ideological and messianic zeal [...] against the *ancien regime*,” as Jordan (2014: xi) puts it. Nevertheless, there is another way to consider this, which is to define the goals of the French Revolution positively in line with the principles of the Enlightenment. Such a standpoint opposes the *ancien regime*, not for its beneficiaries had fancy titles but for it had oppressed its subjects in the interest of bigotry and privilege, for it rejected equal citizenship, denied the freedom of speech and conscience, ruled by nepotism for centuries. When evaluated from such a point of view which this article prefers to call the positive agenda of the Revolution, the Napoleonic regime performed poorly despite its continuous lip-service to the Revolution. It resembled very much the oppressive regime the Revolution sought to replace in its arbitrary “preventive detentions” (Woloch, 2002: 187) and police state attributes (Grab, 2003: 47), in its widespread censorship (Woloch, 2014: 206), and with its continuous erosion of representative democracy by plebiscitary moves. In fact, Fehèr (1990: 203) notes on an interesting encounter between Kant, the idol of the Enlightenment, and Napoleon. We learn that Napoleon quickly removed Kant from his list of special guests after a briefing on his ideas. Small wonder why the architect of militarism was not amused by the ideas of the philosopher of perpetual peace.

OTHER TYPOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

To sum up, Woloch’s analysis condemns Napoleon for his lack of commitment to the positive agenda of the Revolution and for his merely egotistical pursuit of power devoid of any principles. By contrast, Jordan deems Napoleon

a hero, using a negative definition of the revolutionary agenda and fully endorsing his pragmatism in his fight against the *ancien regime*. However, one should acknowledge two other ways to think about the Napoleonic era and explain why they are problematic. The first one is picturing the Napoleonic regime as the last example of a long lineage of enlightened absolutists of the 18th century (Broers, 1996: 2-3). Broers argues that it would be folly to deny Napoleon such a position as his friends and foes alike thought that he was a man in tune with his times and operated together with his civil servants on their shared ideology of the Enlightenment. This article objects to such a characterization: it is true that both enlightened absolutists and Napoleon pursued common policies such as centralization of the state, the secularization of the law, and ending feudal privileges. However, those absolutists were called enlightened primarily because they were pushing for reforms in the extremely conservative institution of monarchy partly in line with the principles of the Enlightenment. Napoleon, on the other hand, inherited the political and social institutions of the most radically democratic Republic that Europe had ever seen till then and had transformed its institutions towards conservatism. Therefore, there is a mismatch between the context and the direction of change despite the similarity in policies. The backsteps of Code Napoleon demonstrate this point clearly as the liberal character of the right of divorce and marriage was repealed by the Napoleonic regime in a socially conservative manner (Dwyer & McPhee, 2002: 155).

This article also rejects the other alternative characterization of the Napoleonic regime as a military dictatorship (Lefebvre, 1964: 274). Such a proposition underlines the heavy dependence of Napoleon on the army to consolidate his

power. Grab (2003: 28), for instance, states that top generals made fortunes by tax farming and confiscation in the conquered lands of Europe. It is plausible to agree with the point that the army had been an essential part of the notoriously militaristic government of Napoleon, but all dictatorships depend on the coercive power of the army and the police to some extent. If one, however, asks the question of how much political influence generals exerted under the Napoleonic regime, it becomes harder to pass judgement. The key positions of the Napoleonic regime were held by career politicians like Talleyrand and Fouché with no background in the military. The Napoleonic government certainly did not depend on a hierarchy of command as in military dictatorships of Latin America, where the rule by generals had been the norm. The second and third consuls, namely Lebrun and Cambacères, were both legal professionals (Woloch, 2002: 121) who had served in the *ancien regime* before the Revolution.

CONCLUSION

This article agrees with Grab's observation (2003: 19) regarding the Napoleonic regime when he calls it a "Janus faced" entity. Its intricate structure combined subordination with liberation in and outside France, which challenges conventional social scientific categories. Was not there anyone, in the meantime, who could act not because he or she loved Napoleon less but France more and would have resolved the issue for everyone with the old-fashioned way? Grab (2003: 40) notes on a bomb attack on Christmas Eve of 1800 when the first Consul was on his way to the opera, but alas, he survived by chance. As a result, the responsibility falls on social scientists to analyze

this extraordinary era and expose the weak spots of dictatorship so that we can face the challenges of our contemporary world threatened by regimes of a similar sort.

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THE GREAT DEBATE: EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE ON STRATEGY

PAUL GALLIENNE

INTRODUCTION

In 1938, as the Second Sino-Japanese war was occurring, Mao Zedong wrote: "The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people", blaming the unorganized state of the Chinese masses for the Japanese occupation (Mao, 1938: 186). The same year, he added: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" (Mao, 1938a: 224). In 1944, as the war was coming to an end, China's revolutionary leader stated that "an army without culture is a dull-witted army, and a dull-witted army cannot defeat the enemy" (Mao, 1944). From asserting that technology (organizational and material) was fundamental to victory, to declaring that culture was crucial to the enemy's defeat, Mao Zedong's discourse regarding the relationship of technology and culture to strategy was deeply altered. In light of Mao Zedong's discourse on war, it seems essential to query: what has a greater effect on strategy, culture or technology?

Strategy is defined as a "long-range plan for achieving something or reaching a goal" (Cambridge Dictionary, 2019). Among the many factors influencing the development of a strategy, two variables hold a significant importance and bear a strong relationship - culture and technology. Culture being "the way of life, especially the general customs and beliefs, of a particular group of people at a particular time", and technology being "the methods for using scientific discoveries for practical purposes" (Cambridge Dictionary,

2019).

Due to the amount of historical examples allowing this query, the challenge is to select case-studies that allow for reflection upon different types of warfare and strategy. Asia is a continent that not only held some of the most powerful armies, such as the Mongol and Soviet armies, but also faced many types of warfare. From conventional forms of conquests and unconventional guerrilla warfare to proxy-wars, the Asian continent possesses a diversity of historical instances that allow the study of this query. The first part of this discussion will focus on the birth and rise of Genghis Khan's Mongol Empire. Being the largest contiguous empire having ever existed in recorded history, its study will provide a neutral understanding of the positive and negative effects of culture and technology on strategy. A second part will target the USSR, as it had to overcome its technological backwardness and develop a unique Cold War strategy. A third part will contrast Vietnamese strategy during the First Indochina War, and Japanese strategy during World War II's Japanese-American War, at which occasion an emphasis on their strategic culture will be drawn.

THE PASTURELAND'S CHILDREN: MONGOLS AND THE CULTURE OR FATIGUE

"Of all troops in the world, [the Mongol troops] are those that endure the greatest hardship and fatigue, and which cost the least" (Polo, c.1300/1997: 260-261).

In 1206, after having unified the various nomadic tribes cohabiting on Mongol territory, Genghis Khan was proclaimed Ruler of All Mongols. The birth of the Mongol Empire would result in a deep reorganization of Mongol society into a power structure capable of expanding itself on different fronts simultaneously. To understand its shift from a territory occupied by nomadic tribes to the largest contiguous empire that ever existed, it is necessary to understand its strong cultural heritage.

Before the rise of the Empire, the geographic conditions of Mongolia imposed a pastoral nomadic culture upon its population. This pastoral nomadic culture was one of the factors which would allow for the creation of the Mongol Empire. The Mongols' nomadic lifestyle traditionally held elements of military training. From an early age, children were taught horsemanship, archery, and hunting. Not acquired with the intent to prepare for combat, these skills were basic steppe surviving skills. The nomadic lifestyle also implied seasonal migration. As Genghis Khan reformed Mongol society into 'The Whole Mongol Nation' (*Qamuq Mongol Ulus*), what had been a traditional nomadic society became a militarily, highly organized, supra-tribe (May, 2007/2016). By introducing the decimal system to the organization of the population, Genghis Khan created a "new social structure in which military units of a thousand men replaced traditional tribal identities and, in the process, transformed a steppe confederation into an army" (May, 2007/2016: 27). The use of such a system revolutionized Mongol society as it allowed administrative organization, conscription for war-waging, tax collection (greatly fuelling conquests), and strict discipline (allowing

coordination and annihilation of the enemy's armed forces).

Strengthened by its organization, the assembly of a Mongol army was eased by the cultural heritage of the nomadic pastoral culture. Only very light training was required to the newly conscripted warrior as most men were already highly trained horse-archers. Pastoral nomadic hunting techniques, such as the *nerge*, were used as tactics on the battlefield and were thus operated with routine perfection by the Mongol warrior (Aigle, 2015). This culturally-induced highly mobile form of warfare proved to be decisive in the success of the Mongol Empire. Consequently, the warrior-like lifestyle of the nomadic tribes allowed the time and cost-effective construction and maintenance of an army. Also, it enabled the mobilization of troops at a competitive pace in times of necessities.

The decimal organization of the Mongol Empire, combined with cultural assets of the nomadic lifestyle, resulted in an overwhelming Mongol strategic superiority over its neighbours. Although nomadic culture held positive effects on strategy, the Mongol Empire also had to overcome its culture's negative effects on strategy in the pursuit of securing Mongolian steppes, eliminating external threats, and, secondarily, dominating sedentary culture.

As the nomadic lifestyle concealed the full potential of the Mongol warrior to steppe warfare, numerous conquests came with the imperative to adapt the modes of warfare at the price of impairing Mongol strategy. Even though nomadic seasonal migrations prepared soldiers to maneuver and coordinate movement over great distances, geographical conditions and enemies' strategy could alter their capacity to maneuver in enemy territory.

As the Mongol warrior went to war with up to five horses, the availability of pastureland was critical to their progress (May, 2007/2016). This cultural limitation to their conquest and strategy caused one of their major defeats. For example, when the Mamluks, an army composed mainly of Turk slaves who conquered several Muslim states during the Middle-Ages, used a scorched earth strategy in a terrain already deprived of great concentrations of pastureland, the Mongols could neither advance nor hold the conquered territories, being forced to retreat (May, 2007/2016). Likewise, the presence of mountains, dense forests, bodies of water, or fortification delayed or prevented their conquests and, consequently, their strategy.

In many cases, these drawbacks were overcome by the integration of foreign artisans, engineers, and fighters into the Mongol armed forces. For instance, Muslim engineers were integrated into the troops and introduced the counter-weight trebuchet in order to defeat the Jin Empire's fortifications. Additionally, Chinese and Korean engineers were responsible for creating a Mongol navy to defeat the Song Empire. Geographical drawbacks could also be reduced by the use of psychological warfare which, for instance, allowed the conquest of the Khwarazmian Empire (Persia) with almost no resistance, also having the advantage of effectively sustaining manpower (May, 2007/2016).

Lastly, the lethality of the light armored horse-archers came to erode itself when facing the Western and Far East war environments. Knights had heavier armours, the damp weather made the Mongol bow fragile, and the presence of special forces dedicating their entire life to war were all factors that greatly threatened Mongol

strategy.

The study of the Mongol Empire's tactics provides remarkable examples of the positive and negative effects of culture and technology on strategy. Culturally, the warrior-like population of the Mongol Empire represented a major advantage from the rise of the Empire until its end. Technologically, the use of the decimal system, and the integration of foreign engineers to their troops, allowed the Mongol army to overcome some of its cultural drawbacks. Overall, the Mongol Empire outstandingly used culture and technology to the benefit of their securing and conquest strategy, although some limitations stem out from their cultural heritage.

IN THE CORNER: THE EASTERN WAY AND RUSSIAN CULTURAL CAPITAL

"The history of the old Russia was the continual beating she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans. She was beaten by the Turkish Beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian. She was beaten by the English and the French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her – for her backwardness [...] We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must take good distance in ten years. Either we do it or we shall be crushed". (Sakwa, 1999: 187-188)

The 1917 Bolshevik revolution, from which the USSR was born, illustrates a shift in politics as well as in Soviet attitude towards Russian history. Determined to regain a position of power, the newly implemented Marxist-Leninist doctrine offered a realist understanding of International Relations. Soviet military doctrine became closely linked to the socio-political realm and underwent

major doctrinal changes. In other words, a new strategic culture was put in place, with three war laws defining peacetime strategic goals: “insuring that the Soviet Union superior forces at the start of the war; insuring that the potential war capabilities of the Homefront are always maximized for the support of war; insuring that the Communist party maintains complete political control” (Glantz, 1991/2005: 4). These communist military policies represent the beginning of a new line of strategic decisions aimed at breaking away from their “long history of armed struggle” (Glantz, 1991/2005: 50) and at carrying forward the revolutionary mission inherent to Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Consistent with the Communist Party’s strategic aims, the 1929 Field Regulation (*Ustav*), preparing the effect of the integration of future mechanization to the Soviet forces, became effective once Joseph Stalin, leader of the Communist Party, enforced the collectivization and industrialization of the Soviet Union (Stalin’s Five-Year Plan) (Glantz, 1992/2004). Consequently, the culturally and politically driven implementation of these organizational paraphernalia was followed by the renaissance of Soviet military thought and technology. As a result, the Soviet armed forces increased by more than twice their original size, and by the mid-thirties, the Soviets implemented the peacetime maintenance of regular forces, the Red Army.

Despite the revitalization of the Soviet armed forces, half of the Soviet peacetime standing forces were annihilated by Nazi Germany during the first six months of the Second World War. The development of new supporting units into the Soviet force structure, such as tank destroyer artillery regiments, provided “the

overwhelming firepower superiority” (Glantz, 1991/2005: 123) necessary to lead a counteroffensive and fight all the way to Berlin.

The beginning of the Cold War marks a turn in Soviet strategy. Having acquired the technological means necessary for the creation of a *cordon sanitaire* around the USSR’s borders, Soviet strategy could finally undertake its second main strategic goal: the international spread of communist ideology (Glantz, 1991/2005). Although still inferior to the United States because of its lack of nuclear weaponry, the Soviet Union deterred “potential United States use of nuclear weapons by holding central and western Europe hostage” to its ground power (Glantz, 1991/2005: 162). This inferiority would quickly be faded by the Soviet military revolution and the 1961 nuclear test of the Tsar Bomb, the most powerful nuclear device in history.

Having proven its superpower character, the Soviet Union could engage in the support of wars of national liberation. The “breakdown of old colonial empires and the emergence of a third world” allowed the instillation of the socialist revolution (Glantz, 1991/2005: 190). Loyal to the original Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the 1968 Brezhnev doctrine “reserved the right militarily to maintain the socialist system where it already existed [...] and to ‘aid’ progressive governments against imperialism” (Glantz, 1991/2005: 205). This period represents the high point of Soviet influence with the consequent development of proxy-wars. From this point on, the Soviets sought to intimidate and deter potential opponents, and if they failed, to be able “to fight and win at all levels of potential war: strategic nuclear, theatre nuclear, theatre conventional, local, short wars, and protracted wars” (Glantz, 1991/2005: 245).

From the creation of the USSR to the fall of the

Berlin Wall, Soviet strategy was ultimately defined by the cultural need to break away from being subject to foreign aggression. Technology allowed Soviet strategic goals to be fulfilled and further developed on the basis of their consistent Marxist-Leninist-motivated strategy. Therefore, the securing of Soviet territory was achieved, not only by the reversal of their technological backwardness, but also by the extension of their influence into bordering countries and beyond. Technology allowed the Soviets to pursue a strategy defined by a political line replete with cultural expectations which, to this day, remains constant.

REMOTE RESISTANCE: VIETNAMESE WAY OF WAR

“The lack of common cultural forms can show itself in such a way that violence-limiting rules and codes are not known or not observed by either side and that transcultural wars demonstrate a tendency to escalate and become total”. (Hohrath, 2006: 250)

Vietnamese history stands out for its striking ability to repel aggression. In the past millennium, Vietnam successively resisted powerful opponents, such as the Song Empire, the Mongol Empire (three times), and the Qing dynasty. Vietnam’s “heroic tradition of struggle against foreign aggression” would reiterate itself during the First Indochina War, opposing France and Bao Ðại’s Vietnamese National Army against the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, and the People’s Army of Vietnam, led by Võ Nguyên Giáp (Võ Nguyên Giáp, 1961/2001: 11; Dalloz, 1991).

In 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam became independent. Soon after its

independence, the French Expeditionary Corps overthrew the North Vietnamese government and declared restoration of French authority. Conscious of its overwhelming material and technological inferiority, the Vietnamese resistance retreated to remote rural areas and developed a three-stage long-term strategy: Contention, Equilibrium, and Counteroffensive (Võ Nguyên Giáp, 1961/2001).

The stage of Contention involved the use of propaganda, the hiding of the central government in mountainous areas, and the engagement of the resistance in a guerrilla warfare “waged with good or mediocre material”, and aiming at equipping the resistance “at the cost of the enemy” (Võ Nguyên Giáp, 1961/2001: 29). In other words, the Vietnamese resistance applied its slogan: “to build up our strength during the actual course of fighting” (Võ Nguyên Giáp, 1961/2001: 29).

The stage of Equilibrium was marked by the Agrarian Reform, also known as the 1953 Land Reform. This reform, although extremely brutal towards landowners, allowed the Vietnamese resistance to revitalize its war efforts, and to counteract on its economic backwardness.

The stage of Counteroffensive was launched in response to the 1953 French Navarre Plan, which prepared the full occupation of North Vietnam within eighteen months. Consequently, scattered all over the territory, French forces became more exposed to guerrilla warfare tactics. The Vietnamese resistance, having regained major parts of the territory, shifted to a mobile type of warfare, allowing for the mobilization and concentration of more units, thus granting overwhelming manpower. The French were ultimately defeated at the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Vietnamese history brims with examples of culturally driven armed forces repelling technologically superior aggressors. Although the Vietnamese were remarkably successful throughout their military endeavour, fighting in this type of war setting requires drastic societal reforms. The case of the World War II Japanese-American War exemplifies the importance of not overestimating the role of culture in the making of strategy.

Mitsuo Fushida, the Japanese captain known for leading the first attacks on Pearl Harbor, wrote in a report that the “Japanese believed the Americans to be soft, self-indulgent, and incapable of serious sacrifice; therefore, [that] Americans would tire and withdraw from a contest with the far tougher and committed Japanese” (Hanson, 2001/2002: 237). Culturally heavily influenced by codes of honors, such as *Bushido* and *Hagakure*, and by the Shinto religion, imposing “absolute obedience to superiors” (notably the emperor), the Japanese viewed surrender as dishonourable and “soldiers were to find reward in death” (the rate of Japanese death was higher than 98% during battles) (Lynn, 2003: 247). Rather than using the American Orange Plan to their advantage, for instance by hastening the construction of fortifications around Japan, they relied solely on the belief of cultural superiority (Iriye, 1981). Unfortunately, “without these prejudiced and fatally incorrect convictions, Japanese war plans did not make sense, since Tokyo always realized that the advantage of numbers in manpower and material always rested with the United States” (Lynn, 2003: 237). This entirely culturally-driven strategy caused their defeat.

The comparative study of Vietnam and Japan demonstrates the importance of culture in

strategy. Pre-war cultural conditions will shape the form of warfare which will take place and dictate the technological means necessary to the furtherance of war and, potentially, of victory. The Vietnamese, technologically far less developed than the Japanese due to prior French colonisation, succeeded in enforcing reforms and strategic actions necessary to their long-term strategy. On the other hand, the Japanese relied on the cultural conviction that Japanese fighters were superior to any fighter, regardless of its technological resources. Much like the Assyrians in 612 BC, the Japanese’ “great success over a long period of time created the deep-seated conviction that the heartland was inviolate and that warfare was best executed offensively” (Lee, 2011: 28). These cultural assumptions combined with technological inferiority ultimately condemned the Japanese to defeat.

CONCLUSION

In light of the historical examples analysed, it is possible to assert that both culture and technology are of critical importance to the making of a successful strategy. As demonstrated by the Mongol Empire, both variables have negative and positive effects on strategy.

To the Mongol Empire, Soviet Union, and Democratic Republic of Vietnam, organizational technologies – such as the use of the decimal system, the enforcement of collectivisation, and reforms – were inescapable societal changes necessary to the well-being of technologically inferior states’ strategy. These organizational technologies can take the form of simple societal shifts and extend to the complete militarisation of a polity. Material technologies are also essential, as even though they may not be necessary from the starting point of war, their

development will allow the pursuit of a strategic goal otherwise unattainable – like securing the Mongolian steppes, the Russian homeland, and Vietnamese territory.

On the other hand, culture determines the aims of a strategy, influences which modes of warfare will take place during initial periods of war, and will keep influencing strategy throughout the war.

So, what has a greater effect on strategy: culture or technology? Culture has the greater effect on strategy as it invariably defines the expected outcome of war and participates in the nature and method of warfare adopted. However, technology should not be underestimated as it is a necessary tool to adapt to its enemy and pursue its own culturally-induced strategic goals. In a few last words, technology is a means to an end; whereas culture is precisely what defines the end.

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